

THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA



THE SENATE

THE CONSTANT QUEST FOR SOLUTIONS THROUGH DIALOGUE AND CONSENSUS IN RWANDA: THE MECHANISMS FOR DIALOGUE AND CONSENSUS

May, 2014

THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA



THE SENATE

THE CONSTANT QUEST FOR SOLUTIONS THROUGH DIALOGUE AND CONSENSUS IN RWANDA:

THE MECHANISMS FOR DIALOGUE AND CONSENSUS

May, 2014

©Senate 2014

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank all those who gave their time to participate in the research and answered our questions. Without their willing participation the project would not have been possible

Executive Summary

Rwanda has embraced a pluralistic political system defined by Dialogue and Consensus approach in order to tackle issues of national and local interest. This commitment is clearly set out in article 9 of the Constitution which commits the Government of Rwanda to promote and reinforce a number of fundamental principles among which the principle of “constant quest of solutions through Dialogue and Consensus”. The Senate has been assigned the role of ensuring that the principle is being implemented nationwide (article 87 of the Constitution). The importance attached to the principle of Dialogue and Consensus is materialized by the number of policies and mechanisms in place to promote and sustain it.

It is in line with article 9 of the Constitution that the Senate has carried out a study designed to find out how Rwandans understand the principle of Dialogue and Consensus, and whether tools put in place to promote and create an enabling environment for Dialogue and Consensus Frameworks are achieving their objectives. The research on Dialogue and Consensus focused on mechanisms such as *Gacaca*, *Abunzi*, *Umuganda*, Community Development Committees, National Women Council, National Youth Council, *Itorero*, *Girinka*, *Ubudehe*, Community Juries, and advisory councils. In addition the study captured views on the trust in various

institutions at national and local level as well as trust in family members and friends. To better inform this study, both quantitative and qualitative methods were used in order to identify the extent to which and for whom the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus are working and how they might be improved.

Results from the household survey suggest that there is a relatively high level of community engagement, with 84 per cent of respondents to the survey having participated in community meetings on at least several occasions over the previous year and 76 per cent having worked with others to develop a programme. The correlation between people who frequently participate in community meetings and those involved in working together with other members of the community to develop a programme is high (0.69). In contrast, the level of engagement in civil society organizations is much lower with little evidence of multiple memberships; 37 per cent of respondents are members of one or more, but most belong just to one. The mean for the index of density of participation in civil society organization is 2.1 on a scale of 13 points. Furthermore, those aged 51 years and over are significantly more likely to participate in dense networks than the younger age groups but less likely than those in mid-life (M 2.0).

There is also a high level of knowledge

of the mechanisms that operate at a local level, but a much lower level of knowledge about those at a national level. Only 11 per cent of respondents had heard of all the mechanisms. Findings suggest that 95 per cent of respondents had some engagement with at least one mechanism and participated because they thought the activity was important.

However, frequent and multiple engagements with mechanisms is lower (the mean of index of density of engagement is 7.9 on a scale of 16 point or 4.9 on a 10 points scale).

The levels of high satisfaction with a mechanism (8 out of 10 or higher by those that gave a rating) ranged from 83 per cent for *Umuganda* to 51 per cent for the National Dialogue Summit. *Ingando*, *Gacaca*, *Girinka* and *Itorero* are the mechanisms considered by respondents to be the major contributors to Dialogue and Consensus with respectively 77.6%, 75.4%, 72.7% and 70% being satisfied, while *Ubudehe* (30.6%), Community Development Committees (30%) and National Youth Council (38.4%) are thought by respondents to contribute the least to Dialogue and Consensus.

To the question on what the community could do if there were problems with leaders, the most frequent response was “to discuss it”. The responsibility for the success or failure of mechanisms was rarely attributed to the community, and the main responsibility for solving problems was seen to lay with leaders

Members of the community were confident in their ability to work together on community projects (87%), but less confidence in their ability to do so without conflict (51%) or that they could actually work together to solve a problem (51%). The level of altruism is low (with a mean of 4.3 on a 10 point scale) and most people are said to be motivated by self-interest (73%) although 70 per cent of respondents thought that people could be relied on to fulfil their obligations.

With regard to trust, the findings shown that trust in politicians and the forces of law and order are high, with more than 80 per cent of respondents saying that they trust them. The President (99%) and the army (96%) have the highest levels while political parties are the least trusted institutions with 61.3%. At a local level, the trust is high for district mayors (84.4%) whilst members of the cell council (79%) are the least trusted. There was relatively high levels of trust in family members (74.4%), friends (78.7%) and neighbours (85%). The level of trust in other people in general was relatively high with a mean of 7.1 on a 10 point scale. There is a significant difference in generalized trust across the Provinces.

Findings from FGDs support, to some extent, the quantitative findings. There is evidence of the existence of thick networks of social engagement. There is a greater awareness of mechanisms that operate at the local level and less awareness of those that operate

at district and national levels. Also in most of FGDs the participants said that leaders informed them about policies and initiatives during meeting held after *Umuganda*. High levels of engagement with some mechanism of Dialogue and Consensus were said mainly to be motivated by the fear of being fined. What did come across in the FGDs was significant involvement in dispute resolution at a local level. FGDs participants told us that citizens at local level have learnt how to resolve disputes themselves and if they could not then neighbours in the village discussed the issues and made recommendations. Disputes were less frequently being referred to village leaders and especially to the cell and *Abunzi* than in the past.

As suggested by both the qualitative and quantitative findings, mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus have helped local communities to solve problems for themselves to some extent. The mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus are making a direct and indirect contribution to the increase in social cohesion. They make a direct contribution by building trust through participation in solving community problems thereby building a common understanding of what is

in the interest of the community. In many communities there seems to be a strong collective commitment to these mechanisms (*Umuganda*, *Abunzi*, Community Juries, etc.) and recognition of what they achieve for the whole community. Mechanisms such as *Umuganda*, the *Abunzi*, Community juries and Girinka were seen to bring benefits to the community, not only through the building of infrastructure including schools, roads and houses for the extremely poor and the elderly, but also through providing effective means for resolving disputes especially those involving land.

Indirectly, the increase in social capital itself provides an important context for economic activities which enable individuals to improve their economic situation and contribute more generally to economic growth. The main motivation for participating in community work was commitment to improving their community. In some cases the community work undertaken during *Umuganda* was seen as benefitting the whole community and in other cases the vulnerable and very deprived. This is what enables the building of social cohesion by the development of an understanding of the collective interests of the community.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AVS	African Values Survey
CBD	Community Based Development
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HMP	Historically Marginalised Person
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
M	Mean
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NISR	National Institute of Statistic Rwanda
NWC	National Women's Council
NYC	National Youth Council
SACCOs	Savings and Loans Cooperatives
SD	Standard Deviation
UNICEF	United National Children's Fund
WHO	World Health Organisation
12YBE	12 Year Basic Education
RFW	Rwandan Franc
ODA	Official Development Association
AERG	Association des Etudiants Rescapés du Génocide
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
OVC	Orphan and Vulnerable Child
VUP	Vision 2020 Umurenge Project
CF	Compared With

Contents

Acknowledgement	i
Executive Summary	iii
Abbreviations and Acronyms	vii
1. Introduction	1
1.1. Introduction to the Report	1
1.2. The Impact of the Genocide	2
1.3. Recovery: Nineteen Years after the Genocide	2
1.4. Structure of the Report	10
2. Re-Building Society: Creating Social Quality	11
2.1. Restoring Social Cohesion	11
2.2. Reconstructing Society: The Social Quality Model	11
2.3. Social Cohesion's Contribution to Sustainable Development	15
2.4. Building Social Cohesion	16
2.5. The Rwandan Policy Framework for Dialogue and Consensus	21
2.6. Building Social Cohesion in Rwanda: dialogue, consensus and Social Capital	23
2.7. Evaluating Rwanda's Policies for Dialogue and Consensus and Building Social Cohesion	27
3. Aims and Objectives of the Research and Research Methods	29
3.1. Aims and Objectives of the Research	29
3.2. Methodology	30
3.2.1. Survey	30
3.2.2. Qualitative Methods	31
3.2.3. Data Analysis	32
3.2.4. Analytical Framework	33
3.2.5. Scales and Recorded Variables	34
3.2.6. Statistical significance	36
4. Location, Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile of the Sample	37
4.1. Introduction	37
4.2. Location	37
4.3. Demographic Structure	38

4.4.	Education, Employment and Ownership of Land	39
4.4.1.	Education	39
4.4.2.	Employment	41
4.4.3.	Ownership of Land and Housing	42
4.5.	Economic Security and Socio-economic Status	42
4.5.1.	Objective and Subjective Understandings of Poverty and Deprivation	43
4.5.2.	Economic Situation of the Country and of Individuals	44
4.5.3.	The Communities Evaluation of the Economic Circumstances of Households	47
4.6.	Disability and Vulnerability	49
4.7.	Conclusions	50
5.	Knowledge of, engagement and satisfaction with mechanisms for consensus building at community and National levels	52
5.1.	Introduction: The Basis for Building Social Capital	52
5.2.	Community Engagement	53
5.3.	Civic Engagement	54
5.4.	Knowledge of the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus	57
5.4.1.	Awareness of the Mechanisms	57
5.4.2.	Sources of information about the Mechanisms	61
5.4.3.	Knowledge of the Mechanisms	64
5.5.	Engagement with the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus	65
5.5.1.	Attending/Using the Mechanisms	65
5.5.3.	Motivation for Attending Meetings of Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus	72
5.6.	Perceptions of Individual and Community Benefitting from the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus	75
5.7.	Satisfaction with the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus	77
5.7.1.	Satisfaction with the Mechanisms Generally	77
5.8.2.	Satisfaction with the Village Advisory Council	79

5.8.3.	Women's Satisfaction with the Work of the Women's National Council	80
5.8.4.	Youth Satisfaction with the Work of the National Youth Council	82
6.	Consensus Building in the Community	85
6.1.	Introduction	85
6.2.	Using Dialogue and Consensus to resolve issues	88
6.3.	Responsibility for the Successful Operation of the Mechanisms	93
7.	Community Identity and Collaboration	101
7.1.	Introduction	101
7.2.	Community Identity	101
7.3.	Community Collaboration	103
8.	Trust and Social Cohesion	110
8.1.	Introduction	110
8.1.1	Fear of Crime and Concern for Personal Safety	110
8.1.2	Trust in Government, Institutions of Law and Order and Civil Society Institutions	112
8.1.3	Trust in Family, Friends and Neighbours	114
8.1.4	Generalised Trust	115
9.	Social Quality: Making Life Good	119
10.	Satisfaction with Life	119
10.1.	Social Quality	121
11.	Conclusions and Recommendations	126
11.1.	Conclusions	126
11.2.	Recommendations	131
	References	133
	Appendices	139
	Appendix 1: People Involved in the Study and their Respective Roles in the Project	140
	Appendix 2: Comparison of the Senate Sample with EICV-3 and FinScope 2012 Weighted Data	141
	Appendix 3: Questionnaire	1

List of Figures

Figure 1: GDP per Capita PPP US\$1993-2012	3
Figure 2: Rwanda Governance Scorecard 2010	4
Figure 3: Scores on World Bank Governance Indicators 2000 and 2011	5
Figure 4: Adults Worried about Conflict, Education of Children and Employment	6
Figure 5: Confidence in Political Institutions in Rwanda 2007 and 2012	9
Figure 6: Social Quality Model	13
Figure 7: Building Social Quality in Rwanda: Examples of the Policy Framework	14
Figure 8: Province of Residence of Respondents to Senate 2012 and EICV3 18 Years and Over (%)	38
Figure 9: Location of Residence of Respondents	38
Figure 10: Age in Categories by Gender	39
Figure 11: Marital Status by Gender of the Sample	39
Figure 12: Highest Level of Education Respondents to Senate Survey and in EICV 3 (Weighted Data)	40
Figure 13: Literacy and Numeracy by Gender (%)	41
Figure 14: Main Activity of Respondents to the Survey	41
Figure 15: Ownership of Land and/or Property by the Households of Respondents to the Survey	42
Figure 16: Respondents Rating of their Household's Economic Standing Compared with Others on a 10 Point Scale	45
Figure 17: Perception of Farmers of Benefits from Government Policies in Agriculture	47
Figure 18: Respondents Household's Ubudehe Category	48
Figure 19: Means for Satisfaction with Ubudehe Category and Process by Category	49
Figure 20: Engagement with the Community in the 12 Months Prior to the Survey	53

Figure 21: Active Membership of Community Based Organisations	55
Figure 22: Normalised Distribution on the Index of Density of Participation in Civil society Organisations	55
Figure 23: % of Respondents heard of the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus.	58
Figure 24: Number of Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus that Respondent Knew About	58
Figure 25: Sources of Information Gacaca	61
Figure 26: Discussion about Gacaca with Family, Friends and Members of the Community % of Respondents	62
Figure 27: Sources of Information Abunzi % of Respondents	63
Figure 28: Discussion about Abunzi with Family, Friends and Members of the Community % of Respondents	63
Figure 29: Sources of Information National Dialogue Summit % of Respondents	64
Figure 30: % of Respondents Engagement with Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus1	65
Figure 31: Index of Density of Engagement with the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus	66
Figure 32: Normalised Distribution on the Index of Density of Engagement with the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus	66
Figure 33: Activities Related to Gacaca Respondents Participated In	71
Figure 34: % of Respondents that Participate in the National Dialogue Summit	72
Figure 35: % of Respondents that think that they/their Community has Benefitted a lot or a Fair Amount from the Mechanism for Dialogue and Consensus	76
Figure 36: Satisfaction with Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus % of Sample Giving a Rating of at Least 8 out of 10, % of Respondents Giving a Rating	78
Figure 37: Levels of Satisfaction on a Ten Point Scale by Those Who Have Used the Service	78

Figure 38: Normalised Distribution for Satisfaction with the Work of Village Advisory Council	80
Figure 39: Score out of 10 for Overall Satisfaction with the Work of the Women's National Council % of Women Aware of its Work	81
Figure 40: Domain Satisfaction for National Women's Council % of Women that Rated the Work of the Council	82
Figure 41: Score out of 10 for Overall Satisfaction with the Work of the National Youth Council % of Women Aware of its Work	83
Figure 42: Domain Satisfaction National Youth Council % of Youth that are Aware of the Work of the Council	84
Figure 43: Subjective Evaluation of the Contribution of the Mechanisms to Dialogue and Consensus.	87
Figure 44: Perception of Effectiveness of Meetings after Umuganda in Dealing with Community Issues	90
Figure 45: Resolving Problems, Village Advisory Council	92
Figure 46: Resolving Problems Relating to Gacaca Courts at Cell Level	92
Figure 47: Resolving Problems %Abunzi Users and Non-Users of the Service	93
Figure 48: Responsibility for the Success and Failure of Gacaca Courts	94
Figure 49: Responsibility for Solving Problems Related to Gacaca	94
Figure 50: Attribution for Responsibility of Success of Abunzi Service, % that Agreed Successful	95
Figure 51: Attribution of Responsibility for Failure of Abunzi Service Users and Non-Users	95
Figure 52: Attribution of Credit and Blame for Success and Failures of Village Council % of Respondents Giving Positive and Negative Responses	96
Figure 53: Responsibility for Resolving the Problems to Make Village Executive Committee More Successful % of Respondents	96
Figure 54: Attribution of Credit and Blame for Success and Failure of Women's National Council at Village Level% of Women Giving Positive and Negative Responses	97
Figure 55: Attribution of Credit and Blame for Success and Failure of	

National Youth Council,	98
Figure 56: Attribution for Responsibility for Success and Failure of Umuganda % agreeing Success and % seeing it as a Failure	98
Figure 57: Responsibility for Resolving the Problems to Make Umuganda More Successful % of Respondents	99
Figure 58: Attribution for Responsibility for Success and Failure of Meetings after Umuganda, % Agreeing Success and % Seeing it as a Failure	100
Figure 59: Responsibility for Resolving the Problems to Make Meetings After Umuganda More Successful % of Respondents	100
Figure 60: Perceptions of Reliability of and Confidence in Members of the Community	102
Figure 61: Community Collaboration% of Respondents	104
Figure 62: Normalised Distribution for Community Collaboration	105
Figure 63: Perceptions of Community Willingness and Ability to Solve Problems	105
Figure 64: Normalised Distribution for Community Problem Solving	106
Figure 65: % of Respondents Confident that their Community can Tackle Divisionism by Province	108
Figure 66: Motivation for Fulfilling Obligations to Others	108
Figure 67: Normalised Distribution for Altruism Scale	109
Figure 68: Fear of Crime % of Respondents	111
Figure 69: Normalise Distribution Fear of Crime Scale	111
Figure 70: High Trust in National Political Institutions	112
Figure 71: High Trust in Local Politicians	113
Figure 72: Normalised Distribution for Trust Local Officials	113
Figure 73: High Trust in Family, Friends and Neighbours	114
Figure 75: Normalised Distribution for Trust Other People in General	115
Figure 76: Sample Means for Active and Non -Active Participation in Community Activities and Groups on Trust Scale	117
Figure 77: General Satisfaction with Life on a 10 Point Scale	120
Figure 78: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs	121

List of Tables

Table 1:	Key Indicators of Development	3
Table 2:	Priorities for Government % of Respondents	7
Table 3:	Community Driven Development	19
Table 4:	Sample size per province.	31
Table 5:	Locations and Samples for the Qualitative Research	32
Table 6:	Summary of Differences between the Senate Sample and EICV/FinScope Weighted Data	37
Table 7:	Vulnerable and non-Vulnerable Groups Mean Scores on a 10 Point Scale Measuring Subjective Quality of Life	51
Table 8:	Economic Factors Influence on Life Satisfaction	51
Table 9:	Differences in Community Engagement by Different Groups (% respondents)	54
Table 10:	Homogeneous Subgroups for Density of Membership of Civil Society Organisations by Deprivation Quintiles	57
Table 11:	Factors Predicting Awareness of Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus	59
Table 12:	Proportion of Respondents that Have Heard of Mechanisms by Various Characteristics	60
Table 13:	Factors Predicting Engagement with Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus	67
Table 14:	Proportion of Respondents that have Frequently Engaged with Mechanisms by Various Characteristics	69
Table 15:	Most Important Reason for Participation/Attending Meeting % of those that Attend.	73
Table 16:	Most Important Reason Why Other People Attend Meetings % of Responses	74

Table 17: Main Reasons Why People Do Not Attend Meetings % of Responses	75
Table 18: Mean Satisfaction with Various aspects of the Work of the Village Advisory Council % Respondents Gave a Rating	79
Table 19: Satisfaction with Activates of Women's National Council % of Women Giving a Rating	81
Table 20: Satisfaction with Activates of National Youth Council % of Youth that Gave a Rating	83
Table 21: The influence of Participation in Community Activities on Trust(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001 **p<0.01	118
Table 22: Economic Security	122
Table 23: Social Inclusion	123
Table 24: Social Cohesion	123
Table 25: Empowerment	124
Table 26: Social Quality	125

1. Introduction

1.1. Introduction to the Report

Following the devastating Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, Rwanda has deliberately set out to build a society that is socially cohesive and makes the good life possible for all (Musoni 2007). It has aimed not just to overcome sectarian divides but for economic, political and social transformation. It is widely acknowledged as one of the success stories in post-conflict reconstruction and development. Just 20 years after the Genocide against Tutsi which destroyed the country, it has a stable Government and a growing economy, poverty is declining, economic transformation is beginning and the country is on track to achieve most of the MDGs. Good governance has been at the heart of the country's development strategy and central to this has been accountability and citizen participation. Frameworks have been put in place for all layers of society to contribute to the development process through civic engagement utilising mechanisms of Dialogue and Consensus. The aim has been to recreate a sense of national identity and loyalty through an emphasis on one language, one culture, one history and one people.

Rwanda has deliberately set out to build social cohesion, a prerequisite for a society to survive and progress and an essential strategy for reducing the risk

of future cataclysmic breakdown. Social cohesion is strongest when a majority of members of society consider themselves to be stakeholders. Beyond enabling people to work together and live in peace and harmony, it provides an essential basis for economic development and the context in which individuals can convert their capabilities into functioning (e.g. Sen 1999). Conflict destroys the very social fabric of a society as well human capital and physical infrastructure. Building a post-conflict state means moving from chaos, insecurity and instability to the establishment of order, regulated institutions and improved human welfare. In addition to infrastructure development, rebuilding the economy and investment in human capital, there is a need to develop a new 'social contract'. Building social cohesion by establishing shared norms and values and a common understanding of the rules governing political and social life is central to this. It is important for legitimating political authority, encouraging participation in decision making at all levels, contributing to the reform of institutions and the shaping of the development and implementation of social and economic policies. Trust in Government, trust in the rule of law, trust in institutions, trust in civil society, trust in family, friends and neighbours and generalised trust in others is essential if life is to go on as normal.

Trust underpins our ability to interact with others on a daily basis without having to constantly worry about the outcomes of our interactions.

The research on which this report is based set out to determine the extent to which the mechanisms put in place to recreate social cohesion are doing so and the extent to which Rwanda is *making life good*. It does so by considering the ways and extent to which adults are participating in the mechanisms and how they are contributing to the growth of generalised trust which provides the basis for social cohesion at community and national levels.¹ It aims to inform policy debates and to provide policy-makers with solutions to real-world policy challenges.

1.2. The Impact of the Genocide

The Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994 destroyed not only the physical infrastructure but the very social fabric of the society. It constituted a totally systemic breakdown; not only through the destruction of the physical infrastructure, the economy, human capital and the institutions of governance, but the very fabric of society itself, the norms and values

¹ Community in this report generally means the *Umuganda* or village, a settlement of between about 100 and 150 households which forms the lowest unit of administration under the decentralisation policy. In remote rural areas the households may be scattered over a wide area with each living in its own plot of land. In total about 37 per cent of the population live in isolated rural dwellings (NISR 2012a).

that provide the very basis for a shared social life. It divided the population and undermined interpersonal and communal trust and destroyed the norms and values that underlie cooperation and collective action for the common good and increased the likelihood of communal strife.

Although the extent of the destruction of human life, the displacement of the population and the impact on the physical and mental health of those who survived is not known with certainty, estimates suggest that at least 12 per cent of the seven million population perished², approximately two million Rwandans sought refuge in neighbouring countries and beyond and 120,000 people (mainly men) were held in prison (Nadjaldongar 2008; Shway 2011; <http://survivors-fund.org.uk/resources/rwanda-history/statistics/>).

1.3. Recovery: Nineteen Years after the Genocide


Rwanda has made a recovery that can be seen as little short of miraculous as it strives to become a middle income, private sector led economy by 2020 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2000). The country's development strategy incorporates the MDGs, promotes pro-poor economic growth, economic transformation and good governance (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2007, EDPR2

² A 2008 report by AERG estimates the number as nearer two million <http://allafrica.com/stories/200810040044.html>

2012). It aims to create an inclusive, cohesive society with a responsive decentralised Government fighting corruption and creating a legal and regulatory framework to support private-sector development. There has been a sustained economic growth

(Figure 1) and poverty reduction. Rwanda is on track to achieve most of the MDGs (Table 1; Abbott and Rwirahira 2013). There has been a growth in non-farm employment, in agricultural productivity, in Government revenues and investment in the private sector.

Figure 1: GDP per Capita PPP US\$1993-2012



(Source: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/gdp-per-capita-ppp>)

Table 1: Key Indicators of Development

Indicator	1990 or nearest	2000	2005	Most Recent
Poverty %	47.5	58.9	57	44.9
Extreme Poverty %	34	41.6	35.8	24.1
% Workers Non-Farm	na	11.4	21.5	29.8
Government Revenues RFW Billions	na	122	180	515
ODA RFW Billions	na	206	344	635
Net Primary School Attendance	62.5	72.6	86.6	91.7
Maternal Mortality Rate	1300	1071	750	476
Under-5 Mortality Rate	150	196	152	76
%Improved Sanitation	37	50.4	58.5	74.5
% Clean Water	66	70.1	70.3	74.2

(Source: Abbott and Rwirahira 2012)

The 2003 Constitution incorporates a Bill of Rights and provides for a tripartite system of Government with legal separation between the executive, a bicameral parliament


and the judiciary. Central to good governance are the National Dialogue Summit, the Decentralisation Policy, mechanisms for social inclusion and Dialogue and Consensus, with many

of the latter involving the adaptation of traditional governance instruments. The principle of subsidiarity underpins the decentralisation policy, which is designed to ensure transparency and accountability for local service delivery through citizen participation in planning. Local Government is held accountable through the Imihigo performance contracts, which are agreed between the districts and the President with the districts being held accountable for their performance at an annual public event chaired by the President.

In 2011 the Rwanda Governance Board was established to promote decentralisation, and principles and practices of good governance in public institutions as well as to conduct research to promote accountability,

transparency and integrity in public affairs (Law N° 41/2011 of 30/09/2011). The locally developed Rwanda Governance Score Card (Figure 2) shows very high scores for Safety and Security, Investing in People, Business Promotion and Private Sector Advocacy and Control of Corruption Transparency and Accountability. Participation and Inclusiveness and Political Rights and Civil Liberties scored above 70 per cent, and Rule of Law and Quality of Service Delivery scored about 36 per cent, but had some poor performing sub-sectors. There are also concerns about lack of equality before the law, the poor not having access to justice, poor citizen participation, and ignorance of citizens' rights, poor service delivery and people sticking to the 'official' line.

Figure 2: Rwanda Governance Scorecard 2010



Source: Shyaka, 2010


The progress Rwanda has made in achieving good governance is generally confirmed by international indicators, where it scores well apart from on democracy and civil liberties. On the World Bank Governance indicators,

for example, Rwanda's scores have increased with the notable exception of Voice and Accountability, where there has been little progress (Figure3). The low score on the latter is seen as problematic in allowing genuine

participation in the political process by citizens. Potentially however some of the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus provide the space for

ordinary Rwandans to have their voice heard and hold to account local and national politicians.

Figure 3: Scores on World Bank Governance Indicators 2000 and 2011



Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp last accessed 07/04/2013

However, Rwanda faces severe challenges in building a stable, inclusive and cohesive society. It is highly dependent on official development aid being the fifth most dependent country in the world (Thomas 2011). Economic inequalities remain high with a Gini coefficient of 49 in 2010/11. Economic transformation is fragile and (re)building human capital is a long term project (Abbott and Rwirahira 2013; Abbott 2013). There is low unemployment but high underemployment, around 73 per cent of the working population are employed mainly in agriculture, 62.5 per cent have more than one job and 85 per cent cultivate their own farm (NISRB 2012). High fertility rates are driving population growth, which is running at 2.4 per cent a year (NISR 2013). This is exerting pressure on the land with 70 per cent of the land surface already being farmed, and most households

dependent upon subsistence farming own less than 0.5 hectares (Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources 2009b). Infant and under-five and maternal mortality rates remain high despite good progress and there is low life expectancy at birth (NISR 2011). Human capital is low with only 38 per cent of 16-64 year olds having completed primary school, 4.6 per cent of 20-64 year olds senior secondary school and 2.6 per cent of 25-64 year olds higher education.


Challenges to implementation of the governance policy include the capacity of districts to deliver, lack of civil society participation, corruption (especially in local Government) and gender inequality (Anastasia 2010). The mapping of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in 2011 highlighted the need for enhanced dialogue between CSOs, the

Government and other stakeholders. The districts are more accountable to central Government than they are to their electorate (Abbott and Rwirahira 2012). Some commentators have suggested that decentralisation in fact makes central power more effective (Purdekova 2011) although others argue that local participation has played an important role in reconciliation (Clarke 2010).

Analysis of the African Values Survey for 2007 and 2012 suggests that life is improving in Rwanda as judged by ordinary Rwandans. In 2012 adults generally felt that they have a moderate level of control over their own lives with a mean of 6.9 on a ten point scale going from no control to high control, up from a mean of 6.5 in 2007. Although they

remain relatively dissatisfied with their lives in general, M 6.5, this represents a significant increase from 2007 when the mean was 5.0. However, over 90 per cent of adults remained very worried about the possibility of a civil war in Rwanda, a war involving the country, not being able to provide a good education for their children and unemployment (Figure 4). The proportion fearing a civil war is especially worrying and questions the extent that Dialogue and Consensus is working in building a cohesive society. It suggests that an overwhelming majority of Rwandans think that there are cleavages between groups that could lead to violent conflict. Nevertheless, 90 per cent feel securer in their neighbourhood, and the crime rate is perceived to be relatively low.

Figure 4: Adults Worried about Conflict, Education of Children and Employment



(Source: African Values Survey 2012, authors’ own calculation)

The findings from the AVS show that ordinary Rwandans’ priorities are for economic growth, a stable economy and maintaining law and order. They are less concerned about having more of a say about how things are done at the community or national level, protecting freedom of speech or

making cities more beautiful. Seventy five per cent see economic growth as a priority and 74 per cent maintaining a stable economy, while 87 per cent of respondents think that maintaining law and order should have a high priority (Table 2).

Table 2: Priorities for Government % of Respondents

Aim	First Choice	Second Choice	Total
Aims of Country			
High Economic Growth	69.1	6.3	75.4
Strong Defence Force	15.2	24.5	39.7
People Having More Say	12.0	39.7	51.7
Making Cities/Countryside More Beautiful	3.7	29.5	33.2
Most Important to Respondent			
Maintaining Order in Country	73.9	12.6	86.5
Giving People More Say in Important Government Decisions	14.4	20.3	34.7
Fighting Inflation	10.5	54.3	64.8
Protecting Freedom of Speech	1.2	12.8	14.0
Other Government Priorities			
A Stable Economy	66.9	16.6	73.5
Less Impersonal and More Humane Society	20.8	9.5	30.3
Society in which Ideas Count More than Money	5.8	32.3	38.1
Fighting Crime	6.5	41.6	47.1

(Source: African Values Survey 2012, authors' own calculations)

Although there has been no previous comprehensive research specifically examining the role that the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus are playing in building social cohesion there have been a number of surveys that provide some information on the extent to which Rwanda is becoming a more cohesive society. The AVS, for example, found strong evidence of national pride and identity. 93 per cent of Rwandan adults are very proud or proud of their citizenship, 79.7 per cent strongly agree or agree that they see themselves as part of the nation and 88.9 per cent strongly agree or agree that they see themselves

as part of their local community (AVS 2012, authors' analysis). However this represents a slight decline in the proportion saying they are proud of their citizenship, a 10 percentage point decline in identifying with the local community and a 20 percentage point decline in those seeing themselves as part of the nation compared to 2007. Furthermore only 59 per cent said that they would be willing to fight for their country in 2012 a decline from 95 per cent in 2007.

Research by the National Unity and Reconciliation Council (2008; 2010)

suggests that there has been an increase in social cohesion and inter-ethnic relations since 1994, with 92 per cent of respondents thinking that there has been an increase in social cohesion, and 80 per cent an improvement in inter-ethnic relations and levels of trust between communities (National Unity and Reconciliation Council 2010). Research by Interpeace (2011) found that 53 per cent of the population thought that there are generally good relationships between all Rwandans. However, at a local level, 53 per cent think that ethnicity is a problem in Rwanda, with 31 per cent saying that there are poor relations between Hutu and Tutsi, and about 20 per cent between Twa and the rest of the population. Similarly the National Unity and Reconciliation Council (2010) found that just over 30 per cent of adult Rwandans think that ethnic discrimination takes place and that Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes.

Furthermore 82 per cent of genocide survivors and 54 per cent of ex-prisoners say they felt threatened during *Gacaca* (National Unity and Reconciliation Council 2008), and 40 per cent believing that there are still people in Rwanda that would perpetrate acts of the past (National Unity and Reconciliation Council 2010).

However, economic cleavages between the better off and the poor are seem to be as problematic with 30 per cent of adult Rwandans seeing this gap as the main source of division in society.

Active involvement in decision making and Government-led frameworks, political parties, and civil society organisations is relatively low. In 2008 only 47 per cent of citizens had recently attended a community meeting and half thought that people have to be forced to attend. There is also reluctance to participate in activities clearly associated with resolving disputes (National Unity and Reconciliation Council 2010). Furthermore nearly half of adults (44.5%) do not think that they have sufficient space and opportunity to influence decisions that affect their lives (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2008) and only 36 per cent rated the degree of freedom and choice they have over their lives as eight or higher out of 10 (AVS 2012).


Levels of trust in family are high but trust in other people in general low and actually declined between 2008 and 2012 from 25.8 per cent to 16.6 per cent according to the AVS on a dichotomous question asking if you can trust other people or you cannot be too careful (authors' calculation). However, on a scale of 10 going from most people take advantage of you to people try to be fair the mean was 6.2, suggesting a somewhat greater trust in other people than on the dichotomous question. According to the Women's Economic Empowerment Survey the average level of trust for women in 2011 was 4.7. Other research on specific groups of adults has also found relatively low levels of general trust, for example on a 10 point scale the mean for operators of

household enterprises was five (Abbott 2011) and for Historically Marginalised People 6.3 (Abbott 2012). While just over a third (35.3%) of Rwandans think that the main reason for bad relationships between Hutu and Tutsi are levels of trust (Interpeace 2011).

Political culture, political institutions and leadership are generally seen as legitimate and effective (National Unity and Reconciliation Council 2008, 2010). Confidence in Government is moderate with 64 per cent of adults having at least quite a lot of confidence in the national Government and 65 per cent

in parliament in 2012. However, this represents a significant decline from 2007 (Figure 5). Confidence in the police and the courts has also declined significantly although it too remains moderate at 63 per cent for the police, but low at 50 per cent for the courts. The same is the case for the churches and the press, with only just over 50 per cent trusting the press at least moderately. This lack of confidence in the media and churches is a concern as these are the organs that should provide an independent report on what is happening in the country and externally.

Figure 5: Confidence in Political Institutions in Rwanda 2007 and 2012



(Source: AVS 2007, 2012 authors' own calculation)

1.4. Structure of the Report

The Report is divided seven into main sections following this introduction:

- Section 2 develops the theoretical framework and discusses the central role that the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus play in building a sustainable society;
- Section 3 sets out the aims of the research, the data collection methods and the approach to data analysis;
- Section 4 describes the demographic and socio-economic profile of the sample;
- Section 5 considers the level of knowledge that the respondents have of the mechanisms, and their level of engagement and overall satisfaction with them;
- Section 6 examines in detail consensus building in the community focusing on *Gacaca*, the Village Council and *Umuganda* and Community Juries, *Ubudehe* and the *Abunzi*;
- Section 7 discusses the extent to which Rwanda is becoming a more socially cohesive society and citizens are satisfied with their lives – that life is becoming good for them;
- Section 8 discusses what can be concluded from the research and the policy recommendations that follow.

2. Re-Building Society: Creating Social Quality

2.1. Restoring Social Cohesion

The critical question is; what are the triggers that enable an orderly society and what policies enable a society to build social cohesion and remain cohesive. Social cohesion is strongest when a majority of members of society consider themselves to be stakeholders and all groups are benefiting from the way society is organised. Building social cohesion means: developing social and economic policies that are inclusive, that ensure that all feel that they have a stake in the existing society and a sense of belonging and being valued; giving people hope for the future as well as meeting their present needs; ensuring that individuals have the opportunity to develop the capabilities to take control over their own lives; that they have economic and personal security; and that groups and individuals can work together to build a better future.

2.2. Reconstructing Society: The Social Quality Model

The ultimate test of what makes for a 'good' society is that it provides the conditions for the flourishing of all its members and it meets their subjective expectations. The Social Quality Model identifies what is necessary to enable the building of a sustainable society. It is

based upon four dimensions: economic security, social cohesion, social integration and social empowerment. The first two dimensions measure the quality of the society at the level of system integration (how the structure of society coheres), whilst the latter two dimensions measure social integration in the sense of how individuals integrated into the societal structure (e.g. Abbott 2007; Abbott and Wallace 2012a).

Governments need to develop policies to explicitly address all four elements. Focusing on the economy and on economic growth alone is not sufficient. A sustainable society needs to be cohesive, inclusive, build the capabilities of its members and provide economic security. Analytically we can separate these four elements but they are inextricably interconnected with each providing the conditions for the others. Just as a watch is not reducible to the parts that make it up so the building blocks of society create a whole that is not reducible to the elements that make it up. The rule of law is essential to enable the orderly conduct of everyday life. This requires not only a functioning legal system but shared norms and values, the informal rules that make everyday interaction possible. The foundation of this is


trust in the Government, trust in law enforcement, trust in the legal system and trust in other people. Without this the economy cannot function effectively and people cannot work together. It also means ensuring social inclusion of all groups and that they have a shared stake in society. Social divisions whether they are based on racial/ethnic identity, economic divisions, generational differences, gender or any other socially created difference, provide the basis for the growth of conflict and dissention.

Building social cohesion is essential for building a sustainable society as it is the basis of social order and provides the foundation for economic development and growth. Underpinning social cohesion is trust, trust provides the basis for social interaction and enables people to work together to achieve common ends. Building social cohesion is not just about integrating individuals but also groups that may have competing or different interests and building trust in other people as well as societal institutions including Government. In turn physical capital, economic capital, human capital and social capital which are inexorably interconnected provide the basis for social cohesion and social wellbeing (Coleman 1998; Falk and Kilpatrick 1999; Grootaert and Van Bastelard 2002). Social inclusion and social empowerment provide the basis for agency and social interaction. Social inclusion includes the social support of friends and neighbours and

participation in social networks and civil society. Performance (participation in institutions) develops a shared understanding of the expected ways of behaving, of values, of interpersonal trust and solidarity and engenders loyalty. Empowerment means that people have both the freedom and the capabilities to act, enabling them to pursue different strategies to improve their quality of life (Sen 1999) by acting on issues they deem important. It is both individual and collective. Thus it is about both building capabilities (education and training, physical and mental health) and providing the conditions for people to be able to exercise their capabilities. Education, for example, builds capability for employment, but for people to be able to exercise their employability capabilities employment opportunities have to be available. This is dependent on economic policies.

The model has to be seen wholistically and is not reducible to its parts. It provides the space within which individuals and society as a whole can flourish and grow and become more productive for the benefit of all. It is interactive and dynamic with each element providing the conditions for the other elements and each in turn dependent on the other. It provides for a society that makes life good and thus the ultimate test of the quality of a society is how satisfied people are with their lives.

Figure 6: Social Quality Model



If we consider the development agenda in Rwanda, both in terms of what it is trying to achieve, Vision 2020, and the legal and policies framework that is being developed and implemented, we can see how it is working to build a sustainable society, one that aims to build social cohesion (Figure 7). It also enables us to see how the different elements of policy interact and are mutually dependent. If we consider the overarching aims of economic policy we can see that it is concerned with economic growth and transformation while at the same time ensuring that the weak and vulnerable are included through, for example, the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme and agricultural policies are designed to increase the productivity of subsistence farmers. Thus it is concerned with social cohesion as well as economic growth. The agricultural policy also includes

empowerment through the work of the agricultural extension workers who build the capacity of farmers to increase the productivity of their land and market surplus produce. The latter includes supporting farmers to form cooperatives which increase social inclusion. A key element of the policy of financial inclusion is the development of the Umurenge SACCOs, which are run as cooperatives at district level and therefore play a role in promoting social inclusion. Policies for social inclusion are designed to promote civic engagement at different levels, vertical as well as horizontal, which in turn builds solidarity and social cohesion. The various councils, for example, have inclusive membership at village level with elected representatives at each successive level. These and other participatory groups are used as a tool for Dialogue and Consensus which

is designed to build social cohesion. Participation in civic activities as well as informal groups builds social capital which in turn builds trust. Societies that are rich in social capital bring greater economic returns to individuals as well as the society as a whole. Participation in civic organisations builds members’ capabilities and thus empowers them. In turn empowerment (education and training) builds peoples’ capabilities to actively participate in civic organisations. Empowerment increases peoples’ ability to make a livelihood and also to make decisions more broadly.

Policies designed specifically to build social cohesion at national level increase trust and solidarity, thus facilitating cooperation and participation in social capital networks and increasing social inclusion. This in turn reinforces social cohesion. More inclusive societies are more cohesive they are. This means that economic policies that are designed to reduce economic inequalities and social inclusion policies that encourage the build vertical and horizontal networks across social and economic divides are especially important in building social cohesion.

Figure 7: Building Social Quality in Rwanda: Examples of the Policy Framework

Economic Security <ul style="list-style-type: none">• VUP• Private Sector Development• Agricultural Transformation• Financial Inclusion• Mutual Health Insurance	Social Cohesion <ul style="list-style-type: none">• One Rwanda• Equality of Opportunity• Decentralisation Policy and Civic Engagement• Pro-poor policies• <i>Umuganda</i>
Social Inclusion <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Family policy• Policies for OVC• <i>Gacaca</i>• Councils (Village, Youth, Women’s, Disabled)	Empowerment <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Education and Training• Health• ICT• IMIHIGO

2.3. Social Cohesion's Contribution to Sustainable Development

Socially cohesive societies generally provide a higher quality of life for their citizens, are more inclusive and have higher economic growth (e.g. Portes and Landolt 2000; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). A divided society by contrast is made up of competing groups that have strong identity with and loyalty to their own group but are in competition and even conflict with each other. Social polarisation and formal institutional rules that constrain arbitrary Government action are critical for the development of cooperative norms and trust (Portes and Landolt 2000).

Social cohesion is the bonds or social networks that unite people together across a nation state and plays a central role in sustainability. It is built through people working together for common purpose within and across communities and differently located social and economic groups. It enables diverse groups to work together and to tolerate and respect difference. It is evident by both what is present, trust, norms of reciprocity, a vibrant civil society and institutions of conflict management and, what is absent latent conflict between different interest groups whether based on economic inequalities, racial/ethnic difference, disparities in political participation or any other form of polarisation (Scott 2009). It breaks down the spatial, social, cultural and

economic barriers that divide societies and builds a shared sense of identity and belonging; a shared purpose. Investing in building social cohesion is thus an investment in preventing future social and economic conflict, a strategy to avoid the risk of social breakdown. However, social cohesion also provides the basis for inclusive economic development that benefits individuals as well as the society as a whole. Trust, the basis of social cohesion, facilitates cooperation, gives confidence in the motivations and actions of others and enables the anticipation of positive outcomes. It is the foundation on which the acceptance of mutual obligations and reciprocity are built, enabling self-interest to be replaced by a commitment to promoting collective interests. The challenge is to build trust across social, economic and geographically located groups, enabling the development of generalised trust in others as well as Government and civic institutions.

Through building social cohesion, social capital contributes to sustainable economic growth by facilitating collective action, and complementing economic and human capital. The majority of wealth in the world lays in intangible capital (human and social); the sum of knowledge, skills and know how possessed by the population, the quality of formal and informal social institutions (norms and networks) and generalised trust (Knack and Keefer 1997; World Bank 2006). Intangible wealth, human, institutional and social capital contributes between fifty

nine and 80 per cent of social welfare (Hamilton and Ruta 2006). Investment in social capital reduces poverty by enabling some groups to exit poverty more rapidly (Knack and Keefer 1997; Naryan and Pritchett 1997, 1999, 2002). Naryan and Prichett showed that increased membership of groups and associations at village level in Tanzania increased household incomes. Conversely Easterley and Levine (1997) have shown that fractionalization impacts negatively on annual per capita growth both directly and indirectly. However, *van Rijin* (2012) found that in terms of farmers' willingness to adopt innovations, this was associated with bridging social capital, ties that go beyond the local community and that strong ties within a community are a barrier to the take up of innovative farming practices. Although Rwanda had one of the lowest scores for both types of social capital, it had the highest for uptake of innovations.³

In an analysis of 159 countries, 'intangible' capital (knowledge, skills and institutions) was found to be an important component of national wealth with a one per cent increase in the stock of social capital resulting in a 1.10 per cent increase in intangible capital, a one year increase in school years a 0.47 per cent increase and remittances a 0.14 increase (Dulal and Foa 2011). The intangible residue of GDP in Rwanda is 54 per cent, but the

relative contribution of social and human capital differs from the general findings with years of schooling contributing 54 per cent and social capital 45 per cent. This is accounted for partly by the high investment the Government of Rwanda has made in education, but also a very low social capital stock even compared with other low income countries. An increase in social cohesion in Rwanda would then yield a large marginal gain and contribute to sustained economic growth.

2.4. Building Social Cohesion

In a society that is fragmented, divided and made up of competing groups with a lack of shared identity between groups and a lack of trust in Government, it is necessary to build social cohesion. There is a need to build trust in Government, the institutions of law and order, civic society and other people in general. Additionally, mechanisms for national unity and reconciliation need to be put in place to bring that about. Whilst a willingness to cooperate, to survive and prosper (Stanley 2003) is a starting point for social cohesion, there needs to be a shared identity (Moody and White 2003), or at least tolerance and respect for difference. This requires building a shared commitment to the same values and goals underpinned by reciprocity and mutual trust which supports cooperation, and mutual exchange (Colleta and Cullen 2000) through social engagement in networks and organisations within and across communities. Participation

³ The data was for a sample of villages in the border region with DRC and Uganda

in voluntary activity, socialising with community groups, active membership of community based organisations, participation in civic activities and participation in Government activities facilitate collective action for mutual benefit and acts as a form of 'capital' by facilitating the exchange of goods and information and reducing transaction costs (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002; Knack 1999). Gibson (2004) has suggested four specific elements: building inter-group reconciliation and trust; political tolerance; support for human rights; and respect for political institutions. Building social cohesion can be seen as a process of building cooperation (Kiresberg 2007), solidarity (Amstutz 2006) and trust. Putnam (1993) showed that the most successful regional Governments and economies in Italy were those that possessed high levels of participation in associational life and in which individuals displayed high levels of trust in social and political institutions.

Colleta and Cullen (2000) argue that the challenge in Rwanda was (is) not building social capital per se, but moving from 'bad' to 'good' social capital, from a society with high social capital within groups but low social capital between groups which can hinder socio-economic development and as Rwanda has already witness lead to societal breakdown (Colletta and Cullen 2000; Knack and Kafer 1997; Woolcock and Naryan 2000). The critical question for Rwanda is: can social capital be built and specifically

can it be built by the Government? Is it possible to have policies for building social capital in the same way as it is possible to build human capital or support economic growth? Specifically, can community networks be built that increase community cooperation and build relationships between individuals in and across communities?

Putnam (1993) has argued that it takes many centuries to build social capital and trust as a prerequisite for building social capital, but Coleman (1998) argues that the perceived benefit of participation is a more important in driving participation than trust, so it is possible to see trust as an outcome rather than a prerequisite for social capital formation. Portes and Landolt (2000) argue that low social polarisation and rules that constrain arbitrary Government action are more important than membership of civic organisations. Giddens (1994) argues that Governments can create the conditions which enable individuals to participate in social groups and networks and build social capital. The key to Governments creating social capital is decentralisation of power (Evans 1996; Skocpol 1996; Warner *et al* 1999) and a strong civil society that keeps Government responsive (Fox 1996; Potapchuck *et al* 1997). Local Government has to move from controller, provider and regulator to motivator, convenor and facilitator (Crocker *et al* 1998) and help build it at community level. Government has to put in place: incentives for individuals

to participate in groups and social networks; it has to mobilise collective action at community level; and it has to facilitate horizontal ties between communities and vertical ties between communities and layers of the state (Fox 1996).

Dialogue and Consensus is a tool that at community level enables all the members to participate in decision making rather than decisions being taken by local leaders or imposed by central Government. It encourages cooperative interaction to solve problems and issues to develop a mutually acceptable solution. It is a way of dealing with conflict productively as it enables people to openly and honestly share their views and builds recognition of interdependency and respect for the views of others (Dean 1999; Bronkhurst 2005). It is based on the principle of ownership of the decision by the participants and engenders identification with and taking on responsibility for others as well as building altruism and trust (Allen 1999). Its benefits include increasing the quality of solutions because they are based on a comprehensive analysis of the problem which may lead to innovative solutions. Furthermore, those most familiar with the problem will be participating in solving it and it will strengthen relationships between participants. It also builds capacity as participants learn from others and deeper and more enduring relationships are formed. It creates a solidarity grounded in dialogue and performance

and practical activity. The collective identity is sustainable because it is created and recreated through activity with collective ownership and shared power providing the basis for future social action based on furthering the interests of the group (Allen 1999).

The community driven approach to collaborative working brings together divided groups/communities to work together to solve problems they have identified. This process rebuilds social capital and trust within and between communities and support the building of social cohesion (United States Institute of Peace) as well as building trust in Government (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2008). It involves:

- Community participation including women and marginalised and previously excluded groups;
- Democratically elected leaders;
- Joint community decision making through Dialogue and Consensus;
- Community selection of projects and beneficiaries;
- Contribution of labour to development projects;
- Community receipt and control over money to invest in development projects to benefit the community with the community selecting the beneficiaries;
- Mutuality and reciprocity;
- Accountability and transparency.

Community Driven Development is designed to improve social relations and social cohesion as well as drive

economic development, overcome institutional weaknesses and improve the physical infrastructure (Table 3). Participation means communities being empowered so that they are in control of the planning process, the implementation, the outcomes and the evaluation (Hamm 2001). Decisions are made by participants through a process of Dialogue and Consensus in a situation where they are in control, where they determine the ground rules and where decisions are collectively owned. It works to overcome fear of difference,

reduce prejudice and to create a sense of belonging and builds confidence through participation (Brune *et al* 2005; Cliffe *et al* 2003). It increase solidarity and build social cohesion by creating a sense of identity - people identify with others as they interact with them and come to feel comfortable with and trust them (Bronkhurst 2005; Dean 1999; Lawrence and Heath 2008). Working together creates a sense of responsibility for others, of loyalty and working for the common good (Allen 1999) and fosters reconciliation.

Table 3: Community Driven Development

Aims	Improved public infrastructure services and more private assets	Improved social relations and cohesion	More effective and responsive institutions
Mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better matching of resources with needs • Improved efficiency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greater participation in civic life and improved relations • More acceptable resource distribution • Mechanisms for defusing problems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demand for more responsive institutions • Improved citizen-state relations • Common programme

Those who argue for decentralisation (community driven development) suggest that it can:

- Facilitate discussion between different interest groups on local issues and the allocation of resources and can formally address the local root causes of grievances and conflict;
- Can develop mechanisms for collaboration and dispute resolution at a local level which can help build social cohesion;
- Broadens political participation by increasing the layers of Government thus reducing the potential for inter group grievances;
- Can build peoples capacity for participation in political decision making and dispute resolution and empower them to become involved in promoting the interests of the community;
- Political inclusion of all groups increasing the legitimacy of the state and perceptions of citizenship/ national identity;
- Builds trust as people work together at a local level to develop joint solutions to problems they have identified;
- Can increase the states legitimacy as it is seen to work at a local level and ensures the rule of law even in remote rural areas thus increasing national political stability;
- Reduces perceptions of horizontal inequalities as groups (economic, gender, ethnic, generational) are involved in the prioritisation of projects and the investment of resources;

- Can bring about improvements in service delivery thus reducing the potential for conflict over scarce resources.

On the other hand, those who argue that it can increase conflict and reduce social cohesion suggest that it can:

- Encourage Government investment in community social capital development where there are not strong horizontal ties in place and civil society is weak may well end up reinforcing a patron-client relationship;
- Result in the dominance of one groups at a local level thereby increasing the marginalisation and exclusion of other groups with marginalised groups especially vulnerable;
- There is a danger of elite capture rather than inclusive participation increasing the chance of creating inequalities through inequitable resource allocation;
- Local leaders can appeal to ethnic identity and social polarisation become entrenched;
- Inadequate administrative resources and finance can result in weak and inefficient local Government undermining the states legitimacy and increasing the potential for conflict as the state fails to fulfil its functions;
- Local/national tensions and conflict as well as interregional ones can develop over the distribution of power and the allocation of resource;
- An increased number of tiers of Government increases the potential

for corruption which can lead to anger and disillusionment amongst the population;

- Decentralisation can increase inequalities;
- Local Governments can be more vulnerable to exploitation from external influences and their financial resources are more likely to be violently appropriated by irregular/armed groups than those of central Government are.

However, there has been little research and what there is has come up with contradictory findings (*Green 2006; Scott 2009*). In practice few studies have found evidence of positive outcomes from decentralisation and most have found negative outcomes in terms of building social cohesion. Nevertheless Scott (2009) concludes that context is important and given the right conditions it is possible for there to be positive outcomes. Research in Burundi, *Vervisch (2013)*, found that attempts to engineer social cohesion through top-down interventions by NGOs providing direct livelihood support failed because of elite capture. They suggest that community based development (CBD) programmes that are truly bottom-up and provide resources that support the community as a whole and provide an environment for the building of social cohesion within a community are more successful.

2.5. The Rwandan Policy Framework for Dialogue and Consensus

In the post-genocide period the Rwandan Government has promoted social cohesion with the emphasis being on the state rather than civil society, what *Green (2009)* have called a republican social cohesion discourse. It has set out to build trust between the Government and citizens, between communities and between individuals by strengthening social linkages within communities and between them and the state (Musoni 2007). It has, in other words, set out to build social capital through civic engagement which means:

--- active involvement of citizens in resolving issues of public concern, shaping Government policy and ensuring that citizens needs are central to programmes design and service delivery. It means promoting the quality of life in a community, through both political and non-political processes (Musoni 2007, p. 2, emphasis in the original).

The Rwandan policy framework for Dialogue and Consensus is part of the plethora of initiatives associated with building national integration and social cohesion using mechanisms inspired by Rwandan traditional culture but modernized to fit the contemporary environment. Building

national integration and cohesion is not an end in itself, but a process that is central to social stability and economic development and transformation. It is part of Rwanda's answer to the question of what kind of political and constitutional arrangements are needed to help democracy function in countries divided by deep societal cleavage. It has avoided the language of power sharing and has sought to promote a common identity, to put in place mechanisms to build a set of shared values which emphasises belonging to and participating in a national political community with Government having a supervisory role over institutions of civil society. It has stressed the importance of communities working together to build a better future for themselves in partnership with Government. Central to this has been the building of the common identity; one nation with one language, one history and one culture, a society where everyone has worked together in the past and can do so in the future.

The legal framework for Dialogue and Consensus is set out in the 2003 Constitution (Official Gazette 2003). The Constitution sets out the main elements of the society that Rwanda intends to build in the wake of the Genocide, to flourish and avoid conflict in the future, explicitly rejecting the majoritarian model of political organization or power sharing and instead champions a pluralistic politics which is 'voice centred' rather than 'vote centred' (Musoni 2007). It emphasise the

importance of building one nation based on a common heritage and a shared vision of the future as well as socio-economic development and the rule of law. Article 9 in Chapter II: Fundamental Principles sets out the framework for fighting Genocide ideology, built on fundamental principles of equity, the rule of law and promoting social welfare and social justice. Article 9.6 states that as a fundamental principle there will be a constant quest for solutions through Dialogue and Consensus. Article 46 states that:

...every citizen has the duty to relate to other persons without discrimination and to maintain relations conducive to safeguarding, promoting and reinforcing mutual respect, solidarity and tolerance.

Political parties must reflect the unity of the Rwandan people and are prohibited from representing any sectarian interests that could give rise to discrimination (Article 54). Article 56 legislates for the Forum of Political Parties which facilitates consultation between them in working for national unity, mediating in conflicts arising between political parties and supporting the resolution of conflicts within political parties. Nominations for Senate by the President (Article 85) and organs responsible for nominating Senators have to take into account national unity and in the case of the latter the equal representation of both sexes (Article 82). Senate has the specific function of supervising the

implementation of the principles referred to in Articles 9 and 54.

Rwanda has then chosen to adopt a 'third way' in responding to the fundamental question of 'Who will do the governing and to whose interests should the Government be responsive when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?' It has placed limitations on the power of the ruling party by requiring it has not more than 50 per cent of Cabinet seats and that the Prime Minister, the President of Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are from different political parties to the President. Pluralistic politics is defined by 'Dialogue and Consensus' which promote reconciliation through:

- Building trust and social cohesion;
- Preventing/reducing community tension;
- Increasing social capital;
- Strengthening a shared sense of national identity.

The 2003 Constitution also mandates for the establishment of the National Commission for Human Rights (Article 177), the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Article 178) and the National Commission for the Fight against the Genocide (Article 179).

2.6. Building Social Cohesion in Rwanda: dialogue, consensus and Social Capital

Rwanda has deliberately set out to build social cohesion, recognising it as fundamental to creating a sustainable society that meets the needs of all its members and in which all citizens feel they have a stake. Building social cohesion through Dialogue and Consensus permeates all levels of society from the national to the smallest administrative unit, the village, and includes the private and non-Governmental sectors as well as the Government (Kostner and Kuehnast 2001; Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs 2002). By building social cohesion through these mechanisms, it is anticipated they will build social capital, which will in turn drive the development of generalised trust and social cohesion and encourage communities to collectively invest in their own future. The role of the Government is as a facilitator, investing in the development of social and human capital, what Giddens has called the social investment state (Giddens 1998).

The decentralisation policy is of especial importance in citizen involvement in the political process and building social cohesion. Mechanisms of Dialogue and Consensus enable the implementation and evaluation of social and economic planning at decentralised levels (Ministry of Local Government 2007, 2008, 2011) enabling people at the

grass roots to identify their needs and work together to meet them with the support of elected local leaders (Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs 2002; Ministry of Local Government 2008, 2011). The main strategy used for mobilising local communities is the *Ubudehe* (local collective action) approach which is implemented at village level and aims to build the capacity of the community to solve its own problems. Other formalised community processes use the *Ubudehe* principles including *Umuganda* (monthly community work, *Abunzi* (disputes mediation), community policing, community health workers and Community Health Insurance (Box 1).

This approach is clearly aligned with what the literature tells us works in building social capital, trust and social cohesion. Relationships and trust are being built by a community-based development approach at both national and local levels. At a national level the 2003 Constitution was developed through a participatory process as was Vision 2020 and the subsequent development strategies. There is the Forum of Political Parties and the National Dialogue Summit which enables all Rwandans the future development of the country (Box 1). The participation of citizens in the development process has vertical as well as horizontal linkages. At community level (the *Umuganda* or village) all residents are members of the Village Council, the National Women's Council, the National Youth Council and

the National Council of People Living with Disabilities. These councils elect representatives to sit on cell councils, which in turn elect representatives to sit on sector councils which in turn elect representatives to sit on District Councils. The Women's National Council and National Council of Youth and the National Council of Disabled people are also organised at national level and there are elected representatives of women, youth and people living with disabilities in Parliament.

Our analysis of the policies and mechanisms that have been developed to build social cohesion in Rwanda suggests that it has been informed by arguments as to what does (is likely) to work and the measures necessary to overcome the potential negative outcomes. It is also worth noting that Dialogue and Consensus is only one of the policies that the Government has developed to build social cohesion. There has been a concerted fight against corruption at all levels, political parties based on ethnic identity are banned, political representation is inclusive and participatory, there is one language and there has been a planned development and strengthening of local Government. Government policy is pro-poor and aims to reduce inequalities and resources have been allocated to reduce regional inequalities, for example in the 2012 Budget the Southern Province was selected for additional investment as the poorest province. Twelve Year Basic Education (12 YBE) is fee-free, and the Mutual Health insurance puts access

to health care within the reach of all Rwandans. Economic and employment policies have supported the growth of micro, small and medium enterprises as well as encouraging investment in large ones. The establishment of the *Umurenge* SACCOs has been designed to enable the majority of Rwandans to have a secure and safe means of saving. Agricultural policies have been designed to enable subsistence farmers to increase the productivity of their land and to be able to benefit from commercialisation through land consolidation and crop specialisation. The land tenure regularisation process gives people a real feel that they have a stake in society by giving them legal title to their land.

Nevertheless it is necessary to be clear about which mechanisms use Dialogue and Consensus as opposed to having the potential to contribute to reconciliation and/or encourage the use of Dialogue and Consensus for resolving problems and issues. Using Dialogue and Consensus to resolve interpersonal disputes as well as to work on community and national issues and challenges is important. Dialogue and consensus encourages the peaceful

resolution of interpersonal disputes without recourse to the courts or the use of violence. However, as we have pointed out, a socially cohesive society is more than one in which people are able to live together in relative harmony. This is not to negate the importance of the latter but to ensure that those mechanisms that have the potential to promote community dialogue and problem solving and build social cohesion are clearly identified. Using this criteria the mechanisms that are in place are the National Dialogue Summit, *Umuganda*, the Village Council, the Women's National Council, the National Youth Council, *Ubudehe* and *Girinka*, to the extent that the community work together to agree who should receive donated cows. *Abunzi* and Community Juries are more concerned with resolving disputes between individuals, although the proposed solution is reached through a process of Dialogue and Consensus. *Ingando* and *Itorero* are concerned with educating citizens in the history and norms and values of Rwandan society as part of the process of reconciliation. An important element of this is explaining the importance of the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus.

Box1: Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus

GACACA – A traditional Rwandan method of conflict resolution that has been adapted to hear Genocide crimes. Local people are elected by the community to prosecute cases and the members of the community participate in the trials with outcomes being agreed through a process of Dialogue and Consensus.

UMUGANDA – Mandatory community service day held from 8.00 a.m. to 11 a.m. on the last Saturday of every month with all able bodied citizens aged 18 to 65 years participating. The free labour contributes to economic development and participation builds community integration and social capital as the community agree projects through Dialogue and Consensus. . Following the community work participants meet to discuss local issues and raise concerns with community leaders.

UBUDEHE –The community working together to solve problems they have identified using Dialogue and Consensus using Dialogue and Consensus. The Ubudehe Credit Scheme enables the poor to benefit from a community project by signing a contract with the community setting out obligations and commitment to pay back. The community monitor the advancing and the repayment of loans

IMIHIKO – a process by which local government articulates its own objectives and is evaluated on its performance against agreed targets. The local plan is developed through a consultative process with citizen involvement through meetings at village level. The outcomes of the meetings are passed on through representative committees at cell and sector levels to the district.

ABUNZI – a system for dispute resolution at community level with the Abunzi mediating on some categories of disputes using Dialogue and Consensus to reach decisions. The Abunzi provide a framework for mandatory mediation prior to filing cases in ordinary courts. Each committee is comprised of 12 local volunteers who have as a minimum completed primary school (Organic Law No 02/2010 of 09/06/2010).

COMMUNITY JURIES - Community juries bring together citizens and local authorities to solve problems and discuss development issues using Dialogue and Consensus. They also brings together citizens to discuss disputes and resolve them with the assistance of local leaders in order to reduce the numbers taken to higher levels of government and the courts (Ministerial Order No 002/07/01 of 20 the May 2011).

NATIONAL WOMEN’S COUNCIL – a forum for all women 18 years and over which meets at all levels villages to national. It enables women to use Dialogue and Consensus to agree on progressing local issues especially as they relate to women. The National Women’s Council is mandated by the 2003 Constitution (Article 187).

NATIONAL YOUTH COUNCIL - a forum for all youth (15 to 35 years) which meets at all levels villages to national. The National Youth Council is mandated by the 2003 Constitution (Article 188).

INGANDO - Unity and reconciliation residential solidarity camps which teach students about Rwandan history, norms and values and the importance of Dialogue and Consensus.

ITORERO - Civic education schools which aim mainly at teaching the national norms and values including national unity, social solidarity, patriotism, integrity, bravery and tolerance as well as the importance of using Dialogue and Consensus..

NATIONAL DIALOGUE SUMMIT – An annual forum chaired by the President with the Cabinet, Parliament, representatives of local government at all levels and such others to debate issues relating to national unity , the state of the Nation and of local government. The dialogue is broadcast live on TV and radio and citizens can ‘phone in with questions and comments. It is mandated by the 2003 Constitution (Article 168).

FORUM OF POLITICAL PARTIES – Is a consultative forum to facilitate the political parties working together for national unity and to mediate between political parties when they are in conflict and to support the resolution of internal conflict in political parties using Dialogue and Consensus (Article 56).

2.7. Evaluating Rwanda's Policies for Dialogue and Consensus and Building Social Cohesion

In this report we are focusing on the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus and the ways in which they are enabling ordinary Rwandans to work together and thereby build a socially cohesive and sustainable society. Rwanda has generally been seen as making significant progress in building a stable, inclusive society but a number of concerns have been raised by commentators about the governance policies and it is important that these are acknowledged (see e.g. Melvin 2012; Purdekova 2011a, 2011b). Concerns that have been raised include:

- Limitation on the power of the majority party rather than power sharing results in political space largely being controlled by the ruling party. Rwanda is no longer a majoritarian democracy but nor is it a consensus democracy in the way described by, for example, Lijphart (1977, 1999), where power is explicitly and proportionally shared between political parties representing the different interest groups. However, voting in elections has generally been seen to be fair and free and decentralisation and Dialogue and Consensus at a local level (the main focus of this report) are used as a mechanism for enabling ordinary Rwandans to make their voice heard.⁴
- Across the world different approaches have been used to manage heavily divided societies. One way is a form of consociational democracy, as they use in Northern Ireland and Burundi, which is where you formally recognise competing groups but effectively force them to share power. Clearly Rwanda has chosen not to do this (as discussed above, it still bears the scars of a power-sharing model that failed), and instead is trying to achieve political stability by eliminating ethnic cleavages. It has sought to emphasise inclusive governance as an essential condition to overcome the legacy of ethnic-based discrimination and genocide. The potential problem with this is that, arguably, it is brushing under the carpet real tensions that would be better discussed more openly. However, there are real downsides to the consociational model: in Northern Ireland, elites may share power but there is little sense of integration between Catholics and Protestants at a community level; and Burundi clearly has real problems of its own.
- It is argued that *Gacaca* has enabled forgiveness and reconciliation to take place and for perpetrators and survivors to live in harmony. Furthermore, the emphasis on a shared identity as Rwandans negates any attribution of blame to those who did not participate in the Genocide and encourages all Rwandans to work together.

⁴ We do not discuss it in this report, but the annual

Children's Summit provides an opportunity for the voices of children and young people to be heard and their views to be taken into account in policy making.

- There is a delicate balance to be had between permitting political debate and ensuring that ethnic divides are not (re)created.
- An environment where NGOs, community based organisations and the media operate self-censorship based on an understanding of what is acceptable. However, there is little evidence of overt censorship and the Government has supported the development of an independent public policy think tank.
- A climate has been created making people very careful about what they say to whom, thereby making it difficult to make sense of what is really going on. However, there is little overt suppression and the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression.
- Some evidence that although people say there is reconciliation, people actually live parallel lives -in other words, there is no mixing across divides. However, there is evidence of people working together across divides across the country.
- That the use of mechanisms of Dialogue and Consensus results in many crimes going unrecorded including gender based violence against women and girls and violence against children in schools as well as at home (Gender Monitoring Office 2013).

3. Aims and Objectives of the Research and Research Methods

3.1. Aims and Objectives of the Research

The core objective of this research project is to:

- a) Explore how Rwandan citizens understand the principle of Dialogue and Consensus
- b) To evaluate how well policies designed to promote Dialogue and Consensus are working in practice: that is the extent to which they are contributing to the *outcomes* identified above, in particular the their impact on social cohesion.

Aims

- To identify and describe the various frameworks for Dialogue and Consensus;
- To find out whether Rwandan citizens at grass root level understand, own and feel part of the Dialogue and Consensus frameworks in place;
- To find out whether these frameworks are contributing to Rwanda becoming a socially cohesive society (i.e. to find out which frameworks are considered more effective and why);
- To measure, through the household survey, the extent of social cohesion in Rwanda in general and within social segments (age, gender, ethnicity, location,

education, socio-economic status);

- To provide evidence-informed recommendations for strengthening the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus;
- To equip the Senate with a clear evidence-base for discharging their duties in respect of Article 87 of the Rwandan Constitution (including, if feasible, the development of clear indicators for assessing the effectiveness of Dialogue and Consensus frameworks).

Objectives

- To analytically demonstrate how Rwandans comprehend the principle of Dialogue and Consensus.
- To evaluate the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus and how they have effected local communities.
- To critically analyze the response of the community to building relationships and shared understanding between diverse groups with using Dialogue and Consensus.
- To identify various challenges and critical areas of debate and gaps in respect of the current operation of Dialogue and Consensus.
- To identify and examine

discrepancies between the expected results and the findings as well as discuss long-term strategic policies; so that various mechanisms of Dialogue and Consensus can be enhanced and strengthened.

- To propose effective mechanisms and tools for a successful Dialogue and Consensus experiences as well as to promote peace building and social cohesion through strengthening the role of local authorities

3.2. Methodology

The research combined the strengths of a large household survey with qualitative methods (in depth interviews with individuals and FGDs) in order to both identify the extent to which and for whom the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus are working and how they might be improved. The survey provides an important snapshot of public opinion allowing us to interrogate overall perceptions about the meaning and effectiveness of Dialogue and Consensus at the local and national level, as well as provide data on some of the desired outcomes of Dialogue and Consensus, for example, levels of social cohesion and trust. The other significant contribution of the survey is that it allowed us to compare how attitudes vary by social segments (urban-rural, gender, age, ethnicity, education level, deprivation etc) across Rwanda, using both descriptive statistical analysis and multivariate analysis. The survey sample was large enough to enable us to generalise to the population and to carry out an analysis of sub-groups of the population, for example young

women living in rural areas with primary education or less, older men living in urban areas, in non-farm employment with secondary school/higher education.

The qualitative work allowed us to probe these issues in more detail: in particular it enabled us to evaluate the different frameworks for promoting Dialogue and Consensus in a more meaningful way than the survey allows. The qualitative research enabled us to provide a greater understanding of what is and what is not working, what the barriers to the mechanisms working are, what facilitates them working well and what would enable them to function more effectively. Retting (2012), for example, based on his mixed methods research in Rwanda, argues that qualitative work provides a different perspective from that gained from analysing survey responses.

3.2.1. Survey

The survey utilised a questionnaire administered face-to-face to a nationally representative sample of the adult population, aged 18 years and over, living in the community and of Rwandan nationality. A two-stage probability sample was used with targeted population being all those 18 years and over with the achieved sample being proportionate to the population size at District level. Sectors were selected using a systematic sampling method and sectors were divided into urban, semi-urban and rural.

In each province except Kigali City, eight villages were selected in each District proportionate to the urban, semi-urban, and rural split; and in Kigali ten villages were selected in each District. At household level the individual selected

for interview was the household member aged 18 years or over who had most recently celebrated their birthday

Size and distribution of the sample

The sample size was determined using the formula hereafter:

$$n = D * \frac{Z^2 * (p) * (1 - p)}{C^2}$$

Where: n = the size minimum of the sample

z = a coefficient depending on the degree of confidence (=1.96 to the threshold of 95%)

p= the proportion of the population with the characteristic (indicator) of interest. In the absence of real data from a recent study on Dialogue and Consensus in Rwanda, we preferred to assign to this parameter a value of 50% which gives the highest sample size for this study.

c = the acceptable margin error (of 2%). This means that the estimated values are within the range of $\pm 2\%$ of actual value.

D = Design Effect (DEFF) is added to the formula to adjust the sample size when selecting the sample is done at several degrees or levels (here, the sample is selected in two steps: first at village level, then at households' level).

$$n = 1.59 * \left[\frac{1.96^2 * (0.5) * (1 - 0.5)}{0.02^2} \right]$$

$$n = 1.59 * \left[\frac{3.8416 * (0.25)}{0.0004} \right]$$

$$n = 1.59 * 2401 \approx 3818$$

With D = 1.59 we have a sample size of 3818 households adjusted to 3840, with 20 households to be interviewed in each selected village in Kigali City and 15 households in the rest of provinces.

This sample was selected in 246 villages across the all districts in proportion to the size of the number of households in the village.

Table 4: Sample size per province.

Province	Number of Districts	Sample Size	Achieved Sample
Kigali City	3	600	600
Northern Province	5	600	600
Southern Province	8	960	960
Western Province	7	840	837
Eastern Province	7	840	840
Total	30	3,840	3,837

3.2.2. Qualitative Methods

The qualitative research used purposive sampling to select key stakeholders/

expert informants and citizens who are the intended beneficiaries of the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus. We conducted in-depth

interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) in 14 purposively sampled locations (Table 5). The locations were selected to ensure coverage of rural and semi-urban/urban locations in each Province. FGDs enabled us to bring together groups of citizens to discuss their views and understanding of the mechanisms and their impact on their lives. Key informants were able to provide a broader perspective of how the community use the mechanisms.

In each location we conducted one male and one female FGD, alternating youth

FGDs and FGDs with people 36 years and over between districts. This was to ensure that we captured the views of older people as well as youth. We had single sex groups because Women tend to speak more freely and openly in single sex groups. For key informants we interviewed at every location a school teacher, a religious leader, the head of a cooperative association and a representative of a civil society organisation. In total we carried out 26 FGDs with each group comprising eight people and 52 key informant interviews.

Table 5: Locations and Samples for the Qualitative Research

Province	District	Sector	FGDs	Key Informant Interviews
East	Ngoma	Kibungo	2	4
	Gatsibo	Rugarama	2	4
	Rwamagana	Rubona	2	4
West	Ngororero	Hindiro	2	4
	Rubavu	Rugerero	2	4
	Karongi	Rubengera	2	4
South	Kamonyi	Musambira	2	4
	Nyanza	Busasamana	2	4
	Nyaruguru	Kibeho	2	4
North	Musanze	Cyuve	2	4
	Gakenke	Nemba	2	4
	Gicumbi	Byumba	2	4
City of Kigali	Kicurkiro	Gahanga	2	4
	Gasabo	Gikomero	2	4

The research team prepared the agenda in advance and the focus groups were facilitated by a researcher(s) specifically trained to run the FGDs for this project. All interviews and FGDs were carried out Kinyarwanda. Notes were taken by trained note takers and the FGDs/

interviews transcribed into English and prepared for thematic analysis.

3.2.3. Data Analysis

The survey data were entered using CSPro software and were transferred

into SPSS for statistical analysis. Data analysis includes frequencies, two-way tables and regression models. Unless indicated otherwise data from EICV3, FinScope 2012, the Women's Economic Empowerment Survey 2011 and the African Values Surveys (2008 & 2012) were analysed specifically for this report and are the authors own calculations.

The qualitative data (FGDs and key informant interviews) were transcribed and analysed using Framework, a method specifically devised for analysing qualitative data for policy research. The analysis showed that we had reached theoretical saturation, in other words that the findings from the FGDs and key informant interviews were repeating the same information rather than new information emerging. There were differences across groups from different locations, but there was generally consistency between the findings from the FGDs and key informant interviews at one location. We can, therefore, be confident that the findings from the qualitative research are credible and representative of the different views of ordinary Rwandans. We indicate where the views expressed were the same across a large number of locations and where they were minority views suggesting differences between locations.

3.2.4. *Analytical Framework*

The main purpose of this report is to consider the extent to, and ways in, which communities work together to build consensus and how this contributes to the development of social cohesion and a way of life that people value. In other words, the extent

to which Rwanda is building a society that is able to overcome the conflicts and divisions of the past and offers all citizens a stable society they can identify with and which offers them hope for the future. To do this it is necessary not just to look at the overall picture but to look at differences between groups in society that may have different interests and are differentially located in the opportunity structure. Our analytical framework includes:

- Gender – male and female ;
- Age – in years ;
- Province - City of Kigali, Southern, Western, Eastern, Northern;
- Location - urban, semi urban and rural;
- Marital status – coded single, married/cohabiting, divorced/ widowed;
- Education measured on an ordinal scale from no education to higher education;
- Economic circumstances – Deprivation Scale, subjective evaluation of economic standing scale, Ubudehe Category;
- Employment status – not employed, agricultural employment, non-farm employment
- Disability/chronic ill-health (coded 0 = disabled/chronic health problem, 1 = other).

The factors that influence our attitudes and behaviours identified in our analytical framework are often correlated, for example, poor people are more likely to live in rural areas than better off people, those with education are generally better off than

those without, and so on. In order to determine which factors are the most important in influencing we carry out multiple regressions. This enables us to identify what are the most important factors after controlling for all the factors that influence an outcome.

3.2.5. *Scales and Recorded Variables*

Latent variables measure underlying phenomena that are not directly measurable and even out random variation in response to a number of questions aimed at measuring the underlying phenomena. For example, deprivation is multi-dimensional so we ask a number of questions and combine the answers to create a deprivation scale. We construct scales by first testing that our variables are measuring the same thing. To do this we use factor analysis with varimax rotation. This enables us to identify the variables that are measuring the same thing and how much of the variance they explain. To ensure that the variables are working together we test the reliability of the scale using Cronbach's Alpha (CA). The minimum acceptable value is 0.75.

- High Community Engagement – often on 23a and/or 23b (see Appendix 2 for the Questionnaire);
- Deprivation Scale Qs 17a , c– 17 f (reverse F M C L FL) explains 53 percent of the variance CA 0.77;5

- Deprivation Quintiles
Deprivation Scale divided into five equal parts;
- Trust Central Government – House of Representatives, Senate, Army, Courts of Law, Police. Explains 55.3 per cent of the variance, CA 0.78;
- Trust Local Politicians Scale Qs241e – 241k one factor explains 72.9 percent of Variance CA 0.95;
- Fear of Crime Scale Qs18a-18e - one factor 63.3 percent of variance CA 0.85;
- Trust Family Friends and Neighbours Qs 241s-241u – variance explained 77.9 CA 0.86;
- Active Member at Least One civil Society Group Q22a/Q22b/Q22c/Q22d/Q22e;
- Satisfaction with *Ubudehe* Poverty Categorises Qs 222 & 223 Variance 86 percent CA 0.84;
- Altruism Scale Qs243a-d Variance explained 57 percent CA0.75;
- Community Problem Solving Qs 235 a b, d, e Variance explained 63.6 percent CA 0.81;
- Community Collaboration Qs 236 a-l Variance explained 74.8 CA 0.91;
- Empowered to Participate Scale (subjective) 234 b & c variance explained 85.6 percent, CA 0.87;
- Satisfaction with Work of Village Advisory Council computed from answers to Qs 83a-h, Variance explained 84.5 percent, CA 0.98;
- Index of Density of Involvement in Civil Society Organisations

⁵ We excluded cash income because of the seasonal nature of income in Rwanda and dropped 'doing without water' because the CA increased when it was removed from the scale.

computed from Qs 22a-e -
no involvement weighted 0,
inactive membership 1 active
membership 2 and leader 3;

- Index of Density of Involvement
in Government Mechanisms
computed from Qs 23a, 23b,
74, 113, 159, 189, 207, never
weighted 0, sometimes/
occasionally 1, frequently/
regularly 3;
- Scale of Domain Satisfaction
with Women's National Council
Qs 188a-188i variance explained
91.9 percent, CA 0.99;
- Scale of Domain Satisfaction
with National Youth Council Qs
206a – 206h variance explained
89.9 percent, CA 0.98;

- Confidence in Community Scale
computed from Qs 242 c and d
variance explained 89 per cent
CA 0.9;
- Trust in Community Scale
computed from Qs 242 a and b
variance explained 80 per cent
CA 0.7.5.

In this report we often present
information using the normalised
distribution for continuous variables. On
the normalised distribution the sample
mean is set to zero and values below
zero are below the mean and positive
values are above the sample mean. This
enables us to see how the respondents
are spread around the mean and see
the variance in the population.

3.2.6. *Statistical significance*

We test all differences for statistical significance, that is, we analyse the data to determine if observed differences are due to chance or if we can be pretty certain that they represent real differences in the population. Small differences that are not of any real interest or large enough to suggest that there should be priorities for policy intervention can none the less be significant.

Test of statistical significance determine if the observed differences are representative of those in the population. If the level of statistical significance is less than one per cent ($p < 0.01$) we can be 99 per cent that the differences in our sample are not due to chance and if it is less than 0.1 per cent ($p < 0.001$) we can be 99.9 per cent certain that the differences are not due to chance. In other words when we say that there are significant differences between groups in the sample then we are confident that they are likely to be replicated in the population at the given confidence level.

The tests of significance that we use are: the student t-test (t) to test the significance between a dichotomous variable and a continuous variable, Anova to test the difference between a categorical variable and a continuous variable, and Cramer's V for testing the significance between two dichotomous categorical variables. We use correlation to establish association between continuous variables and ordinal variables. We use linear regression to determine the contribution of a number of variables to explaining the variation on a continuous variable. The regression enables us to identify the relative contribution that each of the significant variables makes to explaining differences in the population on the dependent variable controlling for the contribution of the other variables. The R^2 tells us the amount of the variance on the continuous variables that we can explain in total and the β s enable us to see the relative size of the contribution of each significant variable. Regression enables us to sort out what are the most important factors correlated with a given factor and thereby enable a firmer basis for prioritising interventions.

4. Location, Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile of the Sample

4.1. Introduction

In this section we describe the achieved sample and point out the differences between our sample frequencies and

the EICV3 weighted sample frequencies for groups in the population and where EICV3 does not have comparable data, FinScope (2012) (Table 6; Appendix 2).

Table 6: Summary of Differences between the Senate Sample and EICV/FinScope Weighted Data


Variable	Difference Senate Sample and EICV3 and FinScope 2012 for Population 18 Years and Over
Location	Senate sample over represents City of Kigali by 5% Marginally over represents the urban population and underrepresents peri-urban
Gender	Over represents men by about 9%
Age	Underrepresents the under 25 by 16% and over represents the 36 to 50 age group by 9%
Education	Underrepresents those with no education by 10% and over represents those with completed primary school by 6% and some secondary schooling by 3%
Marital Status	Underrepresents the single by 16% and correspondingly over represents married couples

The purpose of this research, however, is not to generalise proportions to the population but to look at significant differences between groups in the sample. These significant differences can then be taken to represent significant differences between groups in the adult population.

4.2. Location

The sample was drawn from the four Provinces and the City of Kigali (Figure 8). Compared with EICV3 the sample over represents the City of Kigali and Southern Province and under represents the other three Provinces. The difference for the City of Kigali is 4.6 per cent but smaller for the Provinces.

Figure 8: Province of Residence of Respondents to Senate 2012 and EICV3 18 Years and Over (%)




(Source: Senate 2012)

A majority of the respondents live in rural areas, 74.4 per cent, with 16.1 per cent living in urban areas and 9.5 per cent semi-urban areas (Figure 9). 78 per cent of those resident in an urban area live in the City of Kigali and well over 80 per cent of residents' living out-of-Kigali resides in rural areas, varying from 84 per cent in both Southern and Eastern

Provinces to 91 per cent in Western Province. Those living in urban areas were significantly younger ($t<0.001$) and less deprived ($t<0.001$) than those living in semi-urban areas or rural areas. Those living in semi-urban areas were less deprived than those living in rural areas ($t<0.01$) but there were no significant difference by age.

Figure 9: Location of Residence of Respondents




(Source: Senate 2012)

4.3. Demographic Structure

The age of respondents varied from 18 years to 96 with a mean of 40.5 years and a SD of 14.5. There was no sig-

nificant difference between male and female respondents. A majority of the respondents re in early mid-life, that is between the ages of 26 years and 50 years (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Age in Categories by Gender




(Source: Senate 2012)

A majority of the respondents are married, 73 per cent, with 13 per cent being widowed/divorced and 14 per cent single. Men are more likely than

women to be single or married and women more likely than men to be divorced or widowed (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Marital Status by Gender of the Sample



(Source: Senate 2012)

4.4. Education, Employment and Ownership of Land

4.4.1. Education


The vast majority of the respondents to the Senate Survey have completed primary school education or less, 83 per cent, with just over 50 per cent not having completed primary school. By contrast only two per cent had any higher education. Women were

more likely than men to have had no education (29.3% cf. 20.5%) and male respondents more likely than female to have had some primary education (31.5% cf. 27.5%) or completed primary education (31.5% cf. 26.7%). The proportions of men and women having completed at least some secondary or higher education were not significantly different. Compared with EICV3, the Senate sample over represents those with no education or completed primary

and under represents those with some primary education. A slightly higher proportion of the Senate respondents

compared to EICV3, have had some post primary education (Figure12)

Figure 12: Highest Level of Education Respondents to Senate Survey and in EICV 3 (Weighted Data)




(Source: Senate Survey and EICV3 Data)

The levels of literacy and numeracy amongst the respondents are in line with the levels of education. Men report higher levels of literacy than women. Only half the male respondents and just over 40 per cent of female respondents say that they can read and write Kinyarwanda very well, and only just over 40 per cent of men and 30 per cent of women say that they can do simple arithmetic very well. The

ability to read and write Kinyarwanda and the ability to do simple arithmetic correlate very highly (0.8 $p<0.01$). Just under 13 per cent of men can read and write French quite well or very well and nine per cent English. The comparable figures for women are 10 per cent and seven per cent. There is a large and significant correlation between the ability to read and write French and English (0.7 $p<0.01$).

Figure 13: Literacy and Numeracy by Gender (%)



(Source: Senate Survey)


4.4.2. Employment

Findings from the survey indicate that 91 per cent of the respondents were economically active. Unemployment was just under five per cent (4.8%), 68.6 per cent were employed in farming and 17.3 per cent in non-farm employment. Only just over four per cent (4.4%) said they were too old or sick and disabled to work, although 30 per cent said

that they have a long term disability or illness which limits their daily activities. Those in non-farm employment are on average less deprived than those in farm employment and rate their households' economic situation as better, the mean on the deprivation scale, was for example, 22 for those employed in agricultural and 24 for those employed in non-farm work (t-test df 372.3 p <0.001).

to the Survey

Figure 14: Main Activity of Respondents




(Source: Senate 2012)

4.4.3. Ownership of Land and Housing

A majority of respondents own registered land, 84.6 per cent and a

further 1.7% own non-registered land. 88 per cent are owner occupiers. In total only 6.9 per cent of respondents owned neither land nor a house (Figure 15).

Figure 15: Ownership of Land and/or Property by the Households of Respondents to the Survey



(Source: Senate 2012)

The importance of land ownership came across strongly in the qualitative research. In virtually every interview and FGD we were told that disputes over land were those that occurred most frequently. These disputes included those over the ownership of plots of land, boundary disputes and disputes over the inheritance of land. In some locations we were told that the Land Tenure Regularisation Process has reduced disputes over land. This means that there had been a decline in cases, but this was not always the case. The importance of land ownership was also evidenced by the fact that it was usually the *Abunzi* that had to resolve conflicts. While we were told in many FGDs that people now resolved conflicts amongst themselves, at *Umuganda* or with the support of the village leaders, land conflicts were still frequently referred

to the *Abunzi*. There was general praise for the *Abunzi*, with the general view being that they were doing a good job with only a couple of exceptions where they were said to be incompetent and corrupt.

4.5. Economic Security and Socio-economic Status

Economic security is essential for social cohesion, just as social cohesion provides a framework that facilitates equitable economic growth. Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus will only work to maximum benefit when people have economic security and at least view economic inequalities as equitable. Economic inequalities are generally one of the factors that underlay any conflict. Confidence in the future is also important.

4.5.1. *Objective and Subjective Understandings of Poverty and Deprivation*

In the survey we collected data to measure both respondents' objective levels of deprivation and more subjective perceptions, both of the respondents themselves and of the communities in which they live. We can add value to the existing understanding of poverty by analysing subjective understands, community responses and perceptions of *Ubudehe* – the classification of households economic status by the community

The poor, as well as people living with disabilities and other vulnerable groups, can be excluded from participation in community and other activities because of negative attitudes and stereotypes of others, because they are too busy struggling to survive or because they think that they do not have the necessary capabilities and/or resources to participate. We know from the findings of EICV3 and other research that poverty has declined significantly over the last ten years and now stands at 45 per cent live below the poverty line and 24 per cent below the extremely poor line. Poverty is much higher in rural compared to urban areas, and households at greatest risk of poverty include those that are dependent on agricultural wage labour for their livelihood, with children under fifteen years and those headed by a lone parent mother. We also know that subjective poverty, people's perception of their relative standing,

can be important in influencing their satisfaction with their life and their participation in society. Perceptions of social standing can influence people's behaviour including those who they interact with and are prepared to collaborate with. A feeling of relative deprivation can create a sense of injustice and result in conflict between groups based on socio-economic inequalities. Similarly, people's perception of their future economic situation can influence the extent to which they feel loyalty to their society and are likely to respond positively to initiatives that expect them to invest time and effort working collaboratively with others on community projects.

In the survey we measured deprivation using a number of questions to determine the extent to which respondents' households are deprived (having to do without food, essential medicines/medical treatment, essential cloths, lighting after dark, fuel to cook with). Combining the variable creates a scale with a minimum values of 1 (never afford any item) and a maximum score of 22 (always afford all of the items). The mean for the scale is 18.9 (8.6 on a 10 point scale) and the SD 3.1. 52 per cent of the respondents' households scored 19 or more on the scale suggesting that they are not deprived of essentials and this is in line with the data for poverty from EICV-3.

The residents of the City of Kigali are, on average, less deprived than those living outside of the City, and those in Western Province the most deprived,

with a significant difference in social deprivation across the Provinces (Anova df 4,3745 <0.001). The post hoc test showed that Western Province had the lowest mean (18) and Kigali (20.4) the highest on the scale. Western Province had a significantly lower mean than the other Provinces and City of Kigali a higher one. The differences between the other provinces were not significant. The households of respondents living in rural areas had the lowest mean (18.6) and those in urban areas the highest (20.4). The differences between the three locations were significant (Anova df 2, 3747 <0.001). The households of male respondents were significantly less likely to be deprived than those of female, but the difference in means was small (19.1cf 28 df 3719 <0.05). The difference between rural and urban areas is what would be expected as is the very small difference between men and women. Also households in Kigali being less deprived than those living in other parts of the country.

4.5.2. *Economic Situation of the Country and of Individuals*

The survey and qualitative data both indicate that a majority of Rwandans think that their economic circumstances have improved over the last five years and will continue to improve over the next five. In general the respondents rated the economic situation of the country as good or very good and thought things would be even better in five years' time. 76 per cent of the

respondents thought that the economic situation was fairly good or very good and 96 per cent were confident that it would be better or much better in five years' time. However, some informants in the qualitative work did say that they thought that economic inequalities are widening with the rich getting richer. However, they generally thought that this was not a problem as the better off are now able to provide employment for the poor and in some cases the better off helped the poor by paying school fees and Mutual Health Insurance subscriptions.


However, respondents were somewhat less certain about the economic prospects for their own household; while 87 per cent thought that their household would be better off in five years' time, only 21 per cent thought that they would be much better off. There was, not surprisingly, a positive correlation between confidence that the country's economic situation would improve and that the economic circumstances of one's own household would improve (0.48 $p < 0.01$). The informants in the qualitative research were also generally of the view that things had improved over the last five years even when they thought that people in their community were poor and/or did not think that their own situation had changed much.

However, 91 per cent of Rwandans think that their household's income is insufficient to adequately support their household. On a 10 point scale which asked respondents to place their

household from poorest to best off the mean is 5.5 and SD 2.5 (Figure 16). Only three per cent placed themselves on the bottom or top rungs and 50 per cent placed themselves on the 4th, 5th or 6th rungs; the middle of the income distribution. Most people, therefore,

see themselves as in the middle, neither amongst the poorest or the richest. There was also a modest correlation between the households' deprivation scores and respondents ranking of their household (0.35 $p > 0.01$)

Figure 16: Respondents Rating of their Household's Economic Standing Compared with Others on a 10 Point Scale



(Source: Senate 2012)

There are significant differences across the Provinces in ranking of household economic standing. Southern Province respondents gave their households the lowest average score (M 5.1) and Eastern Providence and City of Kigali the highest (M 5.9). Eastern Providence 'ranked above Southern (M 5.4) with Northern Province (M 5.6) (Anover df 4,3812 <0.001). Those living in rural or a in semi-urban areas rated their households as more deprived than those living in urban areas, but the differences were not large (M 5.5 cf 5.9, Anova df 2,318 <0.001). Although gender and age differences were significant, with women and older people rating their household lower than male respondents and younger people, the differences were slight.

Widows/divorced respondents (M 5.1) rated their household significantly lower on the scale than married (M 5.6) or single respondents (M 5.7) (Anova df 2, 3814 <0.001). Respondents with a chronic illness/disability ranked their households lower, M 5.1 compared to 5.7 for those with no declared chronic illness (t-test df 2014 <0.001). Respondents who had secondary or higher education (M 6.4) were significantly more likely to rank their household as less deprived than those with other levels of education and those with no education to rank their households as more deprived (M 5.1). There was little difference between those with other levels of education, although the relationship is linear (Anova df 4, 3797 <0.001).

The qualitative data suggests that people use four main indicators to assess their economic status compared with others. The most important is food security, with food security being able to have two meals a day; the very poorest go hungry. Other important indicators are; being able to afford to send children to school with the children of the very poorest having to work; being able to afford to purchase Mutual Health Insurance; and being able to save. It also supports the general picture of the extent of deprivation from the survey. Most of the informants told us that their communities had become food secure over the last five years and the availability of clean water was commented on positively by many. Mutual Health Insurance was seen as important and VUP was said to have helped the very poorest improve their standard of living. The increase in incomes combined with an increase in trust amongst neighbours was credited with more tontines being started enabling people to better cope with shocks and to invest in starting small businesses. In a few FGDs, SACCOS was mentioned positively as providing credit for investment in businesses.

There were exceptions in a few communities where food security was a concern. This was due to a number of different factors including poor harvests because of the weather as well low productivity and small plots. Crop specialisation was also seen as problematic by a small number as it increased risk of food insecurity. The


yield was not sufficient to bring in an income to purchase an adequate diet. One concern that was raised in about half of the FGDs was the affordability of the Mutual Health Insurance. We were told that large families find it difficult if not impossible to pay for all members of the family to be covered. In one case we were told that the health centre refused to treat members of a family with insurance if the entire household were not enrolled. There was resentment that the cost of insurance had been increased without consultation. There was also concern that the Mutual Health Insurance only covers people in their own area leaving people without insurance cover if they are taken ill or have an accident when away from home.

In the survey we also asked some questions about the impact of Government policies designed to increase the productivity of farmers, improve food security and enable them to sell surplus crops on the market. 69 per cent of respondents said that they were farmers. While around two-thirds of farmers see benefits from Government policies, this leaves a significant minority who do not think the policies have had a positive impact on them (Figure 17). Just over two-thirds think they have benefited from land consolidation and crop specialisation, 60 per cent from increased access to fertilizers and 56 per cent from terracing. Just over 60 per cent think that they have adequate access to markets and 68 per cent that the infrastructure is good or

very good and 70 per cent have seen a positive impact on their ability to save. However, only just over a quarter think that they get an adequate return on their investment and just 28 per cent

think that the price they get for the produce they sell is good or very good.

Figure 17: Perception of Farmers of Benefits from Government Policies in Agriculture



(Source: Senate 2012)

In the FGDS a number of policies and programmes were credited with bring about the improvements in farm productivity including land consolidation, terracing and the use of fertilizers which have enabled them to produce a surplus for sale. However, a small number of respondents were critical of crop specialisation arguing that it increased their risk of not being able to feed their households. Others argued that the crop they had been directed to grow was not a good one for their soil and others that they could not get surplus crops to a market to sell them. Some respondents said that they were too poor to buy fertilizer and therefore could not increase the productivity of their land and thereby increase their incomes.


4.5.3. The Communities Evaluation of the Economic Circumstances of Households

A key element of Rwanda’s pro-poor policy is the Social Protection Policy (Ministry of Local Government 2011) and eligibility for benefits is based on a household’s poverty status which is agreed by the community using Dialogue and Consensus. The community agree the *Ubudehe* (participatory poverty) category of every household, and those who are placed in the bottom two categories, the destitute and the very poor are entitled to/eligible for social protection benefits including Community Health Insurance, the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (public works, cash benefits and loans) and help with

paying the costs of sending children to school. 27 per cent of respondents were in *Ubudehe* Categories 1 or 2, six per cent in Category 1 and 67.7 per cent in Category 3. In total, 27 per cent of respondents had benefited from VUP, 7.8 per cent from public works, 3.3 per cent from the *Ubudehe* credit scheme, 11.3 per cent from direct support and 4.9 per cent from other benefits. Although respondents in

Ubudehe Categories 1 and 2 were more likely to have benefitted than those in other categories, the relationship was not very strong: 36 per cent of those in Category 1 and 34 per cent of those in Category 2 compared with 25 per cent of those in higher categories. This suggests movement out of the bottom two categories possibly through participation in VUP.

Figure 18: Respondents Household’s *Ubudehe* Category



(Source: Senate 2012)


Respondents whose households are in *Ubudehe* Categories 1 and 2, not surprisingly, have a significantly lower mean score on the deprivation scale than those that do not (20.9 cf 22.9 t-test df 1279 <0.001). Women were marginally more likely to be in *Ubudehe* Categories 1 and 2 than men, 26 per cent of women compared to 22 per cent of men, and widows/divorcees 39 per cent compared to 21 per cent of married and 20 per cent of single respondents. The risk of being in *Ubudehe* Categories 1 and 2 increases with age and decreases with educational attainment, with 34 per cent of those with no education in Categories 1 and 2 compared to 19 per

cent of those with completed primary education and 11 per cent of those with completed secondary or higher education ($\alpha^2 < 0.001$).

Satisfaction with *Ubudehe* category was measured on a 10 point scale from 0 completely dissatisfied to 10 completely satisfied; the mean was 6.4 and the SD 2.8. The normalised distribution went from -1.9 to + 1.3. There was a significant relationship between *Ubudehe* category and satisfaction with the category a respondents is in, although the differences were not large. Those in Category 1 were the most satisfied and those in Category 3 the

least satisfied, and the same was the case for satisfaction with the way the process is carried out. However, in the case, of satisfaction with the process there was no significant difference between those in Categories 1 and 2.

Figure 19: Means for Satisfaction with *Ubudehe* Category and Process by Category



(Source: Senate 2012)(Anova satisfaction with category df 2, 3577 $p<0.001$, satisfaction with process df 2, 3666 $p<0.001$)

The qualitative work suggests that some of the dissatisfaction with placement in *Ubudehe* category relates to the cost of Mutual Health Insurance. We were told that households had been placed in *Ubudehe* category 3 but they could not afford to pay for Mutual Health Insurance. Another concern was that households were no longer considered eligible for Categories 1 or 2 once they had been given a cow. However, informants pointed out it take time for households to benefit from the milk and manure from the cow. It was also evident that there are very few communities where all the members are involved in deciding what category each household should be placed in. In a few focus groups the participants described how they all discussed and agreed which category each household should be placed in, but in the majority of cases the community leaders were said to make the decisions.

4.6. Disability and Vulnerability

Vulnerable groups include the extremely poor, people with chronic health problems and widows/divorcees. People in these groups are at risk of social exclusion and isolation. They may find it more difficult to engage in the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus.

Just under a third of respondents said that they have a disability or illness that limits their daily activities. Some people are more at risk of poor health/disability than others; older people, women and widows/divorcees are at greatest risk. People living with a disability or chronic illness are also at greater risk of poverty and are less likely to be economically active than those without. The risk of

disability increases with age, the mean age for those with disabilities/chronic ill health is 47 years compared to 38 years for those without (t-test df 3770 <0.001). Women are at greater risk than men although the difference is not large, 32 per cent compared to 28 per cent (Crammer's V <0.01), widows/divorcees (51.8 per cent) are at greater risk compared with 18 per cent of single people and 28 per cent of married ones (α^2 <0.001). People living with a chronic illness or a disability are also at greater risk of poverty. 31 per cent of the chronically sick/disabled are in *Ubudehe* Categories 1 and 2 compared with 20 per cent of those without a disability (Crammer's V <0.001), and the mean on the normalised deprivation scale is -0.32 compared with 0.13 (t-test, df 3688 <0.001). People living with a disability are less satisfied with their life in general than those without (M4.6 cf 5.3, t-test df 3790 <0.001), but there are no difference in the levels of trust or fear of crime or for personal safety. There is also little evidence that people with a chronic illness/disability are limited in their ability to participate

in the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus. They are as likely as other people to have participated frequently in a community project and community problem solving, and they are as likely to be an active member of a Government organised group and/or civil society group as other adults. They are, however, more likely to be economically inactive, 20 per cent compared to 13 per cent (Crammer's V <0.001), and less likely to have membership of a dense network of groups, but the differences are very small.

4.7. Conclusions

We have seen that there are five groups of adults who are at greater risk of poverty and social exclusion, older people, widows/divorcees, those in *Ubudehe* Categories 1 and 2, those in Social Deprivation Quintile 1 and people with chronic health problems/disability. One important indicator of this is that they rate the quality of their life as significantly lower (t-test <0.001) although the differences are not large (Table 7).

Table 7: Vulnerable and non-Vulnerable Groups Mean Scores on a 10 Point Scale Measuring Subjective Quality of Life

Variable	Vulnerable	Non-Vulnerable	Test of Significance	DF	Significance
Age 65 Years and Over/ Other	4.6	5.1	t-test	367.5	***
Widowed/Divorced/Other	4.5	5.2	t-test	666.5	***
Chronic Health Problem/Other	4.6	5.3	t-test	3790	***
Ubudehe 1 & 2/Other	4.5	5.3	t-test	1507.4	***
Deprivation Quintile 1	3.8	5.4	t-test	3722	***

(Source: Senate 2012)(***t<0.001)

Subjective as well as objective measures of poverty are both important, with the former generally having more influence on people's satisfaction with their lives than the latter, although both make an independent contribution to explaining life satisfaction. Poverty is also one of the main factors that can limit people's ability to participate in community activities (Abbott *et al* 2012). There is a positive correlation between social deprivation and subjective quality of life measured on a 10 point scale

of 0.37 ($p<0.01$), but the correlation with subjective poverty is higher, 0.58 ($p<0.01$). In regression analysis the two variables combined with a variable for being /not being in the bottom two *Ubudehe* Categories explained 37 per cent of the variance, in life satisfaction with respondents' estimation of their households' relative economic situation explaining by far the largest amount as Table 8 shows. The larger the β the greater the contribution of the variable to the variance explained.

Table 8: Economic Factors Influence on Life Satisfaction

Variables	b	Beta	SE
Constant	1.919		0.096
Deprivation	0.403	0.191***	0.029
Rating of Household's Economic Standing	0.536	0.509***	0.015
Not in <i>Ubudehe</i> Categories 1 or 2	0.234	0.049***	0.066

Adjusted R² 0.37

(Source: Senate 2012)(***p<0.001)

5. Knowledge of, engagement and satisfaction with mechanisms for consensus building at community and National levels

5.1. **Introduction: The Basis for Building Social Capital**

The mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus are intended to enable people to work together to solve problems and have a stake in decision making. They are intended to build social capital mainly at community level, but they are linked into a framework of horizontal and vertical linkages through the decentralisation process and the National Women's Council and the National Youth Council, etc. In this way the aim is for the mechanisms to be tools contributing to the building of a socially cohesive society through working cooperatively together to achieve outcomes that are agreed by the community. Working together in the community it is assumed will build trust amongst community members and horizontal linkages trust across communities and vertical linkages trust in Government at local and national levels.


In this section we give an overview of the respondents' knowledge of and engagement with the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus before considering in the next section if they are providing a basis for the building social capital and social cohesion. As we have pointed out these are Government sponsored and participation is compulsory or an expectation. Participating in *Umuganda*, for example, is compulsory, and attendance is enforced by the police; according to the informants in the FGDs, people are fined if they do not participate. All adult members of a village are expected to participate in the village council and certain disputes have to be taken to the *Abunzi* before they can be taken to courts of law. However, respondents also reported belonging to civil society groups, and these too can build social capital. Indeed as we have already pointed out, much of the literature on social capital has looked at the role of civil society organisations that people join on a voluntary basis.

5.2. Community Engagement

Before we consider the knowledge of and engagement with the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus it is of interest to consider what the respondents said about their general involvement in community activities. The reported engagement with the community is relatively high (Figure 20); nearly two-thirds of respondents frequently attend community meetings and just over half have often worked with other members of their community to develop programmes. There is, not

surprisingly, a high correlation (0.69) between the two scales; people who frequently attend community meetings are also often involved in working with other members of the community to develop programmes. In total two-thirds of the respondents say that they frequently attend community meetings and/or work with others on community development projects. This, however, leaves a third of respondents who do not frequently engage with other community members at meeting or in developing projects.

Figure 20: Engagement with the Community in the 12 Months Prior to the Survey



(Source: Senate 2012)

Combing the two variables together gives us a Scale of Community Engagement which goes from one, low engagement, to seven, high engagement. The mean on the scale is 5.8 (8.4 on a 10 point scale) and the SD 1.7. Using this scale we carried out an analysis to see in more detail which groups are likely

to participate more than others. Those who are more likely to have high levels of community engagement are men, live in semi-rural or rural areas, married, aged 26-50 years, have completed primary school education as their highest qualification and are in Social Deprivation Q3 (Table 9).

Table 9: Differences in Community Engagement by Different Groups (% respondents)

Variable	Differences	Ova df Test
Province	Kigali (M 5.2) lowest and Southern Province highest levels of participation (M 5.9). There is no significant difference in participation between Western and Northern Provinces (M 5.5) but participation is lower than in Eastern (M 5.8) and Southern Province with no significant difference between these.	Anova df 4,370<0.001.
Location	Residents urban areas (M 5.1) are less likely to participate than those in semi-urban (M 5.7) or rural areas (M 5.8) but there is no significant difference between the latter	Anova df 2, 3815<0.001.
Age	Lowest amongst 25 year olds and younger (M 4.8), followed by 51 years and over (M 5.5). No significant difference between 26-35 (M 5.8) & 36-50 (M 6.0) year olds.	Anova dfs 3,3814 <0.001
Gender	Women (M 5.3) less likely to participate than men (M 5.9)	t-test df 3816 <0.001
Marital Status	Single (M 4.7) significantly less likely to participate, followed by widowed/divorced (M 5.2) with married (M 5.9) most likely to participate.	Anova df 2,3815 <0.001
Education	Least likely to participate completed secondary/HE (M 5.0). Most likely to participate completed primary (M 6.0).	Anova df 4,3798 <0.001
Social Deprivation	Q1 (M 5.3) least likely to participate, followed by Q2 (M 5.4). Q3 (M 5.9) most likely. No significant difference Qs 4 or 5 from Q3.	Anova df 4,3707 <0.001
Disability	Disables/chronically sick (M 5.5), not (M 5.7).	t-test df 3816 <0.01

(Source: Senate 2012)

5.3. Civic Engagement


As we have already discussed, much of the literature on social capital argues that it is built through voluntary participation in civil society groups and networks. Social capital is said to be built through the existence of thick networks of social engagement,

especially those that link people across communities and social divides. Some research in Rwanda has suggested that local community based groups and civil society organisations are crowded out by the Government sponsored ones, while other research has suggested that a lack of capacity for leadership is the main problem.

Active membership of at least one civil society group is moderate, with just under 40 per cent of respondents active in one or more community based

groups. The most frequently mentioned was active membership of a religious group (25%), but only six per cent said that there were active members of a voluntary organisation.

Figure 21: Active Membership of Community Based Organisations




(Source: Senate 2012)

Density of membership and activity in civil society organisations is low; there is little multiple membership of organisations or active participation. The Index of Density of Participation in Civil Society Organization goes from zero, no engagement at all, to 13, high

engagement and participation. The mean on the scale is 2.1 and the SD 2.0. The normalised distribution of the Index goes from -1.1 to 5.3 but is crowded around the mean with a long thin tail to the more heavily engaged end (Figure 22).

Figure 22: Normalised Distribution on the Index of Density of Participation in Civil society Organisations



(Source: Senate 2012)

There is a significant difference in dense engagement across the Provinces (Anova df4, 3832 <0.001) with the post hoc test showing that density of Civic Engagement is lowest in the City of Kigali (M 1.5) and highest in Western Province (M 2.5). There is no significant difference between Western Province, Northern Province and Eastern Province. Southern Province has a significantly lower average engagement than the other Provinces (M 2.0), but significantly higher than the City of Kigali. In terms of location, those living in urban areas are significantly less likely to have a density of engagement compared to semi-urban and rural areas (M 1.4 cf M 2.3, Anova df 2, 3834 <0.001).

Men are significantly more likely to have a dense engagement than women, but the difference in means is not large (M 2.3 cf 2.0 t-test df 3835 <0.001). Those with no formal education (M 1.7) are least likely to have dense engagement and those with completed primary the highest (M 2.5). Those with completed secondary or higher (M 2.1) and less than completed primary (M 2.1) have a significantly higher engagement than those with no formal education and lower than those with completed primary education (Anova df 4, 3817 <0.001). People who are married have the highest mean engagement in dense networks (M 2.3) and those who are

single the lowest (M 1.5). The widowed and divorced are significantly different from the married and the single (M 1.8) (Anova df 2, 3834 <0.001). There are significant differences in engagement based on age, with the young being the least likely to participate in dense networks and those in midlife the most. The mean for the 18 to 25 year age group is 1.7 compared to a mean of 2.4 for the 36-50 age group. Those aged 51 years and over are significantly more likely to participate in dense networks than the younger age group but less likely than those in mid-life (M 2.0). The 26-35 years age group does not differ significantly from the 51 years and over age group or the 36 to 50 years age group (Anova df 3, 3833 <0.001).

The extremely deprived are less likely to engage in dense networks than the non-deprived. Those in *Ubudehe* Category 1 (M 1.5) are the least likely to engage in dense networks and those in Category 3 and higher the most likely (M 2.3), with those in Category 2 (M 1.9) being significantly different from Category 1 and Category 3 and higher. (Anova df 2, 3834 <0.001). There is also a significant difference in dense engagement across the deprivation quintiles with those in Q1 (M 1.9) the least likely to engage and those in Q4 the most likely (M 2.4). Those in Q2 (M 2.0) are significantly less likely to participate in dense networks than those in Q4 (Table 10).

Table 10: Homogeneous Subgroups for Density of Membership of Civil Society Organisations by Deprivation Quintiles

Deprivation Quintiles	Subset		
	1	2	3
Q1	1.9		
Q2	2.0	2.0	
Q3	2.2	2.2	2.2
Q5		2.3	2.3
Q4			2.4

(Source: Senate 2012)(Anova df 4, 3724 <0.001)

There is a significant but low correlation (0.2 $p<0.01$) between density of engagement in civil society networks and density of engagement with the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus. There are also low but significant correlations with altruism (0.07 $p<0.01$), trust in other people in general (0.11 $p<0.01$) and satisfaction with life (0.123 $p<0.01$).


5.4. Knowledge of the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus

5.4.1. Awareness of the Mechanisms

An initial question is the extent to which people have heard of the mechanisms put in place by the Government for Dialogue and Consensus. As Figure 23 shows, there is a high level of

awareness of most of the mechanisms, with virtually all respondents having heard about *Umuganda*, participation in which is compulsory, but a low level of awareness of the Forum of Political Parties. There is generally greater awareness of mechanisms that operate at the local level and less awareness of those that operate at district and national levels. Only just over a quarter of respondents had heard of the Forum of Political Parties and only just over half the National Dialogue Summit. There is also comparatively low level of awareness of Community Juries (57%) and the Community Development Committee (45%) which do operate at a local level. Awareness is not the same as being empowered to participate. While, for example, 97 per cent of respondents had heard about *Gacaca*, only 67 per cent said that they knew how to take part. We discuss participation in more detail later in this section.

Figure 23: % of Respondents heard of the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus.




(Source: Senate 2012)

Clearly many of the respondents had heard of more than one mechanism. We computed an Index of Awareness of Mechanisms which goes from 0, never heard of any of them, to 15, heard of all the mechanisms we asked respondents

about. The mean on the Index was 11.1 and the SD 3.1. No respondent had heard of none of the mechanisms, 11 per cent had heard of all of them and over half (54.4%) had heard of 80 per cent of them.

Figure 24: Number of Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus that Respondent Knew About



(Source: Senate 2012)

Regression analysis showed that gender, education, social deprivation, marital status, location and age all make an independent contribution to predicting who is likely to identify more mechanisms (Table 11). Deprivation explains the highest amount of the

variance, with knowledge increasing as you move up the deprivation scale and the same applies to education. Those living in urban areas are less likely to know a large number of the mechanisms than those living in semi-urban or rural areas and those who are

married are more likely to know about more. In other words the people most likely to be aware of more mechanisms

are non-deprived married men over 25 years with secondary school or higher education and not living in an urban area.

Table 11: Factors Predicting Awareness of Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus

Variables	b	Beta	SE
Constant	10.431		0.355
Age	0.013	0.063***	0.004
Gender	-0.0931	-0.151***	0.097
Education	0.427	0.16***	0.046
Married	0.978	0.139***	0.111
Urban Location	-1.428	-0.168***	0.2
Deprivation	0.617	0.199***	0.051
Rural	ns	ns	ns
Disability /Chronic Illness	ns	ns	ns
Adjusted R ² 0.14			

(Source: Senate 2012)(***p<0.001)

When we consider differences in awareness of the mechanisms the most notable difference is between awareness of those that operate at local level and those that operate at a national level (Table 12). Southern Province stands out with respondents having a higher level of awareness for all mechanisms than the other Provinces. Respondents in the City of Kigali had a lower level of awareness of all the mechanisms except for the Forum of Political Parties, the National Dialogue Summit and *Itorero*, where residents of the Kigali City are significantly more likely to have heard of them. The same pattern holds for the differences between urban and other locations. Those with higher levels of education are more likely to have heard of the National Dialogue Summit, the Forum of Political Parties and *Itorero*, but

there is no clear pattern for the other mechanisms. Women are significantly less likely than men to be aware of virtually all the mechanisms. Differences are slight for the main mechanisms that operate at a local level, *Umuganda*, *Gacaca*, *Abunzi*, *Ubudehe* and Women's National Council, but range from 7.4 per cent fewer women than men having heard of the Village Advisory Council to 20 per cent having heard of the Forum of Political Parties. With the notable exception of the National Youth Council and *Itorero*, where young people aged 18-25 years were no less likely to have heard about them than those over 25 years, young people were significantly less likely to have heard of the mechanisms than those in older age groups (Crammer's V<0.001). There were no significant differences between other age groups.

Table 12: Proportion of Respondents that Have Heard of Mechanisms by Various Characteristics

	Umuganda	Gacaca	Abunzi	Ubudehe	VAC	CAC	SAC	DAC	NWC	NYC	Community Juries	CDC	Itorero	NDS	FPP
C of K	99.7	95.3	84.3	88.0	79.8	79.	74.8	66.7	74.8	72.8	42.2	40.3	85.3	70.8	42.7
Southern	99.7	99.2	97.3	97.4	94.3	92.1	82.6	63.7	80.8	73.8	70.9	50.3	76.6	54.9	24.5
Western	99.8	97.0	96.7	97.3	79.5	80.9	76.7	67.6	72.5	69.8	50.5	30.9	61.2	34.4	17.8
Northern	99.5	91.2	95.2	97.3	93.2	90.0	84.5	68.2	69.9	65.7	61.0	51.2	68.8	48.5	24.8
Eastern	99.6	98.2	96.1	96.1	94.3	90.7	83.3	70.7	82.3	78.6	55.4	50.4	74.0	65.4	30.1
Urban	99.5	94.6	82.6	87.0	76.1	74.5	69.5	63.8	70.8	70.9	37.7	35.7	80.4	66.2	39.8
Semi-urban	99.7	97.0	97.0	94.8	95.1	91.5	85.5	68.8	83.0	76.7	62.7	51.5	79.5	61.4	33.2
Rural	99.7	97.0	96.8	97.5	90.5	89.2	82.3	67.8	77.2	72.3	60.5	45.7	70.3	50.7	23.7
Male	99.5	97.8	96.0	96.5	92.3	91.1	85.5	73.0	75.9	79.5	62.2	48.4	81.5	63.2	37.1
Female	99.8	95.5	93.0	94.7	84.9	82.9	75.6	61.5	77.5	65.5	51.8	41.0	64.1	45.2	17.2
No Education	99.5	95.4	93.5	95.8	87.6	84.6	77.2	63.4	71.4	67.1	56.5	43.2	61.9	42.6	14.4
Incomplete Primary	99.8	96.8	95.5	96.6	88.7	86.5	78.9	65.0	73.6	68.4	57.0	44.7	67.5	48.8	20.1
Completed Primary	99.6	97.8	96.4	96.8	92.7	91.7	85.5	70.1	80.9	76.1	62.2	46.1	79.2	58.4	31.9
Incomplete Secondary	99.7	94.9	90.8	90.8	82.7	82.1	77.8	67.5	80.5	79.4	49.6	41.2	82.7	66.7	39.0
Senior Secondary Higher	100	97.7	92	92.4	86.2	86.3	83.2	79.4	87.4	85.5	48.1	48.1	93.9	84.4	66.4
Q1	99.5	96.4	93.2	94.8	84.3	80.7	72.5	59.1	67.0	61.5	52.1	40.1	58.7	38.7	15.8
Q2	99.5	96.3	95.4	97.2	90.0	87.7	79.5	62.8	74.0	68.9	53.8	40.8	66.0	46.2	20.3
Q3	99.9	97.0	95.8	95.7	89.7	88.9	81.7	65.1	78.0	73.2	59.7	47.0	74.9	54.6	25.5
Q4	99.9	97.3	94.7	95.9	89.4	89.4	84.0	72.1	80.2	77.4	61.6	44.8	80.4	63.2	31.9
Q5	99.6	97.2	94.4	94.9	89.9	88.7	85.4	78.6	84.2	81.0	59.6	49.9	83.2	68.2	41.8
Total	99.7	96.6	94.5	95.6	88.6	87.0	80.6	67.3	76.7	72.5	57.0	44.7	72.8	54.2	27.2


(Source: Senate 2012)

5.4.2. Sources of information about the Mechanisms

People are likely to find out about mechanisms that operate in the community from village leaders and by word of mouth, but this may not be the case for those that function nationally. In virtually every FGD the participants told us that the leaders tell them about policies and initiatives in the meetings after *Umuganda*. This seems to be the main way in which Rwandans get information. In a few cases informants told us they get information on what the House of Representatives and Senate are doing from the radio. In the survey we asked respondents to tell us how they find out about three mechanisms, *Gacaca*, the *Abunzi* and

the National Dialogue Summit. As a further indication of awareness we asked respondents to tell us how often they discussed *Gacaca* and the *Abunzi* with friends and relatives. The main sources of information are meetings, especially for getting information frequently. In the case of *Gacaca*, for example, nearly half of the respondents said that they got information at least weekly from meetings (Figure 25) and only eight per cent that they never get information. Friends and the radio were also sources of information with around two-thirds of respondents saying they got information from at least one of these. By contrast only around 15 per cent of respondents ever got any information from television or newspapers.

Figure 25: Sources of Information *Gacaca*



(Source: Senate 2012)


Gacaca is also frequently discussed with family, friends, neighbours and other members of the community. Only

around 11 per cent of respondents did not discuss *Gacaca* ever with any one of these groups, although only just over a

third discuss *Gacaca* often or very often (Figure 26). There is little difference in who *Gacaca* is discussed with, although marginally more respondents discuss

Gacaca frequently with other members of their family than neighbours, friends or other members of the community.

Figure 26: Discussion about Gacaca with Family, Friends and Members of the Community
% of Respondents




(Source: Senate 2012)

The same pattern of information sources holds for the *Abunzi* as for *Gacaca*, but respondents were less likely to get information as frequently. Nevertheless just over 40 per cent of respondents said that they got information at least monthly through meetings and only 13 per cent that

they never get information at meetings (Figure 27). The significantly lower proportion getting information on the *Abunzi* from the radio, television and newspapers compared to information about *Gacaca* suggests that the service does not get the same level of media exposure.


Figure 27: Sources of Information Abunzi % of Respondents



(Source: Senate 2012)

Respondents were slightly more likely to discuss the *Abunzi* with friends, neighbours and other members of the community than with family, but the differences were small (Figure 28). However, 40 per cent of the respondents rarely or never discuss the service with anyone, and only just under a fifth discuss the service frequently with other people.

Figure 28: Discussion about Abunzi with Family, Friends and Members of the Community % of Respondents




(Source: Senate Data)

Figure 29 shows the main sources for information about the National Dialogue Summit. Only 54 per cent of respondents had heard of the Summit, and of these the vast majority had got information from the radio. This contrasts strongly with sources of information about *Gacaca* and the *Abunzi*, where meetings and friends

were nominated as the main sources of information, although the radio was also seen as important. According to EICV 3(NISR 2012) 60.2 per cent of households have at least one radio and 45.4 per cent a mobile phone, while only 6.4 per cent have a television and 3.7 per cent accesses to the internet at home.

Figure 29: Sources of Information National Dialogue Summit % of Respondents



(Source: Senate 2012)

5.4.3. Knowledge of the Mechanisms

In addition to awareness of the programmes, it is important for people to know what they are intended for and how to participate. Only just over two-thirds (67.4%) of respondents said that they knew how to take part in activities related to *Gacaca*. A majority, two-thirds of the respondents, thought that *Gacaca* was intended for the whole community, a quarter that it was for the perpetrators of the Genocide against the Tutsi, 12 per cent that it was for perpetrators and survivors and five per cent for survivors. Only two per cent said that they did not know.

Most of the respondents did not think that they had adequate knowledge about the *Abunzi*. Only 14 per cent thought that they had adequate knowledge while 64 per cent of respondents said that they have no or very little knowledge. Although the differences between groups was not large, respondents living in the City of Kigali (76%), living in urban areas (73.4%), women (72.8%) , under 26 years (73%) and single (74.8%) were more likely to say they had little or no knowledge of the service than other respondents.

5.5. Engagement with the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus


5.5.1. Attending/Using the Mechanisms

However, it is important not just to consider if people have heard of the mechanisms but if they are engaging with them. Dialogue and consensus means participating in the process on a regular basis. As Figure 30 shows, engagement with any given mechanism is relatively low with the notable exception of *Umuganda*. Even with *Umuganda*, 28 per cent of respondents do not attend regularly. While 44.3 per cent of respondents said

that they engaged with the National Dialogue Summit, in practice this is overwhelmingly passive, watching television or listening to the radio. Less than two per cent of respondents participated by calling, sending an SMS, using the internet or participating in person.

In the case of some of the mechanisms, not all members of the community would be expected to have engaged with them, for example, only those involved in a dispute within the remit of the *Abunzi* will have used the service. However, the building of social capital and social cohesion from Dialogue and Consensus are likely to be greatest when there are high levels of engagement.

Figure 30: % of Respondents Engagement with Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus¹




¹ *Umuganda* engagement is attending every month, for Village Advisory Committee 12 or more times a year, for NWC and NYC attending regularly. For NWC % of women and for NYC % 35 years and under)

Nevertheless 95 per cent of respondents have engagement with at least one mechanism, albeit infrequent. An index of density of engagement computed by adding together frequency of involvement with the mechanisms

for Dialogue and Consensus ranged from 0, no engagement, to 16, high engagement, the mean on the 16 point index was 7.9 (4.9 converted to a 10 point scale) and the SD 3.1.

Figure 31: Index of Density of Engagement with the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus




(Source: Senate 2012)

The normalised scale ranges from -2.5 to +2.26 with crowding just above the mean but a more dense tail to the negative end than the positive end in-

dicating that there are far fewer people with a very high level of engagement than there are with a low level of engagement.

Figure 32: Normalised Distribution on the Index of Density of Engagement with the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus



(Source: Senate 2012)

There is a significant difference in the average density of engagement with the mechanisms across the Provinces but the differences are not large. It is densest in the Southern Province (M +0.2) and least dense in the City of Kigali (M -0.27). The post hoc test shows that

there are three subsets with the City of Kigali and the Western Province having the least engagement and the Southern and Eastern the most. The Northern lies between these two groups (Anova df 4, 3821 <0.001. There is also a significant difference by location with density

of engagement being significantly lower in urban areas (M -0.37) than rural and semi-urban areas (M +0.11) (Anova df2, 3823 <0.001). Men, on average, have a denser engagement with the mechanisms than women but the differences are not large (M +0.1, M -0.1, t-test df 3824 <0.001) and the same is the case for people living with a chronic illness (M -0.17, M +0.07, t-test df 3785 <0.001). Married people are significantly more likely to engage in dense networks than single or divorced/widowed people (+ M 0.14, -0.43 Anova df 2, 2, 2823 <0.001). Younger people and older people are less likely to participate in dense networks than adults in mid-life. The lowest mean is for the 18-25 years age group (M -0.34) and the highest for 26 to 35 year olds (M +0.29). There is no significant difference in the means for 18-25 year olds and 51 years and over with 36 to 50 and 26-35 year olds being significantly different from these two groups (Anova df 3, 3822 <0.001).

The most deprived are significantly less likely to engage in dense networks with those in quintile 1 having a significantly lower mean but with no difference between the other quintiles (M -0.26), M +0.12 , Anova df 4,3714 >0.001). Similarly those in *Ubudehe* Category 1 have a significantly lower mean than those in the other two categories (M -0.31, M +0.02, Anova df 2, 3823 <0.001). The lowest mean for education is for completed secondary or higher (M -0.23) and the highest for completed primary (0.25). There is no significant difference between completed secondary and no formal education (Anova df 4,3807 <0.001).

The linear regression enables us to see (Table 13) that married, able bodied men living outside of urban areas with completed primary school education, aged 26 to 50 years and not in the bottom social deprivation category are those most likely to engage in a number of mechanisms.

Table 13: Factors Predicting Engagement with Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus

Variables	b	Beta	SE
Constant	5.445		0.324
Age - Midlife	1.221	191***	0.103
Gender	-0.289	-0.046**	0.096
Senior Secondary or Higher Education	ns	ns	ns
Primary Education	0.529	0.077***	0.108
Married	1.009	0.142***	0.115
Urban Location	-1.288	-0.151	0.137
Not Deprivation Q1	0.864	0.109***	0.123
No Disability /Chronic Illness	0.417	0.061***	0.107
Adjusted R ²	0.15		

(Source: Senate 2012)***p<0.001)

Differences in engagement by different groups in the individual mechanisms are not generally very large and there is no easily discernible pattern. The residents of the City of Kigali are less likely to engage with the mechanisms apart for *Umuganda* and the National Dialogue Summit where they are more likely to engage. Generally engagement is lower in urban areas, with the exception of the National Dialogue Summit where it is higher. With the obvious exception of the Women's National Council and *Gacaca*, women are much less likely than men to engage frequently with the mechanisms. There is no clear relationship between engagement with the mechanisms and education, although those with completed primary education tend to engage more than other groups and those with completed senior secondary or higher education with the National Dialogue Summit. With the exception of the National Youth Council, participation tends to be highest amongst adults in mid-life (25-50 years) and lowest amongst the 18-25 year olds. Those over 50 years are marginally more likely to have engaged with *Gacaca* and *Ubudehe* but the differences are relatively small. With the exception of the *Abunzi* and *Ubudehe* where engagement increases with increasing deprivation, there is a tendency for engagement to increase as the level of social deprivation decreases.

The FGDs and key informant interviews suggest a rather different picture of community engagement and differences across the country. As the survey suggests the highest levels

of engagement are with *Umuganda*, with some communities having very high levels of participation and others lower levels. High participation in some cases is said to be because people want to participate, but in other cases at least part of the explanations for high attendance is fear of being fined. In urban and semi-urban areas those with non-farm jobs were said to participate less frequently than those working in agriculture. Some informants suggested that male youth attended more than older people and women. Apart from this there was little evidence of engagement with the formal mechanisms.

However, what did come across in the FGDs was significant involvement in dispute resolution at a local level. In a large number of the FGDs participants told us that they had learnt how to resolve disputes themselves and if they could not then neighbours in the village discussed the issues and made recommendations. Disputes were less frequently being referred to village leaders and especially to the cell and *Abunzi* than in the past. Also in a high proportion of FGDs and key informant interviews reference was made to the involvement of members of the community in tontines. This was seen to be very important as the groups were seen to provide a sort of insurance saving for members to cope with shocks as well for investment in income generating activities. Also reference was frequently made to attending the funerals and weddings of members of the community providing another forum for interaction.

Table 14: Proportion of Respondents that have Frequently Engaged with Mechanisms by Various Characteristics

	<i>Umuganda</i>	Gacaca	<i>Abunzi</i> (used)	Village Advisory Council	National Women's Council ¹	National Youth Council ²	Community Juries	National Dialogue Summit
C of K	80.8	38.4	12.7	32.0	11.5	7.9	5.3	67.0
Southern	73.8	39.5	21.4	34.4	20.2	14.2	18.6	43.9
Western	69.7	44.4	24.0	30.6	26.6	17.8	10.4	24.6
Northern	70.8	44.8	22.0	50.0	37.0	28.7	6.8	46.2
Eastern	68.1	30.4	25.5	52.1	32.6	25.1	12.3	51.3
Urban	74.8	40.7	12.8	28.6	9.5	6.7	5.7	61.4
Semi-urban	77.3	34.2	21.2	49.3	31.1	21.1	11.8	50.7
Rural	71.1	39.6	23.5	40.6	28.5	21.0	12.7	41.1
Male	78.2	34.1	23.9	44.6	0	25.5	14.3	53.0
Female	66.3	44.4	19.6	34.4	32.9	10.7	8.7	37.4
No Education	57.2	41.2	21.3	37.2	23.5	14.7	9.4	32.0
Incomplete Primary	73.3	40.1	23.2	41.5	24.0	20.5	11.1	40.9
Completed Primary	82.4	35.0	21.2	43.3	29.9	17.8	14.9	48.5
Incomplete Secondary	73.4	43.1	23.4	34.4	22.9	14.6	8.9	56.6
Senior Secondary Higher	77.5	41.8	16.7	29.4	23.7	18.8	10.3	78.6
18-25 Years	69.1	55.7	15.5	23.4	15.3	33.2	5.6	48.2
26-35 Years	86.7	47.0	20.0	43.4	26.1	27.7	12.5	47.9
36-50 Years	81.4	33.2	23.3	43.2	33.3	-----	13.0	44.7
51 Years and Over	45.3	28.1	25.3	40.0	20.1	-----	12.0	41.1
Q1	60.6	43.6	24.7	33.6	22.3	26.0	11.9	29.8
Q2	72.3	37.6	23.3	42.2	24.7	27.1	10.6	37.9
Q3	74.9	41.4	19.8	39.5	25.3	31.3	12.4	45.9
Q4	75.6	38.1	21.8	43.0	26.8	30.8	9.5	54.9
Q5	78.5	35.9	19.3	40.2	26.8	31.1	13.1	57.6
Total	72.3	39.2		39.5	25.3	18.0	11.5	45.2

(Source: Senate 2012)

5.5.2 *Participation in the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus*


A majority of respondents said that in general they welcome participating in the mechanisms and the opportunity they afford for debate. Only 6.8 per cent said that they did not welcome the opportunity, 19.3 per cent that they worry about not being able to express themselves freely and 25.3 per cent that they take up too much time. Those who lack confidence in their ability to contribute are also much more likely to say that they worry that the mechanisms take up too much of their time (Spearman 0.8 $p < 0.01$). Interestingly there is little relationship between welcoming the opportunity to participate and density of participation, the correlation although significant was negligible (Spearman 0.09 $p < 0.01$). The proportion not welcoming the opportunity is too small for detailed analysis.

Those most likely to lack confidence in their ability to participate are widows, the chronically sick/disabled, those with little if any formal education and those in the bottom social deprivation category. However, there were no large differences between groups: women compared to men, (21% cf 17%), the chronically sick and disabled (21.4% cf 17.7%) and widows/divorced compared to single and married people (27% cf 18%) were all less confident

(Crammer's V 0.001). Those with no education were less confident than those with education; the relationship is linear varying from 25.4 per cent of those with no education to 15.6 per cent of those with senior secondary or higher education. The relationship between social deprivation and lack of confidence was more complex. Those in the bottom quintile were significantly more likely to lack confidence (27.5%) and those in Q3 the least likely (14.3%), followed by Q4 (17.7%), Q2 (20%) and Q5 (21.1%) ($\alpha^2 < 0.001$). There were no differences by age. In terms of concern about time to participate those that were concerned about sufficient time were widows/divorced (30% cf 25%), Crammer's V 0.001), with no formal education (30.2% cf 25%) and in the bottom social deprivation category (33% cf 20.3% for Q3, 23.8% Q5 & 24.8% Q2) ($\alpha^2 < 0.001$).

For *Gacaca* we asked respondents which activities they had participated in and Figure 33 shows activities respondents had undertaken. The most frequently mentioned role of those who had participated was as an observer with just over a quarter of respondents saying that they had done this. 14 per cent had gathered information and nine per cent acted as a judge, while only four per cent had given witness testimony and two per cent been defendants or were survivors. The numbers are too small for detailed analysis.

Figure 33: Activities Related to Gacaca Respondents Participated In




The vast majority of those who attend village council meetings feel able to express their opinions (96.8%). Just under half of those who attend meetings have had an issue discussed during a meeting (44.8%, 36.6% of all respondents) and for 93 per cent of these their issue was discussed at a meeting. There was a high level of satisfaction with how the issue was dealt with, 92.6 per cent were satisfied with the amount of time devoted to their issue and 88.6 per cent with the resolution agreed. However, while only 47.6 per cent thought that all decisions made at meeting are implemented, only just over one per cent (1.3%) thought that none of the decisions agreed at meetings were implemented.

Those who attend village council meetings regularly are, perhaps not surprisingly, more likely to have raised an issue than those who attend less

frequently, 51.3 per cent compared to 39 per cent (Cramer's $V < 0.001$). Men are more likely to have raised an issue than women, (54.8% cf 34.0%, Cramer's $V < 0.001$), married/single people than widows/divorced (45.6 cf 38.9, Cramer's $V < 0.01$), and there is a linear relationship between education and raising an issue varying from 50.5 per cent of those in Q5 to 39.6 per cent of those in Q1.

44 per cent of respondents had heard of the National Dialogue Summit but only 45.3 per cent had participated. All of those who said that they participate said they felt free to express their opinions during the Summit but the majority only participated passively by listening to the radio and/or watching the television. Only two per cent of respondents took part actively by phoning in and/or using SMS and/or attending in person (Figure 34).

Figure 34: % of Respondents that Participate in the National Dialogue Summit



In total 57 per cent of women have some engagement with the Women’s National Council and of these the overwhelming majority (98.2%) feel able to express their views during meetings and 97 per cent think that they have sufficient opportunity during meetings to make their views known on local issues. Ninety-one per cent have voted in elections for committee membership.

5.5.3. *Motivation for Attending Meetings of Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus*

It is important to understand what motivates people’s attendance. For a number of the mechanisms we asked respondents the most important reason for their attendance, and we also asked them what they thought was the most important reason for other people attending. For *Umuganda*, which is compulsory, we also asked

respondents how they rated the attendance of the members of their community. Nearly three-quarters thought attendance was high or very high and only 2.8 per cent thought it was low or very low. There was no significant relationship between rating of the level of attendance and participation. There were some differences between respondents rating of attendance and their reports of their attendance by District and location. While Kigali had the highest level of regular attendance by respondents (80.8%) only 68 per cent of respondents rated attendance as high by the community, and while only 70.8 per cent of respondents from the Northern Province reported regular attendance themselves 83.8 per cent reported high levels of community attendance. Similarly, while 74.8 per cent of respondents living in urban areas said that they attend regularly, only 63.8 per cent thought that community attendance was high.

For those who attended meetings the main reason given was that the programme was important and they wanted to participate. Other reasons such as participation being compulsory

or because of the expectation of monetary reward were given by a tiny minority. However, 13 per cent, over 1 in 10 said that they attended *Gacaca* out of curiosity.

Table 15: Most Important Reason for Participation/Attending Meeting % of those that Attend.

Mechanism	Gacaca	Village Advisory Council	Umuganda	Meetings After Umuganda	Women's National council	National Youth Council
Reason for Attending						
Expectation Financial Incentives	0	0	0	0.3	0.8	2.8
Negative Sanctions /Compulsion	7.4	7.4	3.9	2.8	2.9	1.9
Voluntary/Programme Important	69.8	89.1	91.1	90	90.4	77.2
Curiosity	13.1	0	0	2.6	2.0	2.6
Other /Don't know	8.8	3.5	5.0	4.2	3.8	5.7

(Source: Senate 2012)

In the FGDs, respondents talked at length about the reasons for attending *Umuganda*. While there certainly was an element of wanting to avoid paying fines, the overwhelming impression was that people attend because they want to. In many communities there seems to be a strong collective commitment to *Umuganda* and what it achieves for the community. The main motivation for participating in community work was commitment to improving their community. In some cases the community work undertaken during *Umuganda* was seen as benefitting the whole community and in other cases the vulnerable and very deprived. The main motivation for participating in the meetings held after *Umuganda*

was to get information on Government programmes, to keep abreast of what is going on.

The motivations for attendance attributed by respondents to other people were much the same as for self-motivation. However, the proportion of other people who were said to attend because they saw attendance as important was somewhat lower.

Over 1 in 10 in the case of *Umuganda* and 1 in 10 for village advisory council meetings thought that people attended because of fear of negative sanctions if they did not attend. In FGDs, as well as fines for non-attendance community disapproval was also mentioned as a sanction.

Table 16 Most Important Reason Why Other People Attend Meetings % of Responses

Mechanism	<i>Gacaca</i>	Village Advisory Council	Meetings After <i>Umuganda</i>	Women's National Council	National Youth Council
Reason for Attending					
Expectation Financial Incentives	0.1	0	0.8	0.9	0.7
Negative Sanctions / Compulsion	13.7	10.0	6.2	3.1	2.9
Voluntary/ Programme Important	73.8	82.1	87.4	86.2	85.7
Curiosity	8.0	0	1.9	1.8	2.2
Other /Don't know	4.3	7.9	3.7	7.0	

(Source: Senate 2012)

Overall, the two main reasons given for people not attending meetings were lack of time and not being aware of the mechanism. Just over a third said that people lacked time to attend meetings after *Umuganda*, and a fifth to attend meetings of the Village Advisory Council, Women's National Council or the Youth Council. Around a third said that non-attendance at

the Women's National Council and National Youth Council meetings were because of lack of knowledge, but only a tenth thought this was the case for *Gacaca* and the Village Advisory Council. Interestingly a third thought that people did not participate in the Village Advisory Council because they were not encouraged to do so, while none thought this was the case for the other mechanisms.

Table 17: Main Reasons Why People Do Not Attend Meetings % of Responses

Mechanism	<i>Gacaca</i>	Village Advisory Council	Meetings After <i>Umuganda</i>	Women's National council	National Youth Council
Reason for Not Attending					
Not Aware of Mechanism	11.3	11.5	17.8	33.0	34.3
Not Encouraged to Attend	4.3	5.9	6.0	9.2	11.4
No Benefit from Attending	11.4	5.5	7.0	6.3	9.4
Not Willing to Participate	0.0	32.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Do Not Have Time	15.1	20.4	35.3	23.7	19.6
Other/Don't Know	62.0	23.4	32.3	27.7	25.3


(Source: Senate 2012)

The proportion saying that people only attend meetings because they are compulsory was relatively low. Only 18 per cent, for example, of those that were aware of Community Juries thought that attendance should be voluntary, while 80.8 per cent gave answers that suggested they agreed that it should be compulsory. Furthermore there was no suggestion in the FGDs that there was any problem with fining people for non-attendance at *Umuganda*.

5.6. Perceptions of Individual and Community Benefitting from the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus

Figure 35 shows the proportion of respondents who thought that their community had benefitted from the mechanisms. This ranges from 98 per cent who think that their community has benefitted from *Umuganda*, to 43 per cent who think that their community has benefitted from the Community Development Committee. In general, not surprisingly, mechanisms that are more widely known about are more likely to be seen as benefitting the community and these are also the ones where people are more likely to see the direct benefit to their community.

Figure 35: % of Respondents that think that they/their Community has Benefitted a lot or a Fair Amount from the Mechanism for Dialogue and Consensus



(Source: Senate 2012)

Seventy-five per cent of respondents thought that the Women’s National Council represents the interests of ordinary Rwandan women, and 72 per cent that it plays a key role in solving conflicts and problems affecting women in the community. 71 per cent think that the National Youth council represents the interests of youth in Rwanda, and 67 per cent that it plays a role in solving conflict and problems affecting youth.

Around three-quarters of the female respondents think that the Women’s National Council plays an important role in resolving conflict and issues involving women, with 76 per cent thinking that they and their community benefit a lot or a fair amount from it. The same proportion thinks that it represents the interests of ordinary Rwandan women. Seventy-three per cent think that it plays a key role in resolving conflict

and problems affecting women in their community and 74.9 per cent that it promotes Dialogue and Consensus around women’s issues in their community. In total, 62.8 per cent of women think that it has achieved its objective.

Much the same picture emerges when we consider the evaluation of youth of the National Youth Council, although only 52 per cent think that it has been successful. Seventy-four per cent think that they and the community benefit from the Council and 74 per cent that it represents the interests of youth. Seventy-three per cent strongly agree or agree that it promotes Dialogue and Consensus around youth issues, 69 per cent that it plays a key role in solving conflict and problems affecting youth in the community and 66 per cent that it contributes to the process of Dialogue and Consensus.

However, in the FGDs and key informant interviews the three mechanisms that were seen to bring the greatest benefit were *Umuganda*, the *Abunzi* and *Girinka*. *Umuganda* was seen to bring benefits to the community through the building of infrastructure including schools and roads as well as building houses for the extremely poor and the elderly. The *Abunzi* were seen by a majority of informants to be very effective at resolving disputes especially those involving land. In addition, in a number of FGDs, the participants told us that the community had learnt from the *Abunzi* how disputes can be resolved and now most disputes are dealt with at the village level. *Girinka* was seen as successful for two reasons: firstly, it improved recipients' economic wellbeing; and secondly, it increased altruism because those with cows often gave milk to those without and the recipient of a cow had in turn to give a cow to another household.

5.7. Satisfaction with the Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus


5.7.1. *Satisfaction with the Mechanisms Generally*

Respondent's levels of satisfaction with the mechanisms will reflect the extent to which they are delivering. However, it is not a measure of how satisfied they are with it as a way of permitting Dialogue and Consensus. Dialogue and consensus is the way in which decisions that influence the outcomes are expected to be made,

but as the qualitative research shows this is not invariably the case. The extent to which the informants felt they contributed to outcomes varied by mechanism and location, but generally was not considered to be high except for dispute resolution in the meetings after *Umuganda*. Also the mechanism that the informants seemed to be most satisfied with was the *Abunzi*, where few had actively participated. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that levels of satisfaction with Dialogue and Consensus may influence overall satisfaction, at least for some of the mechanisms. We first look at the levels of satisfaction with the mechanisms based on the proportion of respondents who had used the mechanisms. We then look in more detail at three of the mechanisms that respondents participate in at village level and where Dialogue and Consensus is likely to be central to the functioning of the mechanism.

Levels of high satisfaction with the mechanisms (8/10 and above) vary from 82 per cent for *Umuganda* to 51 per cent for the National Dialogue Summit, based on the respondents who rated the mechanisms. Levels of high satisfaction are somewhat lower than the proportion of respondents who think that their community has benefitted from a mechanism, for example, 98 per cent of respondents said that their community had benefitted from *Umuganda* but only 83 per cent gave a score of eight out of 10 or over to *Umuganda* for level of satisfaction.

Figure 36: Satisfaction with Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus % of Sample Giving a Rating of at Least 8 out of 10, % of Respondents Giving a Rating




(Source: Senate 2012)

90 per cent of respondents thought that the service was successful. However, only just over a fifth (21%) had used the service, and on a 10 point scale the mean level of satisfaction was only 7.4,

with a SD of 2.5. Those who have used the service are significantly less likely to be satisfied than those who have not although the difference is not large (85% cf 91% Crammers' V 0.001).

Figure 37: Levels of Satisfaction on a Ten Point Scale by Those Who Have Used the Service



(Source: Senate 2012)

There was no significant difference between those that had not and those

that had used the service in terms of attribution for successful outcomes.

5.8.2. *Satisfaction with the Village Advisory Council*

We also ask a number of questions asking about satisfaction with specific elements of the Council, eight per cent said that they did not know or did not give a rating. The mean rating for overall satisfaction and on the various aspects varied from 7.4 to 7.7 (Table 18). The

variance explained by the various aspects on factor analysis was 84.5 per cent and the CA 0.97 indicating that satisfaction with one aspect correlates highly with satisfaction on all the other aspects. The correlation between overall satisfaction and satisfaction on a scale computed from satisfaction with the various aspects was large and significant (0.8 $p < 0.01$).


Table 18: Mean Satisfaction with Various aspects of the Work of the Village Advisory Council % Respondents Gave a Rating

Activities of Village Advisory Council	Mean Satisfaction	SD	80% +
Overall Rating	7.6	1.8	56.8
Identifying Problems of Community	7.5	1.8	55.2
Initiating community dialogue around Issues	7.5	1.7	53.8
Encouraging Inclusive Participation	7.7	1.7	58
Ensuring that there is a Clear Understanding of Community's perceptions of Issues	7.5	1.8	54.7
Ensuring Inclusion of more Disadvantaged Members of the Community	7.4	1.8	53.6
Implementing the Agreed Action Plan	7.5	1.9	54.2
Mobilising Resources to Address Problems that are identified	7.5	1.8	54.4
Ensuring that All Members of the Community Participate in Implementation	7.5	1.8	53.5
Securing Equity of Benefit from Community Initiative	7.4	1.9	53.7

The normalised distribution for satisfaction with the Village Advisor Council (Figure 38) goes from -3.7 to +1.3 indicating a long tail of people who are less satisfied with the work of the Council, but with the majority of

respondents being crowded around the mean and with a noticeable proportion who are totally satisfied with the work of the Council, and indeed 30 per cent of respondents gave the Council a score of nine or 10 out of 10.

Figure 38: Normalised Distribution for Satisfaction with the Work of Village Advisory Council



(Source: Senate 2012)


Differences between groups in terms of satisfaction with the work of the Village Advisory Council were small even when significant. There were no significant differences between men and women, those with a disability/chronic illness and those without, by education, by deprivation or *Ubudehe* Category. There were differences across the Provinces, with those in the City of Kigali being the least satisfied (M 7.2) and those living in Northern Province the most satisfied (M 8.0). Eastern Province residents (M 7.7) are less satisfied than Northern Province and more satisfied than City of Kigali (Anova df 4, 3558 >0.001). The means for Western Province and Southern Province do not differ significantly from those of City of Kigali residents or those of Eastern Province. Those living in urban areas (M 7.3) are significantly less satisfied than those living in rural areas (M 7.6) but there is no significant difference between urban and semi-urban (M 7.5) or rural and semi-urban (Anova df 2, 3560 >0.001). Those aged

18 to 25 years (M 7.3) are significantly less satisfied than all other age groups with no significant differences between the other age groups (M 51 years and over 7.7) (Anova df 3.3559 <0.001). The single (M 7.2) are less satisfied than the married and widowed/divorced but there is no significant difference between the latter (M Married 7.6) (Anova df 2, 3560 <0.001).

5.8.3. *Women’s Satisfaction with the Work of the Women’s National Council*

Two-thirds of women who rated the work of the council give it a satisfaction score of 8 out of 10 or higher (Figure 39). On the 10 point scale the mean for overall satisfaction is 7.9 with a SD of 1.8. Nevertheless there are some women who are dissatisfied with the work of the Council and 1 in 10 gave it a satisfaction score of five out of 10 or less.

Figure 39: Score out of 10 for Overall Satisfaction with the Work of the Women's National Council % of Women Aware of its Work



(Source: Senate 2012)

In addition to asking about overall satisfaction we asked about satisfaction with various elements of the work of the Council and the satisfaction scores were much the same for all the domains as the overall score (Table 19). Women that are satisfied with one aspect of

the council's work tend to be satisfied with the other aspects and those who are dissatisfied with one aspect with the other aspects as well. The domain scores are highly inter-correlated and a scale computed from them correlates highly with the overall satisfaction score, Pearson 0.8 ($p < 0.01$).

Table 19: Satisfaction with Activates of Women's National Council % of Women Giving a Rating


Activities of Women's National Council	Mean Satisfaction	SD	80% +
Overall Rating	7.9	1.8	67.5
Identifying Problems of Women in the Community	7.7	1.9	62.0
Initiating community dialogue around Issues amongst Women	7.6	1.9	60.0
Encouraging Inclusive Participation of Women in Community Development	7.7	1.9	61.7
Ensuring that Women have a Clear Understanding of Issues	7.7	1.9	61.0
Ensuring Inclusion of more Disadvantaged Women in the Community	7.7	1.9	61.5
Implementing the Agreed Action Plan	7.6	1.9	60.2
Enabling Women to Get their Voice Hard on local Issues	7.7	1.9	62.3
Enabling Women to Get their Voice Hard on National Issues	7.7	2.0	63.2
Initiating Dialogue on Issues between Men and Women	7.7	1.9	61.8

(Source: Senate 2012)

Figure 40 shows the normalised distribution for the scores on the Scale satisfaction with the various aspects of the work of the National Women’s Council around the mean score of 7.7. The scale goes from -3.7 to +1.3 with

crowding around and above the mean but with a long tail again showing a relatively high level of satisfaction by women with the work of the Council but with a long tail of women who are less satisfied.

Figure 40: Domain Satisfaction for National Women’s Council % of Women that Rated the Work of the Council




(Source: Senate 2012)

There were no significant differences in levels of satisfaction between women based on age, marital status, education, social deprivation or living with a chronic illness/disability. There are significant differences across provinces and by location, but they are not large. The Provinces fall into three distinct groups, women are least satisfied with the Women’s National Council in Southern Province (-0.26) and the City of Kigali and most satisfied in Northern Province (+0, 42), with Western and Eastern Province laying in-between (Anova df 4, 1402 <0.001). Women living in urban areas (-0.26) are less satisfied than those living in other locations (+0.06) (Anova df 2, 1404).

5.8.4. Youth Satisfaction with the Work of the National Youth Council

Youth are also relatively satisfied with the work of the National Youth Council although marginally less satisfied than women are with the National Women’s Council. The 76 per cent of youth who are aware of the work of the Council on average give it a score of 7.3 out of 10, with 52.7 per cent giving it a score of 8 out of 10 or higher. However, just under one in five (17.2% of youth) give it a score of five or less on the 10 point scale although nearly a quarter give it a score of 10 out of 10.

Figure 41: Score out of 10 for Overall Satisfaction with the Work of the National Youth Council % of Women Aware of its Work



(Source: Senate 2012)

Youth that were satisfied with one aspect of the Councils' work tended to be satisfied with other aspects. The correlation between the overall satisfaction scale and a scale computed from the scales measuring satisfaction

with various aspects of the Council's work was very high (0.8 $p < 0.01$). This indicates that youth's level of satisfaction with the Council tends to be much the same across the various aspects of its work.

Table 20: Satisfaction with Activates of National Youth Council % of Youth that Gave a Rating


Activities of Women's National Council	Mean Satisfaction	SD	80% +
Overall Rating	7.3	2.0	52.7
Identifying problems of youth in the community	6.9	2.0	41.8
Initiating community dialogue around issues affecting youth	6.8	2.0	40.6
Encouraging inclusive participation of youth in community development	7.0	2.0	42.8
Ensuring that youth have a clear understanding of issues	6.8	2.1	40.9
Ensuring inclusion of more disadvantaged youth in the community	6.8	2.1	41.1
Implementing the agreed action plan	6.9	2.1	40.6
Enabling youth to get their voice heard on local issues	6.9	2.1	42.6
Enabling youth to get their voice heard on national issues	6.9	2.1	44.2

(Source: Senate 2012)

Figure 42 shows the normalised distribution for the Domain Satisfaction Scale. It shows the variance around the mean for the scale of 6.9. It goes from -3.1 to +1.6, showing a moderate level of variance. There is crowding around the mean with a noticeable peak at the top

end but also a long tail suggesting that most youth are relatively satisfied with the work of the Council but that there is a noticeable minority that are less satisfied and in some cases dissatisfied with the work of the Council.

Figure 42: Domain Satisfaction National Youth Council % of Youth that are Aware of the Work of the Council



(Source: Senate 2012)

There were no significant differences in levels of satisfaction between youth based on age, gender, marital status, education, social deprivation or living with a chronic illness/disability. There are significant differences across provinces and by location, but they are not large. Youth are least satisfied in the

City of Kigali (-0.21) and most satisfied in Northern Province (+ 0.21) with no significant differences for the other Provinces (Anova df 4, 1194<0.001). Youth living in urban areas (-0.21) are significantly less satisfied than those living in rural areas (+0.07) but there is no difference with semi-urban areas (Anova df 2, 1196 <0.001).

6. Consensus Building in the Community

6.1. Introduction

A major objective of the mechanisms of Dialogue and Consensus is that they will bring Rwandans together across divides at local and national levels. The assumption is that by working together to solve common problems, people will develop recognition of sharing common problems, a sense of belonging and a shared identity. Performance, working together will result in bonding, trust, a concern with further the interests of the community rather than self or group interests and trust in others in general. Important questions then are the extent to which people are resolving differences and conflict using the mechanism of Dialogue and Consensus and the extent to which people see the community as a whole as having responsibility for the successful operation of the mechanisms. In other words, to what extent are ordinary Rwandans performing Dialogue and Consensus and taking ownership of the mechanism.


Figure 43 shows the extent to which the respondents to the survey thought that the mechanisms contribute to Dialogue and Consensus. A number of interesting points can be gleaned from this Figure. Firstly the high proportion of respondents who said they did not know or did not give a view for a number

of the mechanisms, don't know/did not give a response varied from 55 per cent for the Community Development Committee to 2. 2 per cent for *Girinka*. Interestingly, those mechanisms that are the most likely to involve members of the community directly in Dialogue and Consensus, at least in theory, are not the ones that are most highly rated. The findings from the qualitative research provide some clues as to why this may be the case. Firstly, with the notable exception of dispute resolution between neighbours, there was little evidence that most people take part in Dialogue and Consensus. In other words, members of the community were not meeting and discussing issues and agreeing how to resolve them. In a few cases we were told that the community discusses the placement of households in *Ubudehe* Categories and that the whole community (village) discusses how a dispute can be resolved. Generally, however, we were told that leaders make the decisions and the community implement them. On several occasions the participants in the FGDs said that they would like training in Dialogue and Consensus, although it is clear that informants in some groups did understand the principles as they described for us how the community work together to resolve disputes.

However, the mechanisms that are seen as having made the largest contribution to Dialogue and Consensus are valued because they are seen as a way of bringing the community together, integrating or at least enabling the community to live together. In the FGDs it was not so much *Gacaca* itself that was valued, but the outcome. What was valued was that the processes generally enabled perpetrators and survivors to be reconciled through the asking for and the giving of forgiveness. This enabled them to live in harmony in many communities, although there

were exceptions, with a number of FGD participants telling us that there was not full reconciliation because perpetrators had not made the required payments. *Ingando* and *Itorero* are valued because they provide opportunities for education in Rwandan history and values and providing an understanding of all belonging to one country. So, the mechanisms that are most valued are ones that are thought to bring/or are likely to bring the greatest harmony to communities, but they are not the ones where consensus is most obviously achieved or intended to be achieved through dialogue.

Figure 43: Subjective Evaluation of the Contribution of the Mechanisms to Dialogue and Consensus.



(Source: Senate 2012)

6.2. Using Dialogue and Consensus to resolve issues

A short term objective (outcome) of the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus is that they result in to the performance of resolving differences through Dialogue and Consensus at local and national levels. Longer term outcomes, building community identity and cohesion, a community that works together to solve common problems and where there are high levels of interpersonal trust are dependent on this. We asked respondents to the questionnaire a number of questions which enable us to get some feel for how important they think that dialogue is and are therefore indicative of the extent to which it is used during participation in the mechanisms. We also talked to the informants in the FGDs and the key informants about their and the members of the community in which they live engagement in Dialogue and Consensus.

Dialogue and Consensus, as we have discussed, requires the participants' discussing an issue or problem and agreeing an outcome that is acceptable to all. The research on what works in building trust and social cohesion suggests that people by coming together to agree a solution to a common problem or concern and then working together to solve it can develop a shared understanding of the problems they face. It enables them to recognise that they of have

a common interest in solving the problems and that by working together they can solve them. The process builds trust between participants and supports the development of social cohesion. Working together to solve common problems builds an ethic of collaboration so that Dialogue and Consensus becomes embedded in everyday life and taken for granted, just accepted as the way things are done. Everyone in a community where there are thick networks of civic organisations working together benefits from the increase in trust and social cohesion and it provides the basis for stronger economic development and growth.

If Dialogue and Consensus are to be used effectively, it is essential that leaders have skills in managing group discussions and bring the group to a consensus. Seventy-four per cent of respondents thought that these skills were important for leaders of Village Councils suggesting that Village Council meetings involve discussion. However, only 16 per cent thought this was an important attribute for a *Gacaca* official and seven per cent for an *Abunzi*, even though Dialogue and Consensus would seem to be central to the work of these two mechanisms.


What was most noticeable in the FGDs was that Dialogue and Consensus seemed rarely to be used to discuss and come to a decision about how to solve shared community issues and problems. It was much more a practice used for reaching a decision about the

advice to be given to individuals as to how to solve interpersonal disputes. It is perhaps not surprising then that the skill to manage Dialogue and Consensus were rarely attributed to leaders. Leaders were much more frequently presented as people who make decisions. However, there was repeated reference to the *Abunzi* as having shown people how decisions could be reached by Dialogue and Consensus; a practice now adopted, according to our informants, by villagers for dispute resolution, making the *Abunzi* increasingly redundant. Accepting a solution to an interpersonal problem or dispute recommended by those who are not party to the dispute also generally means compromising and agreeing to a solution all parties can live with. It potentially builds the capacity to take on the position of the other, recognise the importance of compromise and, to the extent that the agreed solution works, builds trust in the community.

However, a very high proportion of respondents, 88 per cent, thought that the meetings after *Umuganda* were very important in initiating community dialogue around issues, while just over two-thirds thought it was important in strengthening common community aspirations. It was said to provide

opportunities for participants to identify community issues and reach consensus on how to resolve them as a community (Figure 44). Around three quarters of respondents thought that meetings after *Umuganda* were successful in identifying common problems, initiating community dialogue, agreeing on how to resolve the issue and how the community would work together to implement the resolution. However, the informants in the qualitative research suggested that it was more disputes between individuals that were resolved through Dialogue and Consensus at the meetings rather than dialogue about development issues or even what projects the community would work on during *Umuganda*. They painted a picture of *Umuganda* as a very top down process, with the village leaders setting the agenda and determining what happens. The meetings after *Umuganda* were valued for the opportunity for members of the community to be given information by community leaders about Government initiatives and programmes. However, it was also evident that community members do work together on the projects that they see as benefitting the community including ones targeted at supporting the poorest and most vulnerable members.

Figure 44: Perception of Effectiveness of Meetings after Umuganda in Dealing with Community Issues



(Source: Senate 2012)

The same picture is painted if we consider the Women’s National Council and the National Youth Council. The Women’s National Council was seen by just under three-quarters of men (70.1%) and women (73.1%) as playing a key-role in solving problems and conflicts affecting women in the community, but the National Youth Council was viewed less positively with only 64 per cent of youth and 65 per cent of older age groups seeing it as resolving conflicts between youth. While 41 per cent of men and 45 per cent of women give the NWC a score of eight out of 10 or higher for facilitating dialogue between women, only 29 per cent of youth and non-youth give this score to the NYC for initiating dialogue between youth. However, there was less difference in the proportions who gave a high score to the Councils for facilitating dialogue between the groups they represent and other members of the community. In the case of the NWC, 41 per cent of men

and 47 per cent of women thought that it facilitated dialogue between men and women, while 41 per cent of youth and 42 per cent of older age groups thought the NYC facilitated dialogue between youth and non-youth.

The mechanisms more directly focused on dispute resolution were more frequently seen to involve Dialogue and Consensus. However, they are concerned with resolving disputes between individuals, although the discussion involves agreeing a common recommendation/decision. Nearly half of the respondents (91% of those that answered the question) said that leaders at Community Juries allow dialogue until a consensus decision is reached. Similarly, the informants in the qualitative research said that *Abunzi* discuss issues until a consensus is reached. The same was said to happen when neighbours try to resolve


disputes between members of a family or other individuals in the community. This was also reported to be generally the case when a dispute was reported to village leaders for resolution, but some informants told us that the leaders make a decision without wider community involvement. Interestingly, protagonists were said to generally abide by decisions because they had publically made a commitment to do so. Some informants did explain to us how the community agrees which *Ubudehe* category each household should be placed in, but in most cases the decision seems to be made by leaders. We were also told that in some cases the lists provided by the village are changed at higher levels, reducing confidence in leaders and making the process of agreeing categories seem a waste of time and effort.

A rather different way of trying to understand the extent to which Dialogue and Consensus has become embedded in the community is to

consider how ordinary Rwandans think that disputes and problems should be resolved. In the qualitative research, participants in FGDs and key informants told us that Dialogue and Consensus has become the accepted way of trying to resolve disputes between individuals within the family and the community. However, it was evident from comments made about leaders that when there was disagreement between them and the community the preferred option was to replace the leaders but this was not always seen as possible.

However, a significant proportion of respondents do see Dialogue and Consensus as a way of resolving conflict between leaders and members of the community. Nearly two-thirds of respondents think that differences between village leaders and members of the community should be resolved through Dialogue and Consensus at the village council. However, 30 per cent think that disputes should be referred to a higher authority. Only 14 per cent's preferred option is replacing leaders

Figure 45: Resolving Problems, Village Advisory Council




(Source: Senate 2012)

Similarly in the case of *Gacaca* Courts, only 18 per cent said that the officials should be replaced, with the most frequent response being that issues with the leaders should be resolved

through discussion. However, only 43 per cent see this as the way of resolving problems (Figure 46). The next most preferred option, given by 22 per cent, was to refer the matter to a Government official.

Figure 46: Resolving Problems Relating to *Gacaca* Courts at Cell Level




(Source: Senate 2012)

In the case of the *Abunzi*, just of half of those that have used the service as well as those who have not thought that issues with mediators should be resolved through discussion, although

over a quarter think that they should be replaced. Less than a fifth think that the issue should be referred to a Government official (Figure 47).

Figure 47: Resolving Problems %Abunzi Users and Non-Users of the Service



(Source: Senate 2012)


6.3. Responsibility for the Successful Operation of the Mechanisms

Another way of trying to understand how ordinary Rwandans understand their role in the mechanisms is to consider who is seen as responsible for the success and failure of them. We asked respondents that thought a mechanism was successful who was responsible for the success, and similarly we asked respondents who thought a mechanism was unsuccessful, who was responsible for its failure. We also asked those who thought a mechanism was a failure, who should be responsible for solving the problems. It is clear that the respondents do

not generally see the community as a whole being responsible and that there is a significant proportion that see leaders as responsible, suggesting a lack of a strong sense of community responsibility and ownership.

In the case of *Gacaca* courts, success was most frequently attributed to leaders/officials, although at 46 per cent this was less than half of the respondents. However, only just over a quarter thought that the community as a whole should be credited with the success of the courts. Responsibility for failure (where responsibility was attributed) was attributed to defendants or their family and friends (Figure 48).

Figure 48: Responsibility for the Success and Failure of Gacaca Courts




(Source: Senate 2012)

Only 15 per cent of respondents thought that the entire community should take responsibility for solving

problems with a clear majority of those that made a nomination or selecting a leader (Figure 49).

Figure 49: Responsibility for Solving Problems Related to Gacaca




(Source: Senate 2012)

The picture is much the same for the *Abunzi*, with responsibility for the success of the mediation service most frequently attributed to the *Abunzi*,

but with a quarter of respondents attributing it to community leaders and a quarter to the community as a whole (Figure 50).

Figure 50: Attribution for Responsibility of Success of *Abunzi* Service, % that Agreed Successful




(Source: Senate 2012)

Those who saw the service as a failure were most likely to blame the *Abunzi*, the more so for those that had used the service, two-thirds, than those that

had not, 48 per cent (Figure 51). Only around 10 per cent thought that the community as a whole was to blame.

Figure 51: Attribution of Responsibility for Failure of *Abunzi* Service Users and Non-Users




(Source: Senate 2012)($\alpha^2 < 0.05$)

When we consider the three councils, Village Advisory Council, Women’s National Council and the National Youth Council, it is evident that leaders are seen as having greater responsibility for success and failure than the community as a whole (Figures 52-55). In the case of the Village Advisory Council, only just over a third thought that the community as a whole was responsible for its success. The majority of those who thought it had failed to meet


its objectives said they did not know who was to blame, but even so the proportion nominating the community as responsible was very small, five per cent (Figure 52). Not surprisingly, nearly two-thirds of those who thought the Village Council was not doing its work thought that village leaders should take responsibility for resolving the problems, with only 15 per cent think that the community as a whole should be responsible.

Figure 52: Attribution of Credit and Blame for Success and Failures of Village Council % of Respondents Giving Positive and Negative Responses



(Source: Senate 2012)

Figure 53: Responsibility for Resolving the Problems to Make Village Executive Committee More Successful % of Respondents




(Source: Senate 2012)

The lack of a strong sense of community ownership is also evident in the case of the NWC and the NYC. In the case of the NWC only a third of respondents think that women in the community can be credited with responsibility for successful outcomes and just over a fifth for failure (Figure 54). Only a tiny minority think that any credit or blame can be attributed to the community more generally. In the case of the NYC, only a fifth of respondents think that youth in the community can be credited with responsibility for its success and 15 per cent think that they are to blame for failure, with only a very small number attributing responsibility to the community more generally. In both


cases leaders are most frequently seen as responsible. In the case of the NWC, a quarter gives the credit for success to local leaders and a fifth to national ones, while responsibility for failure is attributed to local leaders by 20 per cent of respondents and to national leaders by 17 per cent, with just over 10 per cent making reference to ‘outsiders’. In the case of the NYC, the major credit for success and responsibility for failure is attributed to community leaders, 47 per cent for success and 55 per cent for failure. Thirteen per cent credit national leaders with responsibility for success and eight per cent the community as a whole

Figure 54: Attribution of Credit and Blame for Success and Failure of Women’s National Council at Village Level% of Women Giving Positive and Negative Responses



(Source: Senate 2012)

Figure 55: Attribution of Credit and Blame for Success and Failure of National Youth Council,




(Source: Senate Data)

Umuganda suggests a rather different picture, with credit for success being most frequently attributed to the Government (Figure 56). 40 per cent credit the Government with the success of community work but only eight per cent see the Government as responsible for its failure. Surprisingly given that the success of community work depends on the work done

by the participants, only 11 per cent credit them with successful outcomes and 17 per cent the community more broadly, although 17 per cent attribute problems to participants and 23 per cent to the community more generally. The group most frequently mentioned as responsible for failure are local leaders, 36 per cent nominating them although only 15 per cent credit them with success.

Figure 56: Attribution for Responsibility for Success and Failure of Umuganda % agreeing Success and % seeing it as a Failure




(Source: Senate 2012)

Perhaps not surprisingly few respondents thought that those who participate in *Umuganda* or the community as a whole are responsible for resolving the problems to make *Umuganda* more successful. This

responsibility is assigned to leaders by 85 per cent of respondents, the Government by 30 per cent, local leaders/organisers of *Umuganda* by 45 per cent and to local and national leaders jointly by 10 per cent.

Figure 57: Responsibility for Resolving the Problems to Make Umuganda More Successful
% of Respondents




(Source: Senate 2012)

There is more evidence of a sense of community ownership and therefore of responsibility for success and failure when we look at the respondents' views about credit for the success of the meetings held after *Umuganda*. The main credit was thought to be due to the community (Figure 58). Fifty-eight per cent of respondents credited the whole community (43.1%) or participants/some members of the

community (14.9%) with responsibility for success. None mentioned the national Government, although 38 per cent gave credit to local leaders. Responsibility for failure was laid at the door of the community by just under 50 per cent of respondents, but with half of these blaming some members of the community (20%) or those that participate (5.6%) as frequently as the community as a whole (23.1)


Figure 58: Attribution for Responsibility for Success and Failure of Meetings after Umuganda, % Agreeing Success and % Seeing it as a Failure



(Source: Senate 2012)

However, only around 20 per cent thought that the community were responsible for solving problems related to *Umuganda*, while just over half thought that the responsibility lay with local leaders.

Figure 59: Responsibility for Resolving the Problems to Make Meetings After Umuganda More Successful % of Respondents



(Source: Senate Data)

7. Community Identity and Collaboration

7.1. Introduction

In this section we consider the extent to which the respondents identify with their community and the extent to which high identification with community correlated with participation in the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus. We consider the extent to which ordinary Rwandans feel they can collaborate and work with other members of their community. We also consider the extent to which respondents are altruistic; they say that they are selflessly prepared to put the interests of their community and others before their own. In the absence of longitudinal data it is not possible to demonstrate that engagement in the mechanisms is responsible for engendering an ethic of community collaboration and/or altruism. However, given the breakdown in community integration following the Genocide, a strong relationship between high community identity and integration and high engagement in the mechanisms would make it reasonable to conclude that they have made a contribution.

7.2. Community Identity

The vast majority of respondents said that they were proud of their Rwandan citizenship and 93 per cent said that

they feel that they belong to the community in which they live. Only 12 per cent of respondents said that they feel left out of society. Participants in the FGDs told us that when they talk about their community they mean the people that live in their village.

However, only 70 per cent would definitely not prefer to live in another community and 20 per cent would like to move out of their village as soon as possible. In other words nearly 3 in 10 do not feel a strong affinity with the community in which they live, and 1 in 5 want to move away as quickly as possible. Although 76 per cent think that everyone is striving for the same goals, only 39 per cent think that members of their community are prepared to put the interest of the community before their own goals.

There is no strong evidence that those who identify with their community are more likely to engage with the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus. There was a positive correlation between community identity and the density of engagement with the mechanisms, but it was only 0.2 ($p < 0.01$) for a sense of belonging to the community and thinking everyone in the community is striving for the same goals and 0.1 ($p < 0.01$) for preferring


to live in this community more than any other. Although those who want to leave the community are significantly less likely to attend meetings of the Village Advisory Council and *Umuganda*, the differences are very small.

Those who want to move are more likely to live in urban areas (32% cf 14% semi-urban, 18% rural) and live in the City of Kigali (30% cf 19% Southern, 21% Western, 23.5 Eastern) with those least likely to want to move living in Northern Province (6%). Men, the more educated and youth were also significantly ($\alpha^2 < 0.01$) more likely to want to move than women, the less educated and older people, but the differences are very small.

There was a relatively low level of trust

in other members of the community to be able to take on responsibility for projects and tasks unsupervised, but moderate confidence none the less that they could rely on each other (Figure 60). In the FGDs and key informant interviews we were frequently told that while community members provided support to families when a member dies and that neighbours could be relied on to look after children, there was less certainty that other members of the community or even neighbours and friends could be relied on to repay money loaned to them. Alcohol and drug use was said to make some members of the community unreliable and in some, but not all communities, theft and witchcraft were seen as problematic.

Figure 60: Perceptions of Reliability of and Confidence in Members of the Community



(Source: Senate 2012)

The two variables on feeling comfortable with other people taking responsibility without personal supervision for projects and tasks form a scale which measures perception of reliability of other members of the community. On a nine point scale the mean is four which converts to five on a 10 point scale.

The two variables on ability to rely on other members of the community form a scale which we can use to measure confidence in other members of the community. The mean on the nine point scale is 5.8 which converts to 6.4 on a 10 point scale. The two scales correlate but the correlation is only

moderate, 0.32 ($p < 0.01$), suggesting that there is a tendency for those who trust other members of the community to take responsibility for projects and tasks unsupervised by them, also have confidence in other members of the community.

Perceptions of the reliability of other people and confidence in members of the community has little impact on whether or not people want to move, although the means on both scales for those who want to move are significantly lower than for those who wish to stay, the differences are very small.


The analysis suggests that the main motivation for wanting to move is the desire to move away from Kigali or another urban area rather than lack of trust in other members of the community.

7.3. Community Collaboration

There are some contradictions in answers to questions on ability of the community to use Dialogue and Consensus to resolve disputes and agree on how to tackle shared issues and problems. On the one hand, a majority of respondents to the questionnaire thought that people in their community can work together but they were a lot less confident that they could do so without conflict and that they could actually work together to solve problems.

Figure 61 shows the answers to a series of questions relating to the ability of the community to work together. The proportion of respondents giving a positive answer varied from 73 per cent who thought that their community had members with the skills, knowledge and ability to implement a community action plan, to 88 per cent who think that their community as a group can influence decisions that affect them. There was also a high level of confidence that they could work together cooperatively, deal with difficult issues and mobilise the necessary resources to tackle community problems.

Figure 61: Community Collaboration% of Respondents




(Source: Senate 2012)

The answers to the nine questions were used to construct a 32 point scale going from one (low community collaboration) to 32 (high community collaboration). The mean on the scale was 24.2 and the SD 4.9. The mean converted to a 10 point scale is 7.3. The distribution on the normalised scale goes from a minimum -4.9 to a maximum of +1.6 (Figure 62) and shows a peak at the mean and at the maximum of the scale with a long, thin tail to the negative end. This indicates that there is relatively good agreement amongst respondents that there is good community collaboration but with a small number who do not agree with this. There was no significant difference by gender, education or location and other difference were not large. People living in the Northern Province (M

25.5) were significantly more likely to say that community problem solving was high than in the other Provinces (Anova df 4,3614 <0.001). Young people aged 18-25 years were less likely to agree that there was good community collaboration but the differences were relatively small; where significant the mean for 18-25 year olds being 23.6 compared with 24.4 for 26-35 year olds (Anova df 3,3615 <0.001). Single people were less likely to think community collaboration is high compared to the married and widowed, with no significant difference between the latter (Anova df 2, 3616). There is a linear relationship with wealth, with the mean for the bottom quintile being 23.1 and that for the top 24.9 (Anova df 4,3523 <0.001).

Figure 62: Normalised Distribution for Community Collaboration



(Source: Senate 2012)

Respondents generally thought that members of their community can work together and support members of the community solving their problems

(Figure 63). However, only around half were confident that they could actually solve problems and a similar proportion thought that the community could not work together without conflict.

Figure 63: Perceptions of Community Willingness and Ability to Solve Problems




(Source: Senate 2012)

We constructed a scale for Community Problem Solving from the items in Figure 63. The Scale goes from 0 to 16 with a means of 12.3 and SD of 2.6. The mean converts to 7.2 on a 10 point scale. Figure 69 shows the normalised distribution for the Scale which ranges from a minimum of -4.8 to a maximum of +1.8. There is a noticeable peak just below the mean and another at the top of the scale with a long tail to the negative indicating a long tail of people that do not think their community has the necessary skills to tackle problem solving. The picture was much the same as for community collaboration; differences between groups even where significant are not large. There is no significant difference by gender, education or deprivation.

Younger people significantly rate the ability of their community to work together to solve problems as significantly lower than older age groups with no significant differences between the latter. The mean for 18-25 year olds is 11.8 compared to 12.6 for those aged 51 years and older (Anova df 3,3717 <0.001).The single (M 11.8) rated community problem solving significantly lower than the married (M 12.4) or widows/divorced (M 12.4) (Anova df 2,3716). Residence of the City of Kigali rated community problem solving the lowest (M 11.8) and the Northern Province the highest (M 13) with no significant difference between the other three Provinces (Anova df 4,3716<0.001).

Figure 64: Normalised Distribution for Community Problem Solving




(Source: Senate 2012)

The qualitative research indicated that people do collaborate and work together as a community, although not everyone participates. The general impression was that participation was higher in rural areas than urban ones. Communities reportedly do work together to solve problems, but this was generally using Dialogue and Consensus to help individuals resolve interpersonal disputes. There was little evidence of communities using Dialogue and Consensus to agree collective working together to overcome community problems. They did collaborate on projects to solve social problems such as helping the very poorest or improving communications, but it was generally leaders that dictated what work was to be done. The same is the case for land consolidation and crop specialisation - farmers affected clearly worked together but the 'solution' to low productivity had been identified by the Government and the farmers were doing what they had been instructed to do.

We also asked respondent to the survey specifically if they are confident that their community has the skills, knowledge and abilities to tackle issues

of divisionism and genocide. Only 59 per cent said that they were. There is no significant relationship between the scale on community problem solving and this variable suggesting that different factors are at play in influencing a general confidence in the ability of the community to work together to solve problems and a specific confidence that the community can tackle divisionism and genocide ideology. Nevertheless 78 per cent of respondents were confident that their community was better able to deal with issues related to divisionism and genocide ideology today than five years ago and only two per cent thought that their community was less able to do so. There is no significant difference on the variable on tackling divisionism by gender, age, social deprivation, marital status or education but there is by Province. Just over two-thirds of respondents living in Western and Eastern Provinces are confident that their community have the necessary resourced to tackle divisionism compared with only 45 per cent in Northern Province. City of Kigali and Southern Province lay between these (Figure 65).

Figure 65: % of Respondents Confident that their Community can Tackle Divisionism by Province




(Source: Senate 2012)

There was little evidence of altruism. In general people were said to be motivated more by a fear of the consequences of not fulfilling their obligations than any concern for the wellbeing of others (Figure 66). Nearly 60 per cent of respondents think that people are motivated by a fear of punishment and 70 per cent by a concern that if they fail to fulfil their obligations then others will not fulfil their obligations to them.

One of the aims of Dialogue and Consensus is that people will come to recognise that they share common problems and that they can work together to solve them. In other words, that people will come to a shared understanding of the goals of their community and commit to work towards achieving them. Although 70 per cent of respondents thought that people do fulfil their obligations to others and that they have confidence in their community.

Figure 66: Motivation for Fulfilling Obligations to Others




(Source: Senate 2012)

We combined the four variables to create a 17 point Altruism Scale, going from 0 (low altruism) to 16 (high altruism). The mean for the scale is 7.3, converting to 4.3 on a 10 point scale, with a SD of 3.4, confirming that altruism is low. On the normalised distribution (Figure 67) the range goes from -2.1 to + 2.6. There is crowding around the mean and a tail of very low altruism. However, there are a relatively small proportion of people with high scores. There were no significant differences by gender, age or marital status. Residents in the City of Kigali had the lowest scores for altruism (M 6.4) and Northern Providence the highest (M 8.6), with Eastern Province

scoring significantly lower than Northern Province (M 8.0) but higher than Southern (M 6.5) and Western (M 6.8) Provinces between whom there was no significant difference (Anova df 4,3810 <0.001). People living in urban areas (M 6.4) scored significantly lower on the Scale than those living in other areas (M rural 7.3, semi-urban 7.5) with no difference between the latter (Anova df 2,3812<0.001). Difference by social deprivation were not large or for the most part significant but those in Q5 (M 7.0) were significantly less likely to be altruistic than those in Q3 (M 7.5) (Anova df 4,3702 <0.001).

Figure 67: Normalised Distribution for Altruism Scale



(Source: Senate 2012)

8. Trust and Social Cohesion

8.1. *Introduction*

Generalised trust in other people as well as trust in Government and other institutions provides the basis for social cohesion; it is what enables everyday interactions to take place on a normal basis. However, following the Genocide against the Tutsi, trust in Rwanda was destroyed, citizens did not trust the Government, they did not trust civil society organisations and they did not trust each other, or rather they did not know who they could trust. This made everyday life extremely problematic.


As we have discussed there is strong and consistent evidence that trust in Government at least at a national level has been rebuilt. Citizens trust the President, the army, the forces of law and order, the Government and Parliament. There are also relatively high levels of trust in family and friends, but lower levels of trust in other people in general. Indeed the African Values Survey suggests that generalised trust may even have declined between 2008 and 2012, but this is based on cross sectional survey data not longitudinal. We have also shown that less than half of the respondents to the Senate survey think that people can be relied on to take responsibility for projects without supervision, over a third for

tasks and 30 per cent who do not think they can rely on other members of their community (see Figure 60 above).

8.1.1 *Fear of Crime and Concern for Personal Safety*

Feeling safe in one's home and community is a measure of people's confidence in the forces of law and order as well as trust in other people. Fear of crime disrupts people's everyday activities and reduces levels of trust in the forces of law and order and other people in general. In general there was relatively low fear of crime although a quarter of respondents were concerned about something being stolen from their home. Conversely only around six per cent are worried about going out alone during the day, although just over one in ten are worried about being physically attacked in their neighbourhood and one in five have at least some concerns about their safety in their own neighbourhood (Figure 68). There was little difference between men and women in terms of concern about crime. Women were more likely to be afraid of crime and concerned for their personal safety but even where the differences were significant they were trivial


Figure 68: Fear of Crime % of Respondents



Combining the five variables creates a 16 point Fear of Crime Scale going from 0 (high fear of crime) to 15 (no fear of crime). Just over half (52.4%) of the respondents said that they have no fear of crime or for their personal safety in their neighbourhood. The mean on the

scale is 12.9 (converting to 7.1 on a 10 point scale, SD 3.4) indicating , as the normalised distribution shows (Figure 69), that generally there is a low level of concern about crime but that a small minority are very concerned about crime (range -3.7 to +2.3).

Figure 69: Normalise Distribution Fear of Crime Scale




8.1.2 *Trust in Government, Institutions of Law and Order and Civil Society Institutions*

Trust in the organs of Government and law and order was generally very high. There seemed to be a general confidence amongst the survey respondents and the informants in the qualitative research that the Government was delivering. The President was said to be universally trusted by the survey

respondents as was the Chamber of Deputies and The Senate (Figure 70). However, in the FGDs it was evident that people generally do not completely trust the members of either Chamber of Parliament. Informants frequently did not voice an opinion as to whether they trusted them or not but said that they had never met them; that they do not come to their community. In a noticeable number of FGDs the informants said that they did not trust them because they had not met them.


Figure 70: High Trust in National Political Institutions



There was also high trust amongst survey respondents in the police, the army and the law courts. However, in the FGDs although the level of trust in the army was said to be high, the level of confidence in the police was much lower. It was evident that the informants in a noticeable number of FGDs had little confidence that the police would deal with those the community thought had committed crimes.


Trust in elected local politicians was high amongst survey respondents although not as high, in general, as for national ones (Figure 71). In the FGDs informants generally said they trusted local leaders but in a small number of cases said that they did not do so. On a scale going from 0 (no trust) to 24 (high trust) the mean 22.5 (9 converted to a 10 point scale) and the SD 3.1.

Figure 71: High Trust in Local Politicians



The normal distribution goes from -4.7 to 0.5 and as Figure 72 shows, the majority of people have very high levels of trust in local politicians with a long thin tail of people that are less trusting.

Figure 72: Normalised Distribution for Trust Local Officials




Trust in the media and religious institutions was relatively high but somewhat lower than for political leaders and the forces of law and order. Seventy-six per cent of respondents say that they trust the media and 71 per cent religious institutions, with 69.5 per cent saying that they trust both. However, 17.5 per cent said that they trusted neither, meaning that they do not trust the main independent sources of information in the country.

8.1.3 Trust in Family, Friends and Neighbours

Trust in family, friends and neighbours is relatively high. Trust is highest in

family and lowest in neighbours (Figure 73). Nevertheless 15 per cent of respondents to the survey do not fully trust their family, 21 per cent friends and 26 per cent neighbours.


Figure 73: High Trust in Family, Friends and Neighbours



On a 10 point scale going from 0 (no trust) to nine (complete trust) the mean is 8.3 and the SD 1.2. The normalised distribution goes from -4.3 to 0.5 and

as Figure 74 shows there is high crowding above the mean and a relatively long tail indicating that a small minority are very distrusting of relatives and friends.

Figure 74: Normalise Distribution for Trust Family, Friends and Neighbours Scale




8.1.4 Generalised Trust

The levels of generalised trust in other people reported by our respondents is much higher than has been found in other surveys including the African Values Survey which was carried out in the same year. However, we asked a different question: whereas the AVS asked people to say if they trusted people or if you could not be too careful we asked respondents to rate their level of trust on a 10 point scale. Forty per cent of respondents gave a score of eight out of 10 or higher on the trust scale. The mean was 7.1 and the SD 1.8. However, 10 per cent of respondents refused to answer the question. If they

are assumed to have a low level of trust the mean falls to 6.4.

The range on the normalised distribution (excluding the non-responses) went from -3.3 to +1.5, indicating a skew to the negative end (Figure 75). However, most respondents are clustered around the mean with a long negative tail, indicating a small proportion of respondents with very low levels of trust but most with moderate to relatively high levels of trust in other people in general. There is a positive correlation between general trust and trust in family and friends and trust in local officials, but the correlations are not large (0.31 and 0.25 $p<0.01$).

Figure 75: Normalised Distribution for Trust Other People in General



In the qualitative research informants were generally though that levels of trust in other people had been increasing but that people still do not fully trust others, including their own families. It was also evident that when people say that they trust other people

they are referring to people they know and interact with on a frequent basis, not other people in general. It is family, friends and neighbours that are trusted. There seemed to be two tests of trust: would you trust someone to look after your children; and would you

trust someone to pay you back if you lend them money. Informants in FGDs most frequently indicated that people in their communities generally trust family, friends and neighbours to look after their children but there was much less certainty that you could trust even those you know well to pay you back if you lend them money. However, there was said to be an increase in tontines in virtually every community we visited, and that this is the case across Rwanda is supported by the findings from FinScope 2012 (authors own analysis of the data).


There is a significant difference in generalised trust across the Provinces but the Anova post hoc test shows that the only significant difference is between the City of Kigali and the four Provinces. The mean for the City of Kigali is 6.3 compared with 7.1 for both the Southern and the Western Provinces, 7.3 for the Northern Province and 7.4 for the Eastern Province (Anova df 4, 3417 $p < 0.001$). Similarly there is a significant difference by location with urban areas having a significantly lower mean (6.4) than semi-urban and rural areas which both have a mean of 7.2 (Anova df 2, 3419 $p < 0.001$).

As we have already discussed, research suggest that active participation in civil society groups and community activities increases generalised trust which in turn increases social cohesion. As we have demonstrated there is relatively high participation in a range of community activities although active participation in voluntary organisations is much lower. Analysis of participation in community activities (Figure 76) shows that the mean score on the trust variable is significantly higher for

those who actively engage in these activities compared with those who do not, although there was no difference between those who have and have not used the mediator service or between those who do and do not participate in *Umuganda*. There is also a significant correlation between engaging in community problem solving (0.23 $p < 0.01$) and trust and community collaboration (0.21 $p < 0.01$).

However, factors other than engagement in community groups and networks have been shown to influence or at least are correlated with trust, including gender, with women generally being more trusting than men, trust generally increases with age, with wealth and educational attainment. There is no significant difference in trust by economic status, as measured by the social deprivation scale or *Ubudehe* categories or by gender in the Senate data. However, there is a significant correlation between trust and age, with trust increasing with age in a linear relationship although the differences by age are not large. The mean for the 18 to 25 year age group being 6.6 and increasing to 7.3 for the over 50 years age group (Anova df 3, 3418 $p < 0.001$). However, trust decreases with educational attainment, the higher the level of education the lower the level of trust, the mean for those with completed secondary or higher education is 6.6 compared to 7.3 for those with no formal education (Anova df 4, 3404 $p < 0.001$). Single people have less generalised trust than the ever married, the mean for single people is 6.5 compared to 7.1 for those who are married/cohabiting or formerly married (Anova df 2, 3419 $p < 0.001$).

Figure 76: Sample Means for Active and Non -Active Participation in Community Activities and Groups on Trust Scale



(Source: Senate Survey) (Notes – t-test: Community engagement df 2613p<0.001; worked on community project df 3406 p<0.001; regularly attend community meetings df2701 p<0.001; active member civil society df 2945p<0.001; participated Gacaca df 3139 p<0.001; village advisory council df 3339 p<0.001); *Ubudehe* df 1750 p<0.001; meetings after Umuganda df 2788p<0.001)

In order to know which factors explain the variation in trust taking account of all the significant participation variables as well as education and age, we carried out a linear regression. We first controlled for age and education and then added the participation variables to our regression model. When we entered age and education on their own they both made a significant contribution to explaining the variance but the amount of variance

explained was trivial (0.009) and when we added the participation variables they no longer made a significant contribution. The variables measuring participation together only explained 7.5 per cent of the variance ($p < 0.001$). This indicates that participation in community activities increases generalised trust but that most of the factors that explain differences in trust are not in our model (Table 21).

Table 21: The influence of Participation in Community Activities on Trust

Variables	b	Beta	SE
Constant	4.74		0.49
Age	0.01	0.04	0.00
Education	-0.02	-0.02	0.03
Active Participation in <i>Gacaca</i>	0.07	0.02	0.02
High Community Engagement	0.70	0.19**	0.3
Frequently Worked on Community Projects	0.35	0.09**	0.10
Frequently Attended a Community Meeting	0.77	0.20**	0.27
Active Member Civil Society Group	0.08	0.02	0.07
Participation in Village Advisory Committee	0.28	0.05**	0.07
Participation in <i>Ubudehe</i>	0.21	0.05**	-0.078
Participated in Meetings After <i>Umuganda</i>	0.28	0.03	0.22
Community Collaboration	0.03	0.09***	0.01
Community Problem Solving	0.09	0.13***	0.02
Adjusted R ² 0.075			

(Source: Senate Data) *** $p < 0.001$ ** $p < 0.01$

It is evident that actively engaging in the community correlates with trust. We cannot demonstrate if it is more trusting who participate more actively in the first place or if participation builds trust but there is likely to be an element of both. The failure to explain more of

the variance in trust by differences in active community participation may be due to spill over effect. As we discussed in the literature review the extensive research on social capital suggests that in a society rich in social networks the whole society benefits, not just those who participate.

9. Social Quality: *Making Life Good*

10. Satisfaction with Life

If a society is to remain stable and enjoy inclusive economic growth then citizens need to feel they have a stake in society and to feel relatively satisfied with their lives. As the contributors to Hutton and Redmond (eds. 2000) point out, social cohesion, or at least relative social stability, achieved because of economic growth is fragile. An economic downturn can result in old cleaves resurfacing and conflict among different groups.

As we have seen, the improvement in their economic circumstances that ordinary Rwandans have witnessed in recent years is the main reason that people are optimistic about the future. Undoubtedly, one of the main reasons for trusting politicians is that they are delivering; people see their lives as getting better and have confidence that this will continue. In FGDs those that were discontent generally had not experienced the same improvement in their economic circumstances that they perceived other to have had. People generally know what they want and those that live in households that cannot provide these feel resentful of those that can. The main causes of resentment were the increases in the premium for Mutual Health Insurance

and the placement into *Ubudehe* Categories. In FGDs informants told us that many households could not afford to insure all their members. The increased premiums had exacerbated the problem. They also said that many very poor households ended up in *Ubudehe* Category 3 but were no better off than those in Categories 1 and 2. There was also evidence of tensions between groups that have historically been in conflict. The failure of some of those convicted of Genocide crimes to make restitution as mandated by the courts is a cause of resentment in some communities.


The respondents to the survey generally thought that things had gotten better over the last five years (92%) and the vast majority were confident that things would improve for them and their households over the next five years (87%). In the FGDs and key informant interviews informants, except at a very small number of locations, agreed that things had gotten better over the last five years and that the quality of their life was improving. However, a majority were dissatisfied with their lives. The improvement in their economic circumstances was clearly one reason

for this, with a general perception that incomes had improved for most people. However, it was also clear that what people value goes beyond economic security, although some of the things they value are seen as important for improving their economic situation. People value good health, education for their children and economic security for the poorest and most vulnerable members of their community. They also value having decent housing, access to water, improved sanitation and good roads. They also want security, low levels of crime, to be able to trust the members of their community and live

in harmony with them. They want to be confident that leaders will deliver on their promises and improve their lives, as well as wanting to have a say over the decisions that impact on their daily lives. They want politicians to show that they take an interest in their welfare.

However, they do not, in general, think that life is good. On a 10 point scale the mean for general satisfaction with life is 5.1 with SD 21 (Figure77). The distribution on the scale shows that a majority of people are neither fully satisfied nor totally dissatisfied but is skewed towards dissatisfied.

Figure 77: General Satisfaction with Life on a 10 Point Scale



There is no significant difference by gender, but young people are significantly less satisfied than older people although the difference is small (Pearson -0.01**). People living in urban areas are significantly less satisfied than those living in semi-urban areas ($t < 0.01$) or in rural areas ($t < 0.01$) but there is no significant difference between semi-urban and Rural areas. People living with a disability or chronic

illness are less satisfied than those not doing so ($t < 0.001$), single people ($t < 0.001$) and married people ($t < 0.001$) are significantly more satisfied than widows and divorcees but there is no significant difference between single and married people. There is a positive and significant correlation between rating of economic circumstances compared with that of others (0.59**), deprivation scale (0.39**), education


(0.21**) and those who think their monthly income is enough to live on are significantly more satisfied than those who do not ($t < 0.001$). There is also a positive correlation between trust in other people in general and satisfaction with life (Pearson 0.13**) but no difference for trusting national and local politicians and family friends and neighbours. Those who feel left out of society are significantly less satisfied than those who do not ($t < 0.001$).

10.1. Social Quality

The Social Quality Model provides a heuristic device to enable us to understand the factors that make ordinary Rwandans more or less satisfied with their lot based on building a society that delivers for its citizens and integrates them into a society where the different interest groups are able to live work together to achieve common ends

and that meets peoples basic needs. Maslow's hierarchy of needs (1943, 1954), has been questioned in terms of the extent to which the needs are hierarchical and the extent to which self-actualisation, reflects Western values rather than more collectivised values of non-western societies; nevertheless, it does provide a framework of what is necessary to enable people to grow and flourish (Figure 78). Whilst the needs may not form a hierarchy in that needs at the bottom of the pyramid need to be met before those higher up, it does alert us to the importance of survival and having sufficient to live on. In research on life satisfaction economic security and health have been found to be the most important factor for explaining variation in life satisfaction between individuals and groups with trust, social capital and human capital all making a contribution (see e.g. Abbott and Wallace 2012a, 2012b)

Figure 78: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs



Subjective life satisfaction is the cognitive evaluation by people of their current situation. It tells us what life is like for them, the extent to which they are living a life that they value. So it is important to understand what makes some people and groups more satisfied with their lives than others in order to improve people’s lives.

Table 22 shows the extent to which variables that measure economic security influence life satisfaction. The model explains 38 per cent of the variance which is a reasonable amount. The variable that makes the largest contribution is respondents’ own evaluation of their economic circumstances; but not being deprived makes a significant contribution as does confidence in the households economic circumstances improving over the

next five years, as well as not being in *Ubudehe* categories 1 or 2. The fact that not being in *Ubudehe* category 1 or 2 makes a contribution, controlling for other economic factors, suggests that there may be an element of social stigma attached to being placed in the bottom two categories. However, in the qualitative research more concern was expressed about not being in one of the two bottom categories and therefore not being exempt from paying premiums for Mutual Health Insurance. Perhaps, not surprisingly, we can conclude that those that are not deprived and, even more importantly, those who think that they are relatively better off than others are more satisfied with their lives than those that are deprived and think that they are relatively worse off than others.

Table 22: Economic Security

Variables	b	Beta	SE
Constant	0.68		0.25
Social Deprivation	0.36	0.17***	0.03
<i>Ubudehe</i> Category	0.16	0.05***	0.05
Rating of Household’s Economic Standing	0.51	0.49***	0.02
Economic Situation of Household in Five Years’ Time	0.20	0.07***	0.05
Economic Situation of Country in Five Years’ Time	0.70	0.02	0.05
Adjusted R ² 0.378			

(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001

Table 23 shows that variables and scales measuring social inclusion explain very little of the variance in life satisfaction.

The only variable that make a significant contribution to the variance explained are participation in civil society organisations.

Table 23: Social Inclusion

Variables	b	Beta	SE
Constant	4.41		0.16
Density of Government Sponsored Mechanisms	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Frequent Participation in Government Mechanisms	0.26	0.03	0.17
Density Participation Civil Society Organisations	0.11	0.10***	0.02
Frequency of Participation in Civil Society Organisations	0.26	0.06***	0.08
Employed	0.04	0.01	0.10
Married	0.07	0.01	0.08
Adjusted R ² 0.02			

(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001 **p<0.01)

The only trust variable for which there was a significant correlation with life satisfaction was generalised trust;

however, as Table 24 shows trust in the generalised other only explains a very small amount of the variance.

Table 24: Social Cohesion

Variables	b	Beta	SE
Constant	4.00		0.14
Trust in others	0.149	0.130***	0.02
Adjusted R ² 0.02			

(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001 **p<0.01

Empowerment is the extent to which people have the basic capabilities to take control over their lives. The empowerment variables explain seven per cent of the variance with the main

contribution being education followed by health with feeling empowered to participate and not feeling left out making more modest contributions (Table 25).

Table 25: Empowerment

Variables	b	Beta	SE
Constant	3.75		0.31
Empowered to Participate	0.17	0.08***	0.04
Empowered through Community Collaboration	0.01	0.03	0.01
Empowered Through Community Problem Solving	0.03	0.03	0.02
Education	0.32	0.17***	0.03
Disability/Illness	0.54	0.12***	0.08
Feel Left Out	0.56	0.09***	0.11
Adjusted R ² 0.07			

(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001

Table 26 shows the influence of the factors that were significant for economic security, social cohesion, social inclusion and empowerment influence on subjective life satisfaction. In combination they explain 40 per cent of the variance, which is marginally more than the economic security variables did alone.

The economic variables make the greatest contribution, but trust in others, education and not feeling left out all make a contribution at the 99.9 per cent level. *Ubudehe* only makes a contribution at the 99 per cent level and participation in civic society organisations at the 95 per cent level.

Table 26: Social Quality

Variables	b	Beta	SE
Constant	1.14		0.37
Social Deprivation	0.32	0.15***	0.04
Ubudehe Category	0.14	0.04**	0.05
Rating of Household's Economic Standing	0.51	0.48***	0.02
Economic Situation of Household in Five Years' Time	0.22	0.08***	0.05
Density Participation Civil Society Organisations	0.04	0.04*	0.02
Frequency of Participation in Civil Society Organisations	0.16	0.04*	0.07
Trust in Others	0.10	0.09***	0.02
Empowered to Participate	0.06	0.03	0.03
Education	0.12	0.06***	0.03
Disability/Illness	0.08	0.02	0.07
Feel Left Out	0.43	0.07***	0.10
Adjusted R ²	0.40		

(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05

As has been found in other research where poverty levels are high economic factors tend to explain most of the observed variance in subjective life satisfaction. This is perhaps not surprising. People that are struggling to survive are unlikely to be very satisfied, especially when they see others who do not have to struggle to survive. However, even controlling for economic circumstances the model suggests that trusting others (social

cohesion), participating in civic society organisations and being empowered are associated with higher levels of life satisfaction. Moreover, as we have argued throughout this report, for a Government to deliver economic security for all requires that people are empowered and a basic condition for sustainable inclusive economic growth is social cohesion. Furthermore social cohesion is built through social participation which creates social capital.

11. Conclusions and Recommendations

11.1. Conclusions

From the analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data it can be concluded that:

- Rwanda is becoming a more cohesive society and people are living together in relative harmony in most local communities. There is a very strong sense of identity with Rwanda, of pride in being a Rwandan citizen and people feel part of their local community. There is, however, less evidence of people having links outside their local community whether with other communities or by being linked into hierarchical social and administrative layers. Given the high levels of economic inequalities and the urban-rural divide this could lead to new divisions and conflicts based on socio-economic inequalities.
 - Government is experienced as top down and there is little sense that ordinary Rwandans feel that they have say in decision making even at a very local level.
 - Nonetheless the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus have undoubtedly played a role in rebuilding the social fabric and trust thus enabling people to live together in harmony and to work together to build a shared future. By building social cohesion they provide a context which is essential for the rebuilding of the economy.
- However, the contribution of the mechanisms cannot be untangled from the contribution of other policies and developments that have improved people's lives and their sense that things will continue to get better.
- A majority of Rwandans think that life has improved over the last five years and are confident that it will improve over the next five years. What ordinary Rwandans want is economic security, personal security and to be able to live in peace and harmony with family and neighbours. They want to have enough to eat; employment especially for youth; to be able to save to mitigate shocks and invest in income generating activities; accessible markets to sell surplus produce in; accessible quality education for their children; affordable mutual health insurance; roads, electricity, clean water and hygienic sanitation; decent housing; affordable access to fertilizers; a responsive police force; local leaders that are not corrupt and include the community in decision making; effective means of resolving conflicts; and socially and economically inclusive communities with social protection for the poorest and most vulnerable.
 - Ordinary Rwandans do recognise social cleavages that are seen

as having the potential to cause disharmony and conflict most notably the division between the poor and the better off and between genocide survivors and perpetrators. The most frequent causes of conflict and disputes were said to be family conflict and disputes over land. In some communities such conflicts were said to be declining but this was certainly not universally the case and the frequency with which the community was said to meet to resolve conflicts suggests that they are rife. Gender based violence was also seen as a significant problem in most communities generally attributed to the consumption of alcohol or male infidelity. Theft, alcoholism and drug abuse were seen as problematic in some communities and witchcraft was also raised as a concern in several.

- Rwandans do want to live and work in harmony as one people. This is fragile and depends on ensuring that everyone feels that they have a stake in society; that their interests are being addressed and their needs meet. Also, central to this are continued economic growth and social cohesion with the latter requiring the building of trust in other people and confidence in Government, forces of law and order and civil society.
- There are very high levels of confidence in Government at all levels and the forces of law and order, but marginally less in the media and religious institutions. There are also high levels of trust in family and neighbours. The

qualitative work suggests that confidence in Government and the forces of law and order may not be as high as the survey suggests with a number of communities rising concerns about unresponsive police. In a majority of communities the informants either said that they had little trust in members of Senate and the Chamber of Deputies because they had never met them or that they did not know if they trusted them because they had never met them. Where informants said that they trusted them this was generally said to be because they had visited the community.

- Levels of trust in other people are marginally lower but still comparatively higher and much higher than other recent surveys including the Women's Economic Empowerment Survey carried out in 2011 and the African Values survey in 2010. The informants in the qualitative work were quite clear what they meant when they said that they trusted other people; they trust people they know and interact with on a regular basis. They trust people they would be prepared to leave their children with and people they would lend money to. Even then trust is contingent and has to be earned. There is little evidence of trusting other people in general.
- The policies for rebuilding the political and social fabric of the country are clearly influenced by those that have been shown to enable the rebuilding of cohesive societies in post conflict situations.

Rwanda has forged a unique path based on creating a single national identity and Government sponsored mechanisms for creating social capital through Dialogue and Consensus. Participation is often compulsory or highly encouraged and little capacity building has been provided for working in such groups.

- People are working together in communities to resolve issues and disputes but it is much more difficult to demonstrate a causal link between this and the building of trust and greater social cohesion. Other policies are also likely to influence a change in levels of trust, greater confidence in political, legal and civil institutions and people's sense of wellbeing and confidence in a better future. Disentangling the contribution of the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus is not possible in the absence of longitudinal data. The best that can be said is that as things are improving then, unless there is evidence to the contrary, the mechanisms are making a contribution.
- It is evident from the qualitative work that for some of the mechanisms there is a very strong feeling of top down control especially for *Umuganda*. The degree of control questions the quality of and experience of participation in some of the mechanisms reviewed.
- Where ordinary Rwandans did seem to engage in Dialogue and Consensus was in solving disputes between members of

the community, most frequently between members of families. The community, or more frequently, the immediate neighbours of the people in dispute would discuss possible ways of resolving the problem and make an agreed recommendation.

- In trying to understand the extent to which the mechanisms are contributing to the building social cohesion we can look at the logical connection or chain of connection from knowledge of the mechanisms, to active participation, to levels of trust and hence to social cohesion. Given the total breakdown of trust following the Genocide against Tutsi, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be safe to assume that, if there is a difference in levels of general trust between those who do and do not participate, the mechanisms have contributed to the difference.
- There is a relatively high level of community engagement with 84 per cent of respondents to the survey having participated in community activities in the year preceding the survey and 76 per cent having worked with others to develop a programme. This high level of engagement was confirmed by those who participated in FGDs.
- The level of engagement in civil society organisations is much lower with little evidence of multiple memberships. In total 37 per cent of respondents are members of one or more but with the vast majority belonging just to one. Typical members are again married men in midlife with completed primary

school education and not living in urban areas.

- There is a high level of knowledge of the mechanisms that operate at a local level, especially *Gacaca* (96.6%) and *Umuganda* (99.7%), but a much lower level of knowledge about national level mechanisms. Only 11 per cent of respondents had heard of all the mechanisms but just over half had heard of 80 per cent of them.
- The most important source of information about most of the mechanisms is local leaders, followed by friends. The radio is also a relatively important source of information but very few people get information from TV or newspapers. However, in the case of the National dialogue Summit the main source of information is the radio.
- 95 per cent of respondents had some engagement with at least one mechanism and had participated because they thought the activity was important. However, frequent and multiple engagements with mechanisms is much lower.
- Taking into account the responses to the survey and what informants told us in the FGDs the most valued mechanisms are *Umuganda*, the *Abunzi* and *Girinka*. *Umuganda* was valued most for providing an opportunity to get information on Government projects and programmes although that infrastructure improvements are the outcome from community work were also appreciated.

The *Abunzi* are credited with having

contributed to the significant decline in interpersonal disputes both directly by adjudicating on disputes but also because community members have learnt from their example how to resolve disputes without recourse to them. *Gacaca* is also very highly valued and the outcomes from the process are credited with enabling survivors and perpetrators to live in relative harmony in the community and get on with their lives. However, we were told in a noticeable number of communities that the failure of some perpetrators to pay the agreed compensation was causing ongoing tensions.

- There is little evidence that the mechanisms are enabling ordinary Rwandans to engage in dialogue and reach consensus to agree development initiatives and community projects that enables the building of social cohesion by the development of an understanding of the collective interests of the community. There is, however, evidence that in many communities neighbours and even the whole village discuss and agree recommendations for individuals resolving interpersonal disputes.
- One potential negative outcome of the resolution of interpersonal disputes through Dialogue and Consensus is that much anti-social behaviour and crime does not get officially recorded and perpetrators and victims may not get the professional support and advice they need. This is especially the case with gender based violence and violence against children

- Ninety-two per cent of respondents to the survey said they feel that they belong to the community in which they live. However, only 70 per cent would definitely prefer not to live elsewhere and 20 per cent would like to move away as soon as possible. Although 76 per cent think that everyone in their community is striving to achieve the same goals, only 39 per cent think that community members are prepared to put the interests of the community above their own interests. There is no evidence that strength of identity with the local community is related to participation in the mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus.
- There is confidence in the ability of members of a community to work together on community projects (87%) but less confidence in their ability to do so without conflict (51%) or that they can actually work together to solve a problem (51%). There is little evidence of altruism. Most people are said to be motivated by self-interest (73%) although 70 per cent of respondents thought that people could be relied on to fulfil their obligations.
- Only 59 per cent of respondents to the survey thought that their community has the skills, knowledge and abilities to tackle issues of division and genocide - although 78 per cent thought that their community was better prepared to tackle these issues than five years ago.
- Fear of crime is one measure of community cohesion. Cohesive communities can work together to take action to reduce crime and having good connections with neighbours can act as a buffer. High fear of crime can reduce confidence in the police and Government. Levels of fear of crime are comparatively low but not negligible as measured by responses to the survey. However, in the FGDs frequent reference was made to domestic violence being a major concern and in a majority theft was also talked about.
- Trust is significantly higher amongst those who participate in community activities and civil society organisations but in the absence of longitudinal data it is not possible to say if this is because participation increases trust or more trusting people are more likely to participate. Regression analysis shows that the main influences on trust are frequently attending community meetings, high community engagement and being involved in community problem solving. There are no difference between men and women, by age or by level of education.
- It is clear that people think that life is getting better but there are nevertheless people dissatisfied with their lives. We were constantly told in the FGDs and the key informant interviews that things are getting better but that most people felt that things needed to improve a lot more before they would feel satisfied with their lives. On a 10 point scale the mean for general satisfaction with life was

5.1 suggesting that people are relatively dissatisfied.

- Building social cohesion requires more than putting in place mechanisms to specifically build trust. It requires that citizens feel that they have a stake in the existing social arrangements and are valued members of society. This means ensuring that peoples' basic needs are met as well as fighting social exclusion, making politicians and other leaders accountable to the electorate and more generally building social inclusion, trust and social cohesion. The Social Quality Model enables us to see how policies for economic security, social integration, social inclusion and empowerment interact and mutually support each other in deliver a way of life that people value.
- Regression analysis shows that the main influence on life satisfaction is economic circumstances and especially people's perception of their household's economic situation relative to others.
- It is evident that improving the economic circumstances of ordinary Rwandans and ensuring economic security makes the strongest contribution to people's sense of wellbeing and there is a strong influence on increased trust and increased social cohesion. Mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus make a direct and indirect contribution to the increase in social cohesion. They make a direct contribution by building trust through participation in solving

community problems thereby building a common understanding of what is in the interest of the community. Indirectly the increase in social capital itself provides an important context for economic activities which enable individuals to improve their economic situation and contribute more generally to economic growth.

11.2. Recommendations

Policy Recommendations

- The Government of Rwanda should continue to combine policies for economic growth and transformation with pro-poor policies and to promote good governance in order to ensure an increase in inclusive community and civil society engagement amongst different segments of the population;
- The Government of Rwanda should continue to sensitize Rwandans to use Dialogue and Consensus as a way of overcoming their problems;
- The Government of Rwanda should explore ways of ensuring that genocide perpetrators that have failed to do so make the payments to survivors agreed by the *Gacaca* Courts as not doing so may prove to be a setback to reconciliation ;
- The Government of Rwanda should explore ways of publicising all mechanisms for dialogue operating at the national level, namely the National dialogue Summit and the Forum of Political Parties, so that all Rwandans are aware of their existence and their purpose.

- The Government of Rwanda should explore ways of increasing frequent and multiple engagements with mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus especially in urban areas. This can be done by the ongoing capacity building of local leaders, especially at the village level, on how to better engage the community with mechanisms for Dialogue and Consensus;
- The Government of Rwanda should find appropriate ways to improve the service delivery of local Government in order to increase the trust of citizens in local Government and among themselves;
- The Government of Rwanda should encourage greater participation by youth in the National Youth Council at a local level through concrete actions. There is a need for engaging youth in decision making and debate because youth are future leaders and a potential force for social transformation;
- The Government of Rwanda should strengthen linkages between councils at village level to encourage cross community bridges and vertical linkages and give more voice to youth and women;
- The Government of Rwanda should ensure that ordinary Rwandans feel that they are able to make a contribution to the development of their community and the country more generally and ensure that a sense of ownership policies is increased and decision making is not perceived as top down;
- The Government of Rwanda should continue to explore ways of increasing the capabilities of communities to tackle issues such as divisionism and promoting a sense of solidarity and altruism.
- The Government of Rwanda should ensure that community policing is responsive to local communities and that the police explain laws and legal procedures. A particular emphasize should be put on explaining that detention is an exception and that correction is different from judicial punishment ;
- Members of Senate together with members of the House of Representatives should consider ways of increasing interaction with citizens by putting in place strategies for improving their visibility in local communities. Especially appreciated are members of parliament participating in *Umuganda* with members of a community;
- Civil society organizations, political parties and faith based organizations should engage in the process of promoting and reinforcing Dialogue and Consensus in local communities.

References

- Abbott, P. (2011). *Raising the Productivity and Reducing the Risk of Household Enterprises: Fieldwork Report*. Kigali: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research –Rwanda.
- Abbott, P., Malunda, D. and Festo, N. (2013). *Rwanda Case Study for the 2013 European Development Report*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Abbott, P. and Rwirahira, J. (2012) *Against the Odds: Achieving the MDGs in Rwanda*. Kigali: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research - Rwanda.
- Abbott, P., Rwirahira, J., (2012) *Situational Analysis of Historically Marginalised People*. Kigali: Ministry of Local Government.
- Abbott, P. and C. Wallace (2012a). Social Quality: A Way to Measure the Quality of Society. *Social Indicators Research* 108 (1): 153-167.
- Abbott, P. and C. Wallace (2012b). Happiness in Post-Conflict Rwanda. *Happiness across Cultures: Views of Happiness and Quality of Life in Non-Western Cultures*. H. Selin and G. Davey. London, Springer Verlag. 6: 361-376.
- Allen, A, (1999). Solidarity After Identity politics:Hannah Ardent and the Power of Feminist theory, *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 25:1, 97-118.
- Shyaka, A. (ed) (2010). Governance for Production and Development: Understanding the Concept and Exploring its Applicability in Rwanda. *Rwanda Governance Review* 1: Special Issue, 1-58.
- Amstutz, M. R. (2006). Is Reconciliation after Genocide Possible? The Case of Rwanda. *Journal of Church and State* 48: 546.
- Asian Development Bank (2005). *Poverty in the Philippines: Income, Assets and Access*. Manila: AD
- Brune, N. , Bossert, T., Bowser, D. and Solis, F. (2005). *Building Social Capital through Human Capital Development Programms in Rural Nicaragua: An Evaluation of MSH Management and Leadership Programmes in Wasala and Pantasma*. Management and Leadership Project. Harvard: Harvard School of Public Health and Management Science.
- Brunkhorst, H. (2005). *Solidarity: from Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community*. Canmbridge, MA:MIT Press.
- Cliffe,S., Guggenheim, S. and Kostner, M.(2003).*Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions*. CPR Working Paper 7.

- Clark, P. (2010). *The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Coleman, J. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (supplement): S95-S120.
- Colletta, N. J. and Cullen, M. (2000). *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia and Rwanda*. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- Colletta, N. J., Lim, T. G. and Kelles-Viitanen, A. (2001). *Social Cohesion and Conflict Prevention in Asia*. (eds) Washington DC: The World Bank.
- Colletta, N. J., Lim, T. G. and Kelles-Viitanen, A. (2001). Social Cohesion in Southeast Asia: From Economic Miracle to Social Crisis in Colletta, N. J., Lim, T. G. and Kelles-Viitanen, A. (eds)
- Dean, J. (1996). *The Solidarity of Strangers: Feminism after Identity Politics*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Dean, J. (1995). Reflections Solidarity. *Constellations* 2 :114-40.
- Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2008). *Building Trust Through Civic Engagement*. New York: United Nations.
- Dulal, H. B. and Foa, R (2011). *Social Institutions as a Form of Intangible Capital*. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, Working paper No 2011-01.
- Easterley, W. and Levine, R(1997). Arica's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112: 1204-1249
- Evans, P. (1996). Government Action, Social Capital and Development: Reviewing the Evidence of Synergy. *World Development* 24: 1119-1132.
- Falk, I. and Kilpatrick, S. (1999). *What is Social Capital? A Study of Integration in a Rural Community*. Paper D5?1999 CRLRA Discussion Paper. Tasmania: University of Tasmania.
- Ferreira, S. and Hamilton, K. (2010). *Comprehensive Wealth, Intangible Capital and Development*. The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5452. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- Fox, J. (1996). How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in Rural Mexico. *World Development* 24: 1089-1103.
- Gender Monitoring Office (2013). *Gender Based Violence in Primary and Secondary Schools in Rwanda*. Kigali: Republic of Rwanda.
- Gibson, J. L. (2004). *Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?* Cape Town and New York: HTRS Press and Russell Sage.

- Giddens, A. (1994). *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*, Standford: Standford University Press.
- Green, A., Janmaat, G. and Han, C. (2009). *Regimes of Social Cohesion*. London: Centre for Learning and life Chances in Knowledge Economies and Societies at <http://www.llakes.org.uk> last accessed 14/03.2013
- Green, A., Preston, J. and Janmatt, G. (2006). *Education, Equality and Social Cohesion*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Grootaert, C. and van Bastelaer, T. (2002). *The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical Assessment*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Grootaert, C and van Bastelaer, T. (2001). *Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A synthesis of Findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital Initiative*. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- Hamilton, K. and Ruta, G. (2006). *Measuring Social Welfare and Sustainability*. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- Hamm, B. (2001). A Human Rights Approach to Development, *Human Rights Quarterly* 23:1005-1031.
- Hutton, S. and Redmond, G. (2000). *Poverty in Transition Economies*. London: Routledge.
- Interpeace (2010). *Identité Ethnique et Cohésion Sociale au Rwanda: Analyse Critique des Défis Politiques et Socio-économiques*. Kigali: Institute of Research for dialogue and Peace.
- Johnson, N. (2008). *Citizenship, Cohesion and Solidarity*. London: The Smith Institute.
- Kaur-Stubbs, S. (2008). Poverty and Solidarity in Johnson, N. (ed). *Op cit*.
- Knack, S. (1999). *Social Capital, Growth and Poverty: A Survey of Cross-Country Evidence*, SCI Working Paper No 7. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*: 122, 1251-1288.
- Kriesberg, L. (2007). Is Reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis Possible? *Journal of International Affairs* 60: 164.
- Kostner, M. and Kuehnast, K. (2001). Building Cooperation in Post-conflict Areas: Rwanda Community Reintegration and Development Project. *Social Development Notes* 59: 1.
- Lawrence, J. and Heath, A. C. (2008). *Predictions of community Cohesion: Multi-Level Modelling of the 2005 Citizenship Survey*. London: Department of Communities and Local Government.

Lijphart, A. (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1999) *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Maslow, A. H. (1954). *Motivation and Personality*. New York: Harper.

Maslow, A. H. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation, *Psychological Review* 50: 4.

Melvin, J. (2012). *Veneer of Reconciliation: Human Rights and Democracy in Rwanda*. London: Commonwealth Advisory Bureau.

Ministry of local Government (2011). *Decentralisation Implementation Plan 2011-15*. Kigali: Republic of Rwanda.

Moody, J. and White, D. R. (2003). Structural Cohesion and Embeddiness: A Hierarchical Concept of Social Groups. *American Sociological Review* 68: 104-.

Musoni, P. (2007). Rebuilding Trust in a Post-conflict Situation through Civic Engagement: The Experience of Rwanda. Paper presented at the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government; Vienna, Austria, June. <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan026588.pdf> last accessed 17/03/2013.

Nadjaldongar, R. (2008). Lessons Learnt from post-Conflict Reconstruction in Rwanda. Paper

given at the Regional Workshop on Post-conflict and Development (*for the development of a regional post-conflict reconstruction policy*) Abidjan, June <http://www.oecd.org/countries/rwanda/41425587.pdf> last accessed 17/03/2013.

National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (2010a). *Social Cohesion in Rwanda*. Kigali: Republic of Rwanda.

National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (2010b). *Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer*. Kigali: Republic of Rwanda.

National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (2007). *The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation*. Kigali: Republic of Rwanda.

Naranyan, D. (1997). *Voices of the Poor: Poverty and Social Capital in Tanzania*. Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Studies and Monograph Series 20. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Narayan, D. and Pritchett, L. (1999). Cents and Sociability: Household Income and Social Capital in Rural Tanzania. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*: 47, 871-897.

Okunmadewa, F. Y., Olaniyan, O. Yusuf, S. A., Bankole, A.S. Oyeranti, O. A., Omonona, B. T., Awoyemi, T. T. and Kolawole, K. (2005). *Human Capital, Institutions and Poverty in Rural Nigeria*. Research Report Submitted to African Economic Research Consortium

AERC for the second Phase of Collaborative Poverty Research Project.

Official Gazette (2004). *Organic Law No 16 of 2004 of 14/06/2004 Establishing the Gacaca Courts*. Kigali: Republic of Rwanda.

Pahl, R. E. (1991). The Search for Social Cohesion: from Durkheim to the European Commission. *European Journal of Sociology* XXXII: 345-360.

Potapchuck, A., Crocker, J., Schechter, W. and Boogaard, D. (1997). *Building Community: Exploring the Role of Social Capital and Local Government*. Washington DC: Programme for Community Problem Solving.

Portes, A. and Landolt, P. (2000). Social Capital : Promise and Pitfalls of its Role in Development, *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32: 129-47.

Purdekova, A. (2011a). *Rwanda's Ingando Camps: Liminality and the Reproduction of Power*. Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper No 80. Oxford: University of Oxford,

Purdekova, A. (2011b) 'Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes': Surveillance and State Reach in Rwanda. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 49: 475-497.

Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Putnam, R. D. (1993a). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditon in Modern Italy*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1993b). The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life. *The American Prospect* 13: 36-42.

Rogoff, I. and Schneide.R. F. (2007). Productive Anticipation, in Held, D., Moore, H. and Young, K. (eds) *Cultural Politics in a Global Age: Uncertainty, Solidarity and Innovation*. Oxford: OneWorld.

Scott, Z. (2009). *Decentralisation , Local Development and Social Cohesion: An Analytical Review*. Birmingham: The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham, UK.

Sen, A. (1999). *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shway, N. (2011). Rwanda Genocide: Causes and Consequences. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/44704253/Rwanda-Genocide-Causes-and-Consequences> last accessed 17/03/2013.

Skocpol, T. (1996). Unravelling from Above. *The American Prospect* 25:20-25.

Stanley, D. (2003). What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal Government's Social Cohesion Research Network.

Canadian Journal of Sociology 28: 5-17.

Thomas, A., Viciani, L., Tench, J., Sharpe, R., Hall, M., Martin, M. and Watts, R. (2011) *Real Aid 3: Ending Aid Dependency*. London: ActionAid.

van Rijn, F., Bulte, E. and Adekunle, A. (2012). Social Capital and Agricultural Innovation in sub-Saharan Africa, *Agricultural Systems* 108: 112-122.

Vervisch, T., Titeca, K., Vlassenroot, K and Braeckman (2013). Social Capital and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Burundi: The Limits of Community-based Reconstruction. *Development and Challenge* 44: 147-174.

Warner, M. (2001). Building Social Capital: The Role of Local Government. *The Journal of Socio-Economic* 30: 187-192.

Warner, M. (1999). Social Capital Construction and the Role of the Local State. *Rural Sociology* 64: 373-393.

Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K (2010). *The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Woolcock, M and Narayan, D. (2000). Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research and Policy. *World Bank Research Observer* 15: 225-250.

World Bank (2006). *Where is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring Capital in the 21st Century*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Appendices

Appendix 1:

People Involved in the Study and their Respective Roles in the Project

Members of the Senate Ad Hoc Committee

Dr. Jean Damascène BIZIMANA

Professor Chrysologue KARANGWA

Tito RUTAREMARA

Professor Laurent NKUSI

Authors

1. Pamela ABBOTT, Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, Rwanda

2. Roger MUGISHA M., Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, Rwanda

3. Guy LODGE, Institute of Policy Research, London, UK.

Associate Researchers

Paul KAYIRA: Research Assistant, IPAR-Rwanda

Lillian MUTESI: Research Fellow, IPAR-Rwanda

John RWIRAHIRA: Research Fellow, IPAR-Rwanda

Appendix 2:

Comparison of the Senate Sample with EICV-3 and FinScope 2012 Weighted Data

Compared with the findings from the 2012 Census our sample over represents the City of Kigali by about five per cent and under represents the Eastern Province by four per cent and Western Provinces by just under two per cent. Compared with FinScope 2012 which used the 2012 classification of urban and rural our sample slightly over represents the urban population and correspondingly underestimated the semi-urban. We had 50/50 per cent men and women in our sample which indicates an under representation of women aged 18 years and over by about nine per cent compared to EICV3. The mean age of our sample was higher than that for EICV 3 40.5 years compared with 36.7 years. Our sample significantly under represents the under 25 year olds (15% compared with 31%) and over represents the 36-50 year olds (32% compared to 23%) and marginally over represents other age groups. Not surprisingly given the under sampling of the youngest age group our sample under represents single people (13% compared with 30.5%) and over represents married couples. Our sample under represents those with no educational qualifications (54.4% compared to 64.2%) and over represents those with a primary school leaving certificate by six per cent and some secondary schooling by three per cent. The sample has a slightly smaller proportion of non-workers (14% compared to 18%) but the proportions doing farm and non-farm work as their main activity are much the same. Compared to FinScope 2012 our sample under represents the proportion of households in *Ubudehe* Categories 2 (21.4% compared to 25.5 %) and 4 (4.7% compared to 8.4%) and over represents those in Category 3 (67.7% compared to 50.3%). However, there is little difference if we dichotomise between Categories 1 and 2 and other (27% compared with 30% in the bottom 2 categories). 30 per cent of our sample said that they have a disability or illness that limits their daily life while 37 per cent of the respondents to FinScope 2012 said that they had poor health. This compares to the eight per cent that are reported as having a severe disability in EICV3.



KIMIHURURA, P.O. BOX 273 Kigali - Rwanda,
Tel: +250 0252 570741 Fax: +250 0252 570740
www.ipar-rwanda.org, e-mail: info@ipar-rwanda.org



This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 4.0 License.

To view a copy of the license please see:
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
<http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/>